Filed: Feb. 22, 2016
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 3/11/16 GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through their respective Counsel, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 19, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the statu
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 3/11/16 GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , Senior District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through their respective Counsel, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 19, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER TO CONTINUE CASE TO 3/11/16
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through their respective Counsel, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 19, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until March 11, 2016, and to exclude time between February 19, 2016, and March 11, 2016, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendants desires additional time to consult with their clients, continue to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
b) Counsel for defendants believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) The government does not object to the continuance.
d) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 19, 2016, to March 11, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: February 18, 2016 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
/s/ Jill Thomas
JILL THOMAS
Assistant United States Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
