STIPULATION AND ORDER VACATING DATE, CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING TIME; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge.

STIPULATION

Defendant Jacob Mora, by and through his counsel of record, and plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. On February 4, 2016, the Honorable Burrell signed the order, continuing the status conference to March 4, 2016. See Dkt. No. 28.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until April 15, 2016 and to exclude time between December 11, 2015 and April 15, 2016 under Local Code T4. The government does not object to the continuance.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The new offer from the government includes a plea to a different charge, and the defense is researching and reviewing this with the client. The defense has also proposed a new counter offer and the U.S. Assistant Attorney is reviewing it with her supervisor. The defense feels that the case is close to resolution and requests time to work out the terms of a deal.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 11, 2015 to March 4, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.