GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, Assistant United States Attorney Samuel Wong, defendant Juan Munoz-Herrera, by and through his counsel of record Candice L. Fields, and defendant Otilia Maldonado-Vargas, by and through her counsel of record Clemente M. Jimenez, hereby stipulate to continue the previously set status conference from March 4, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. and set the matter for a status conference/change of plea hearing on April 8, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. for the reasons set forth below.
Counsel for defendant Munoz-Herrera for defendant Munoz-Herrera is requesting this continuance so that the parties can finalize the terms of a plea agreement (forwarded to her on March 2, 2016 by the Government), and allow her time to explain the ramifications of the plea agreement versus the risks of proceeding to trial to her client. These tasks are made more difficult because Munoz-Herrera's primary language is Spanish and the services of a Spanish/English interpreter will be necessary to accomplish these tasks.
Defendant Maldonado-Vargas also desires a continuance of her status conference to the new date to provide her counsel time to conduct additional investigation and present to the United States additional mitigating information in her defense before resolving the prosecution against her.
The parties agree that the Court should find that the failure to grant this requested continuance would deny respective counsel for both defendants reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and deny Munoz-Herrera continuity of counsel. The parties further agree and request that the Court find that the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a trial within the time periods prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 4, 2016 and April 8, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of the parties, it is ordered that the status conference presently set for March 4, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., shall be continued for a status conference/change of plea on April 8, 2016, at 9:00 a.m. Based on the representations of the parties in their stipulation, the Court finds that the failure to grant this requested continuance would deny respective counsel for both defendants reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and deny Munoz-Herrera continuity of counsel. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 4, 2016 through April 8, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because the results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
IT IS SO ORDERED.