MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
Plaintiff Knolts Hutchinson ("Plaintiff") is a disabled inmate at the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's ("CDCR") California Medical Facility ("CMF"). Through counsel, Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants CDCR, CMF Warden Vimal Singh, and Correctional Officer M. Scott (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehab Act"). Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 29. Plaintiff filed an Opposition (ECF No. 33), and Defendants filed a Reply (ECF No. 34). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
Plaintiff is paralyzed below the chest. He is unable to stand or walk, and he requires a wheelchair to ambulate at all times. He has use of his arms and hands, but has limited dexterity. He was housed at CMF, where Defendant Singh was the warden and Defendant Scott was a correctional officer, at all times relevant to this action.
Plaintiff was first issued a large in-cell locker to store his medical supplies. In early October 2011, however, officials replaced the large locker in Plaintiff's cell with a smaller one. On October 15, 2011, Plaintiff submitted a formal request to replace the smaller locker with his previous locker because he could not reach down and access the small locker from its position on the floor. In response to this request, Defendant Scott placed the small, metal locker on plastic milk crates. On October 17, 2011, at approximately 4:15 a.m., Plaintiff attempted to access the small locker when it fell off of the milk crates and on top of him. He was trapped under the locker for over an hour.
On October 28, 2011, prison officials delivered a larger replacement locker to Plaintiff's cell. However, the officials positioned the new locker in such a manner that the door opened toward and into Plaintiff's bed, rendering the locker inaccessible to Plaintiff. When Plaintiff alerted prison officials that he could not access his locker, Defendants responded by turning the locker upside down. Plaintiff again requested a new locker stating that the inverted locker was unstable. Prison officials responded by turning the locker right side up and removing the door. Without a door on the locker, Plaintiff experienced problems with other inmates stealing his medical supplies when he was not in his cell and Plaintiff was forced to change his adult diapers and complete his bowel program in the full view of other inmates and correctional staff.
Plaintiff proceeds on his ADA and Rehab Act claims.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for summary judgment when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
In a summary judgment motion, the moving party always bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the portions in the record "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."
In attempting to establish the existence or non-existence of a genuine factual dispute, the party must support its assertion by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits[,] or declarations . . . or other materials; or showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The opposing party must demonstrate that the fact in contention is material, i.e., a fact that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.
In resolving a summary judgment motion, the evidence of the opposing party is to be believed, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the facts placed before the court must be drawn in favor of the opposing party.
Defendants seek summary judgment on Plaintiff's ADA and Rehab Act claims. The ADA and the Rehab Act both prohibit a public entity from discriminating against an individual because of his disability.
Title II of the ADA was modeled after § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff is a disabled individual or that Defendant CDCR is a public entity. Thus, the first element and part of the second element of Plaintiff's ADA claim are met.
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because "there was no discrimination against Hutchinson based on the fact that his larger locker was replaced with a smaller one." Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 4. Specifically, Defendants argue that because their official guidelines are void of any specific requirements to provide disabled inmates with lockers, there was no discrimination by replacing Plaintiff's large locker with a smaller one.
Defendants read Plaintiff's allegations too narrowly. Plaintiff's claims are not confined to, nor do they focus on, Defendants' initial decision to replace his large locker with a smaller locker. In fact, Plaintiff concedes that there is no objective discrimination in replacing an inmate's large locker with a smaller one. ECF No. 33 at 8. Rather, Plaintiff contends that the denial of benefits and discrimination was in Defendants' failure to provide Plaintiff with accommodations—specifically, an accessible locker—equivalent to that provided to nondisabled inmates in the custody of CDCR.
The Court is satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was denied the benefits of Defendants' services or otherwise discriminated against because he was the only inmate who was not afforded an accessible locker. As Plaintiff has been a paraplegic since 1990, Defendants were aware of Plaintiff's disability when they replaced his large locker with a smaller one. Defendants were thus aware that Plaintiff's disability would make it difficult for him to reach down and access a small locker. If Defendants were not so aware, they were made aware when Plaintiff submitted an administrative request to provide him with his old, large locker because the new, small locker was inaccessible to him. Rather than provide Plaintiff with a large locker, Defendants responded to Plaintiff's request by stationing the new, small locker on top of plastic milk crates. Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 33-1, at 2. While attempting to access the small locker, it fell on top of Plaintiff and trapped him beneath it for over an hour.
According to Plaintiff, Defendants' lack of concern for accommodating Plaintiff's disability did not stop there. Two weeks after the small locker fell on Plaintiff, Defendants provided him with a large locker but positioned it in such a manner that it was inaccessible to him.
Defendants do not contend that non-disabled inmates were subject to the same or similar treatment that Plaintiff received. Rather, it appears this treatment was unique to Plaintiff. If Plaintiff was not disabled, Defendants' actions would not have been problematic. However, Plaintiff is disabled and confined to a wheelchair, limiting his ability to access his cell locker relative to non-disabled inmates in the custody of CDCR.
Thus, construing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the Court finds that a reasonable jury could determine Defendants' actions amounted to a denial of CDCR's services, programs, or activities, or otherwise amounted to a form of discrimination against Plaintiff, thereby satisfying the second element of Plaintiff's ADA claim.
To succeed on his ADA and Rehab Act claims, Plaintiff must also prove that the discrimination he suffered was "by reason of his disability."
Defendants proffer two reasons for why Plaintiff's locker was replaced, arguing neither was because of Plaintiff's disability. Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 5. First, Defendants contend that their actions were pursuant to and consistent with a penological policy of phasing out large lockers in favor of smaller lockers at all CDCR institutions.
Again, Defendants read Plaintiff's allegations too narrowly. Plaintiff does not base his claims on the replacement of his large locker. Rather, Plaintiff maintains that Defendants' failure to account for his disabled status resulted in a denial of benefits and discrimination when Defendants: (1) replaced his large locker with a smaller locker, (2) positioned the small locker on top of plastic milk crates, (3) positioned the replacement locker too close to his bed, (4) turned the locker upside down, and finally (5) when Defendants removed the door of his locker.
In addition, Plaintiff disputes that his locker was replaced solely because of CDCR policy. Defendants maintain that CDCR's policy of phasing out large lockers was in place as of 1995.
The second reason proffered by Defendants for replacing Plaintiff's locker is an allegation that Plaintiff was hiding behind the door of his large locker while smoking in his cell. Defendants also cite this as the reason for removing the door on Plaintiff's replacement locker when it was returned to its upright position. Plaintiff, however, adamantly disputes this allegation and emphasizes that Defendants failed to provide any disciplinary actions or rules violations reports in support of it. This amounts to a genuine dispute of a material fact. Accepting Plaintiff's denial of this allegation to be true, a jury could reasonably conclude that the locker door was not removed for Defendants' proffered reason and take this as further evidence of discrimination against Plaintiff.
On balance, the facts before the Court lead it to believe that a reasonable jury could conclude that the alleged denial of benefits and discrimination was by reason of Plaintiff's disability. The small locker would have been accessible if Plaintiff was not disabled, as he would have had the ability to easily bend over and access the material in his locker. Similarly, if Plaintiff were not disabled he may have been able to maneuver his body to access the replacement locker when it was positioned with the door opening into his bed. Although Defendants took action in response to Plaintiff's complaints, they failed to provide what Plaintiff actually requested: an accessible locker. On Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court must construe all of Defendants' actions in replacing Plaintiff's locker in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Applied here, a jury could reasonably conclude that Defendants' actions subjected Plaintiff to "discrimination by reason of his disability," thereby satisfying the third element of Plaintiff's ADA claim.
To recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA, a disabled plaintiff must prove that he or she was intentionally discriminated against by the defendant.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has put forth enough evidence for a jury to conclude that Defendants subjected him to intentional discrimination. Applying the first prong of the Ninth Circuit's test for deliberate indifference when assessing claims under the ADA and the Rehab Act, Plaintiff repeatedly alerted Defendants of his need for an accommodation by requesting that he be given an accessible locker. Pl.'s Opp'n, ECF No. 33, at 2-3. Defendants were thus on notice that an accommodation was required. Because all Defendants were acting on behalf of CDCR and CDCR qualifies as a public entity, Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong of the deliberate indifference test.
Applying the second prong of the Ninth Circuit's test for deliberate indifference under the ADA and the Rehab Act, Defendants' following actions may reasonably be construed by a jury as evidence of failure to undertake a fact-specific investigation of what constitutes a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff: (1) replacing the large locker of a disabled inmate in favor of a small locker without accounting for the disabled inmate's inability to access the new locker; (2) placing the small locker on top of milk crates in response to Plaintiff's complaint that the locker was inaccessible and his request for a large locker; (3) replacing the small locker with a large locker only after the small locker fell from the milk crates fell and trapped Plaintiff beneath it; (4) placing the large locker in such a position that it was inaccessible to Plaintiff; (4) flipping the locker upside down thereby making the locker unstable in response to Plaintiff's complaint of inaccessibility due to the proximity of the locker to Plaintiff's bed; and (5) placing the large locker right side up and removing the door, thus exposing Plaintiff's valuables and medical supplies to the prison population and forcing Plaintiff to change his adult diapers and complete his bowel program in the full view of the prison population.
Whether Defendant CDCR undertook a fact-specific investigation to determine what constituted a reasonable accommodation for Plaintiff Hutchinson is a material fact of which there is a genuine dispute between the parties. Plaintiff alleges that all of Defendants' actions relating to replacing his locker demonstrate a failure to undergo a fact-specific investigation into what constituted a reasonable accommodation for his disability. Defendants, on the other hand, did not claim to have conducted a fact-specific investigation when filing their Motion; it was not until their Reply that they claimed to have based their responses to Plaintiff's complaints on fact-specific investigations. Resolution of this disputed fact will very likely affect the outcome of this suit because the evidence of whether Defendant conducted a fact-specific investigation into reasonable accommodations for Hutchinson is "such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."
Furthermore, Defendants' arguments that there was no intentional discrimination are unpersuasive. In the relevant part of the Motion, Defendants narrowly focus on the absence of discrimination after Defendants placed Plaintiff's small locker on top of plastic milk crates and that locker fell on top of Plaintiff. Defs.' Mot., ECF No. 29-1, at 7. Defendants admit that the injuries Plaintiff suffered when the small locker fell on him would meet the objective component of deliberate indifference under their view of the law, but argue that there was no deliberate indifference after the small locker was replaced.
The Court is satisfied that these actions could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendants subjected Plaintiff to intentional discrimination. As the Court is equally satisfied that a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has fulfilled all the elements of his ADA and Rehab Act claims, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to those claims.
Although the conduct underlying Plaintiffs claims is attributed to all of the Defendants, Defendants Singh and Scott are named as individual defendants separate and distinct from CDCR. Defendants argue that neither Title II of the ADA nor § 504 of the Rehab Act authorize suits against individuals. However, Plaintiff's Complaint makes clear that he is suing Defendants Singh and Scott in their official capacities, not their individual capacities. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2.
The statutory language of Title II of the ADA does not foreclose suits against public officials in their official capacities.
That does not mean, however, that Defendant CDCR is exempt from liability for the actions of Defendant Singh or Defendant Scott. Claims against persons in their official capacity are considered suits against the entity of which the person serving in the official capacity is an agent.
Accordingly, Defendants Scott and Singh are dismissed from this action. Their conduct will be imputed to Defendant CDCR when assessing whether Plaintiff was subjected to intentional discrimination. If it is determined that Plaintiff was subjected to intentional discrimination, he will be entitled to receive monetary damages from Defendant CDCR, not Defendants Singh and Scott.
Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 29) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Motion is GRANTED to the extent it seeks dismissal of Defendants Singh and Scott; those Defendants are hereby DISMISSED from this action. However, the Motion is DENIED to the extent it seeks summary judgment on Plaintiff's claims under Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehab Act.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
