MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CRAIG M. KELLISON, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, who is proceeding with retained counsel, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. Pursuant to the written consent of all parties, this case is before the undersigned as the presiding judge for all purposes, including entry of final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Pending before the court are plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 11) and defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment (Doc. 14).

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff's father, David Ballard, applied for social security benefits on October 31, 2011. In the application, the claimant alleged that disability began on December 31, 2008. The claim was initially denied. Upon David Ballard's death on July 1, 2013, plaintiff filed a substitution of party on July 15, 2013, and requested an on-the-record decision in lieu of a hearing. In a July 26, 2013, decision, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Mary L. Everstine determined that the claimant had not been disabled from the alleged onset date through the date of his death. The ALJ concluded that, while plaintiff had the impairments of hypertension and type II diabetes, those impairments were not severe, either singly or in combination. After the Appeals Council declined review on December 23, 2014, this appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court reviews the Commissioner's final decision to determine whether it is: (1) based on proper legal standards; and (2) supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. See Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). "Substantial evidence" is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 521 (9th Cir. 1996). It is ". . . such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971). The record as a whole, including both the evidence that supports and detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, must be considered and weighed. See Howard v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1986); Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). The court may not affirm the Commissioner's decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence. See Hammock v. Bowen, 879 F.2d 498, 501 (9th Cir. 1989). If substantial evidence supports the administrative findings, or if there is conflicting evidence supporting a particular finding, the finding of the Commissioner is conclusive. See Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d 1226, 1229-30 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the Commissioner's decision, the decision must be affirmed, see Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002), and may be set aside only if an improper legal standard was applied in weighing the evidence, see Burkhart v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1335, 1338 (9th Cir. 1988).

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff argues: (1) the ALJ failed to include the claimant's coronary artery disease and depression as severe impairments; and (2) the ALJ failed to consider the claimant's work history in assessing credibility.

A. Severity of Impairments

In order to be entitled to benefits, the plaintiff must have an impairment severe enough to significantly limit the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).1 In determining whether a claimant's alleged impairment is sufficiently severe to limit the ability to work, the Commissioner must consider the combined effect of all impairments on the ability to function, without regard to whether each impairment alone would be sufficiently severe. See Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1289-90 (9th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(B); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523 and 416.923. An impairment, or combination of impairments, can only be found to be non-severe if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work. See Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 85-28; see also Yuckert v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 303, 306 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting SSR 85-28). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the severity of the impairment by providing medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508, 416.908. The plaintiff's own statement of symptoms alone is insufficient. See id.

In this case, the ALJ stated: "The claimant had the following medically determinable impairments: hypertension and type II diabetes." Regarding any other impairments, the ALJ stated:

Plaintiff argues:

The court disagrees. As discussed above, a threshold requirement to receive social security benefits is the existence of a medically determinable impairment which is severe, meaning that, at a minimum, it is one that limits the physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. The court accepts the lengthy medical history set forth in plaintiff's brief regarding coronary artery disease and depression. This record, however, at best establishes the existence of medically determinable impairments. Plaintiff has not — nor can he given the lack of evidence — established that these conditions affected the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities.

Plaintiff contends that the findings of agency consultative examining doctor Ursula Taylor, M.D., provide substantial evidence showing the effects of the claimant's impairments on his ability to perform work activities. As to Dr. Taylor's findings, the ALJ stated:

Plaintiff's argument is unpersuasive. A review of Dr. Taylor's report at Exhibit 2F reveals no opinions as to mental functional limitations. Therefore, the doctor's report does not provide substantial evidence with regard to the claimant's depression. Similarly, the doctor made no findings of limitations specific to coronary artery disease. In fact, as to the claimant's cardiovascular function, the doctor noted unremarkable objective findings.

B. Credibility

The Commissioner determines whether a disability applicant is credible, and the court defers to the Commissioner's discretion if the Commissioner used the proper process and provided proper reasons. See Saelee v. Chater, 94 F.3d 520, 522 (9th Cir. 1996). An explicit credibility finding must be supported by specific, cogent reasons. See Rashad v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1229, 1231 (9th Cir. 1990). General findings are insufficient. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 834 (9th Cir. 1995). Rather, the Commissioner must identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the testimony. See id. Moreover, unless there is affirmative evidence in the record of malingering, the Commissioner's reasons for rejecting testimony as not credible must be "clear and convincing." See id.; see also Carmickle v. Commissioner, 533 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Lingenfelter v Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1936 (9th Cir. 2007), and Gregor v. Barnhart, 464 F.3d 968, 972 (9th Cir. 2006)).

If there is objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment, the Commissioner may not discredit a claimant's testimony as to the severity of symptoms merely because they are unsupported by objective medical evidence. See Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 347-48 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). As the Ninth Circuit explained in Smolen v. Chater:

The Commissioner may, however, consider the nature of the symptoms alleged, including aggravating factors, medication, treatment, and functional restrictions. See Bunnell, 947 F.2d at 345-47. In weighing credibility, the Commissioner may also consider: (1) the claimant's reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent testimony; (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment; (3) the claimant's daily activities; (4) work records; and (5) physician and third-party testimony about the nature, severity, and effect of symptoms. See Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 (citations omitted). It is also appropriate to consider whether the claimant cooperated during physical examinations or provided conflicting statements concerning drug and/or alcohol use. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002). If the claimant testifies as to symptoms greater than would normally be produced by a given impairment, the ALJ may disbelieve that testimony provided specific findings are made. See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 (citing Swenson v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 683, 687 (9th Cir. 1989)).

Regarding the claimant's credibility, the ALJ stated:

Plaintiff argues that this analysis is flawed because the ALJ failed to consider the claimant's unbroken 38-year work history. The crux of plaintiff's argument appears to be the notion that someone with such a history would not stop working for any reason other than actual disability and that this bolsters the credibility of the claimant's subjective allegations.

As defendant observes, the analysis in this case ended with the ALJ's conclusion that the claimant did not have severe impairments. At this phase of the analysis, the ALJ properly restricted her discussion to the medical evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508. Thus, the claimant's credibility was irrelevant and any error in failing to consider the claimant's work history was immaterial to the ultimate disability determination. Furthermore, the ALJ properly cited instances of non-compliance with medical advice as a basis to discount the claimant's credibility.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court concludes that the Commissioner's final decision is based on substantial evidence and proper legal analysis. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: