Filed: Mar. 29, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 29, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 24, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Beshiba Cook, by and through her undersigned counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until July 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between March 24, 2016 and July 28, 2016, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipul
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , Chief District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 24, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendant Beshiba Cook, by and through her undersigned counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until July 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between March 24, 2016 and July 28, 2016, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipula..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., Chief District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 24, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, defendant Beshiba Cook, by and through her undersigned
counsel, now moves to continue the status conference until July 28, 2016, at 9:00 a.m., and to exclude time between March 24, 2016 and July 28, 2016, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 2590 pages of investigative reports and related documents and recordings of thousands of wiretap calls. All of this discovery has been produced directly to counsel.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, conduct investigation and research, review discovery, and to discuss potential resolution with his client.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 24, 2016 and July 28, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
Dated: January 5, 2016 BENJAMIN B. WAGNER
United States Attorney
/s/ Jason Hitt (approved via email)
Jason Hitt
Assistant United States Attorney
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
