ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES UNDER EAJA (Doc. 32)

ERICA P. GROSJEAN, Magistrate Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") challenging the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits on November 18, 2011. (Doc. 1.) On November 20, 2012, this Court issued an order and judgment finding that the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision was supported by substantial evidence and was based on proper legal standards. (Docs. 21 and 22.)

Plaintiff timely filed an appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ("Ninth Circuit") on January 10, 2013. (Doc. 23). On August 18, 2015, the Ninth Circuit issued a Memorandum vacating this Court's judgment with instructions that the case be remanded to the Social Security Administration for further consideration. (Docs. 27). A mandate was issued on October 14, 2015. (Doc. 30). On October 16, 2015, this Court remanded the case to the Commissioner. (Doc. 31).

On November 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)) ("EAJA") requesting payment in the amount of $4,565.58, and $14.00 in costs in this Court.1 (Docs. 32 and 37.) Defendant opposes the motion on the basis that the Commissioner's position was substantially justified. (Doc. 36.) Plaintiff also simultaneously filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees at the Ninth Circuit for reimbursement for services rendered for the appeal. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, the Court stayed the instant motion pending the resolution of the Motion for Attorney's Fees at the Ninth Circuit because the same issues were raised in each motion. (Docs. 39 and 40.) On March 10, 2016, the Ninth Circuit awarded $10,755.58 to Plaintiff for attorney's fees and costs. This Court lifted its stay on March 23, 2016. (Doc. 43.) Upon a review of the pleadings, Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A), claimants who successfully challenge an agency decision in a civil action are entitled to reasonable fees and expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) provides as follows:

28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

Thus, when a claimant wins a remand based on an incorrect decision by the Commissioner, attorneys' fees are to be awarded unless the Commissioner shows that she was "substantially justified" in her position, or that special circumstances make an award unjust. Meier v. Colvin, 727 F.3d 867, 869-870 (9th Cir. 2013); see also, Lewis v. Barnhardt, 281 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2002).

Under the EAJA, attorney's fees paid must also be reasonable. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2002). The amount of the fee must be determined based on the particular facts of the case. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983). In making this determination, courts should apply the "lodestar" method to determine what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. To calculate the lodestar amount, the court multiplies "the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation . . . by a reasonable hourly rate." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. The applicant bears the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of the fee request. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984).

II. Analysis

Here, although the Defendant has argued that the Commissioner's position was substantially justified, the Ninth Circuit awarded attorney's fees and costs to Plaintiff's counsel. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Commissioner's position was not substantially justified. Additionally, there are no special circumstances that makes this award unjust. Finally, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's request and finds the amount for attorney's fees and costs to be reasonable.

Plaintiff's counsel requests that the fees be paid directly to the Law Office of Lawrence D. Rohlfing pursuant to an assignment agreement. However, the Court agrees with the Commissioner that any award under the EAJA must be made payable to Plaintiff because the Treasury Offset Program requires that the government consider whether the fees are subject to any government offset. Astrue v. Ratliff, 130 S.Ct. 2521 (2010). If Plaintiff does not owe a government debt that qualifies for the offset, then payment may be made in the name of Plaintiff's counsel based on the government's discretionary waiver of the requirements in the Anti-Assignment Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3727.

ORDER

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

IT IS SO ORDERED.