STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record AUSA JUSTIN LEE, and the Defendant, ELENA GUTIERREZ by and through her counsel of record TASHA CHALFANT, and the Defendant CARL WOODRUFF by and through his counsel of record TODD D. LERAS, hereby stipulate and request that the Court make the following findings and Order as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on April 22, 2016.

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 3, 2016, and to exclude time between April 22, 2016, and June 3, 2016, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 400 pages of investigative reports and related documents in electronic form. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, discuss possible negotiations and explain consequences and guidelines. This case involves an allegation of child abduction in which relevant actions took place in the Eastern and Central Districts of California, the District of Nevada, the Eastern District of Virginia, as well as other locations. As such, the investigation spanned a wide geographical area and required travel by the defense. This investigation was vital to explore potential defenses, identify and obtain evidence in mitigation and prepare for meaningful discussions with respect to resolution. We are now at the stage of being able to discuss potential resolution and any offers which may result need to be discussed with the defendants.

c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 10, 2016, to June 3, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

All counsel have reviewed this proposed order and authorized Tasha Chalfant to sign it on their behalf.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the stipulation of the parties and the recitation of facts contained therein, the Court finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

The Court orders that the time from the date of the parties' stipulation, April 22, 2016, to and including June 3, 2016, status conference hearing date shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B) (iv), and Local Code T4 (reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare). It is further ordered that the presently set April 22, 2016, status conference shall be continued to June 3, 2016, at 9:00 a.m.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.