STIPUATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant THOMAS CHADD, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status. May 13, 2016.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 27, 2016, and to exclude time between May 13, 2016 and May 27, 2016 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The government has provided initial discovery. Further discovery is expected to be produced shortly.

b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to complete the review of discovery, to conduct defense investigation, and to discuss potential resolution with his client. Counsel has also been continuing to engage in negotiations with the government.

c. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 13, 2016 and May 27, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h) (7) (A), B (iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.