JAMES K. SINGLETON, Jr., Senior District Judge.
Vusal Manafov, a state prisoner represented by counsel, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Manafov is in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and incarcerated at Salinas Valley State Prison. Respondent has answered, and Manafov has replied.
On August 15, 2011, Manafov and his co-defendant, Eugene Rice, Jr., were charged with second degree robbery (count 1). The consolidated information further charged Manafov with another count of second degree robbery (count 2) and with personally using a firearm during the commission of the robberies in counts 1 and 2. Manafov and Rice proceeded to a joint jury trial before two different juries. On direct appeal of his conviction, the California Court of Appeal laid out the following facts underlying the charges against Manafov and the evidence presented at trial:
People v. Manafov, No. C069505, 2013 WL 5414106, at *1-4 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2013).
At the conclusion of trial, Manafov's jury found him guilty of both counts of robbery and found true the allegation that he personally used a firearm in committing each offense. The trial court sentenced Manafov to an imprisonment term of 17 years and 4 months.
Through counsel, Manafov appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) Manafov's right to a fair trial was violated by the court's orders regarding his uncharged crimes; 2) trial counsel was ineffective for not moving to limit the admissibility of the uncharged crime evidence and for failing to timely seek the admission of Rice's jail note as evidence of Manafov's state of mind; 3) trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the implausible defenses of legal necessity and intoxication rather than focusing on Manafov's duress defense; 4) the trial court erred in admitting police opinion testimony regarding the identity of robbers in a surveillance video; and 5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of that police testimony. The Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed the judgment against Manafov in an unpublished, reasoned decision issued on September 27, 2013. Manafov, 2013 WL 5414106, at *15. Manafov petitioned for review in the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied on December 18, 2013. Manafov's conviction became final on direct review 90 days later, when his time to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court expired on March 18, 2013. See Jiminez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796, 798 (9th Cir. 2003).
Manafov timely filed a counseled petition to this Court on February 25, 2015. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
In his counseled Petition before this Court, Manafov raises the same arguments he unsuccessfully raised on appeal to the state courts, namely that: 1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of uncharged robberies and allowing Detective Simmons to testify on the surveillance videos; and 2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely seek the admission of Rice's jail note and for presenting multiple defenses.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule that contradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000).
The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002). Where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court `unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'" Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (citation omitted).
To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (holding that it is of no federal concern whether state law was correctly applied). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (a federal habeas court cannot reexamine a state court's interpretation and application of state law); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (presuming that the state court knew and correctly applied state law), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. See Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2002)). A summary denial is an adjudication on the merits and entitled to deference. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
Manafov first challenges his conviction by arguing that the trial court made two reversible errors. The Supreme Court has acknowledged its "traditional reluctance to impose constitutional restraints on ordinary evidentiary rulings by state trial courts." Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 689 (1986). The Supreme Court has further made clear that federal habeas power does not allow granting relief on the basis of a belief that the state trial court incorrectly interpreted the state evidence code in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977); Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
The erroneous admission of evidence does not provide a basis for federal habeas relief unless it rendered the trial fundamentally unfair in violation of due process. Holley v. Yarborough, 568 F.3d 1091, 1101 (9th Cir. 2009). Evidence violates due process only if "there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis omitted). A writ of habeas corpus will be granted for an erroneous admission of evidence "only where the `testimony is almost entirely unreliable and . . . the factfinder and the adversary system will not be competent to uncover, recognize, and take due account of its shortcomings.'" Mancuso v. Olivarez, 292 F.3d 939, 956 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 899 (1983)).
Manafov contends that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of his two uncharged robberies. According to Manafov, the Court of Appeal erred in determining that there were sufficient similarities between the uncharged robberies and the charged offenses to permit the admission of the uncharged robberies to show identity pursuant to California Evidence Code § 1111.
However, the Supreme Court has made clear that federal habeas power does not allow granting relief on the basis of a belief that the state trial court incorrectly interpreted the state evidence code in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973); Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154; Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). On direct appeal, the appellate court determined that, in line with the California Evidence Code and state case law, the trial court properly allowed the uncharged robberies into evidence. This Court is bound by the state court's interpretation of California state law. Bradshaw, 546 U.S. at 76.
Moreover, the United State Supreme Court has left open the question of whether state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of prior crimes evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75 n.5 ("[W]e express no opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of `prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime."); Mejia v. Garcia, 534 F.3d 1036, 1046 (9th Cir. 2008). As such, the Ninth Circuit has routinely found federal habeas relief to be foreclosed by § 2254(d)(1) for claims challenging the admission of evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. See, e.g., Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1066 (9th Cir. 2008); Alberni v. McDaniel, 458 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir. 2006).
Here, because the propensity evidence was properly admitted under California law to prove Manafor's identity, and lacking any clearly established Supreme Court authority prohibiting admission of such evidence, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeal's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, Manafov is not entitled to habeas relief on his claim that the admission of his prior uncharged robberies to prove identity violated his due process.
Manafov additionally argues that the trial court erred in allowing Detective Simmons to opine at trial about the identify of the suspect in the surveillance videos. The Court of Appeal agreed with Manafov that the admission was error, but nonetheless found the error to be harmless. Manafov challenges that finding on the ground that Simmons' status as a police officer unduly influenced the jury.
Manafov's argument is unpersuasive. The Court of Appeal concluded:
Manafov, 2013 WL 5414106, at *15 (citation omitted).
This conclusion is both reasonable and fully supported by the record. The error here was hardly prejudicial as Manafov "was trapped by evidence of an overwhelming quantity both direct and circumstantial. The addition of [Simmons'] testimony was but a small fraction of all that enmeshed" Manafov. See United States v. Burke, 506 F.2d 1165, 1170 (9th Cir. 1974). Manafov thus fails to establish prejudice, and he is not entitled to relief on this claim either.
Manafov additionally claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, a defendant must show both that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one in which "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id.
The Supreme Court has explained that, if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome might have been different as a result of a legal error, the defendant has established prejudice and is entitled to relief. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1385-86 (2012); Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Williams, 529 U.S. at 393-95. Where a habeas petition governed by AEDPA alleges ineffective assistance of counsel, the Strickland prejudice standard is applied and federal courts do not engage in a separate analysis applying the Brecht harmlessness standard. Avila v. Galaza, 297 F.3d 911, 918, n.7 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Musalin v. Lamarque, 555 F.3d 830, 834 (9th Cir. 2009). Under this rubric, in reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims in a federal habeas proceeding:
Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (citations omitted); see also Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 775 (9th Cir. 2012).
Thus, Manafov must show that defense counsel's representation was not within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases, and there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's ineffectiveness, the result would have been different. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). An ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be denied if the petitioner fails to make a sufficient showing under either of the Strickland prongs. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (courts may consider either prong of the test first and need not address both prongs if the defendant fails on one).
Manafov first faults counsel for failing to file a timely and well-supported motion requesting the admission of Rice's jail note to support Manafov's duress defense. At trial, Rice unsuccessfully sought to exclude the seized note, but the court admitted it to show his consciousness of guilt. At the time of Rice's motion, Manafov's counsel indicated that it might be relevant to his client's state of mind. The trial directed counsel to file a motion in limine and include points and authorities if he wished to have that issue considered. After the People rested the case against Manafov, counsel asked to admit the note to show that Rice had threatened Manafov. The court declined to admit the note for that purpose.
Manafov contends that the court declined to admit the note because counsel's request was untimely and did not provide legal support. But the record indicates that, although the trial court reminded counsel that the request should have been made by written motion filed before trial, the court did its own research and found "no evidentiary basis to allow that evidence on behalf of Mr. Manafov." The court explained that, because the note was written two months after the robberies, it had no bearing on Manafov's state of mind when the robberies occurred. The record therefore fully supports the Court of Appeal's determination that "Manafov has not shown a more effective counsel would have succeeded in admitting the note in his case." Manafov, 2013 WL 5414106, at *13. Likewise, the Court of Appeal's alternative conclusion that Manafov failed to demonstrate prejudice from the failure to admit the note is both reasonable and fully supported by the record. Manafov's ineffective assistance claim based on the jail note therefore fails.
Manafov also contends that trial counsel "failed to present a coherent defense theory." Manafov alleges that trial counsel's presentation of legal necessity and intoxication defenses diluted his only viable defense of duress. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Manafov on direct appeal:
Manafov, 2013 WL 5414106, at *14.
As the Court of Appeal reasonably concluded, the record reflects that the evidence of duress was quite weak. It is not reasonably likely that focusing solely on this defense would have resulted in a better outcome. Manafov is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.
Manafov is not entitled to relief on any ground raised in his Petition.
The Clerk of the Court is to enter judgment accordingly.
