EDMUND F. BRENNAN, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges a judgment of conviction entered against him on September 19, 2012, in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of assault with a deadly weapon causing serious bodily injury and battery with serious bodily injury. He seeks federal habeas relief on the grounds that the trial court violated his right to due process in ordering him physically restrained during trial and in failing to instruct the jury to disregard the fact that he was in restraints. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief must be denied.
In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following factual summary:
People v. Gueyger, No. C072520, 2014 WL 4071328, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 3 Dist., Aug. 19, 2014).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief:
For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), "clearly established federal law" consists of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent "may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably." Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be "used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to "determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is "clearly established Federal law" governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it applies a rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court precedent on "materially indistinguishable" facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). Under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
If the state court's decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner's claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.").
The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). "When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption may be overcome by a showing "there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner's claims rejects some claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013).
Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). "Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable." Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of "showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner's claims. Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the state court record to determine whether there was any "reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court "must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. at 102. The petitioner bears "the burden to demonstrate that `there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.'" Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98).
When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner's claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner claims in his first ground for relief that the trial court violated his right to due process by ordering him shackled during trial. ECF No. 1 at 4. He argues that he suffered prejudice from the shackles because they made him "look guilty during my trial." Id. In the traverse, petitioner argues that the shackles were visible to the jury throughout the trial. ECF No. 17 at 3.
On appeal, petitioner also claimed that the trial court violated his right to due process in ordering him to be physically restrained during trial. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 5. He argued it was "fair to assume" that the jury saw petitioner's shackles and therefore knew that he was restrained throughout the trial. Id. at 19. In his opposition brief, respondent argued that because the record did not reflect whether the jurors saw petitioner's restraints, the appellate court could not simply "assume" that they did. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 5A7-8. Immediately after respondent's opposition brief was filed, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of Appeal. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 9. Attached to that petition was an affidavit from petitioner's trial counsel, who declared that he was "certain" the jury saw petitioner's wrist shackles. Id. at consecutive p. 9. Petitioner also filed a request for judicial notice, requesting that the Court of Appeal take judicial notice of trial counsel's affidavit in connection with petitioner's appellate claim that the use of shackles violated his right to due process. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 4. The Court of Appeal denied petitioner's request for judicial notice. Id.
The California Court of Appeal denied petitioner's shackling claim on appeal, reasoning as follows:
Gueyger, 2014 WL 4071328, at **1-3.
After the California Court of Appeal upheld his judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a petition for review, claiming that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury to disregard petitioner's visible restraints constituted prejudicial error. Resp't's Lodg. Doc. 8. That petition was summarily denied.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution assure a criminal defendant the right to a fair trial. See Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976). Visible shackling of a criminal defendant during trial "undermines the presumption of innocence and the related fairness of the factfinding process" and "`affront[s]' the `dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.'" Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 630-31 (2005) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970)). See also Larson v. Palmateer, 515 F.3d 1057, 1062 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has therefore held that "the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the use of physical restraints visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial." Deck, 544 U.S. at 629. Those interests include "physical security," "courtroom decorum" and "courtroom security." Id. at 624, 628. Accordingly, criminal defendants have "the right to be free of shackles and handcuffs in the presence of the jury, unless shackling is justified by an essential state interest." Ghent v. Woodford, 279 F.3d 1121, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002).
Shackling is not unconstitutionally prejudicial per se. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343-44; Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 748 (9th Cir. 1995) ("shackling is inherently prejudicial, but it is not per se unconstitutional"). Unjustified shackling does not rise to the level of constitutional error unless the defendant makes a showing that he suffered prejudice as a result. Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1132 (citing United States v. Olano, 62 F.3d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir 1995) and United States v. Halliburton, 870 F.2d 557, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also Larson, 515 F.3d at 1064 (state trial court's violation of the petitioner's due process rights in requiring him to wear security leg brace during his trial found to be harmless). An unjustified decision to restrain a defendant at trial requires reversal only if the shackles or handcuffs had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567, 591 (9th Cir. 2004). In the Ninth Circuit, "only the most egregious kind of shackling has been found . . . to deny due process." Castillo v. Stainer, 983 F.2d 145, 148 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth Circuit has also held that the unconstitutional shackling of a defendant "results in prejudice only if the evidence of guilt is not `overwhelming.'" Cox v. Ayers, 613 F.3d 883, 891 (9th Cir. 2010) (shackling not prejudicial where the evidence against petitioner was "overwhelming").
The California Court of Appeal did not engage in an analysis of whether petitioner was prejudiced by the use of shackles because it found that the trial court's use of restraints was justified in light of petitioner's threats to harm his trial counsel if he were not restrained. This court agrees that the use of shackles was justified in this case. Under the circumstances of this case, as accurately described by the California Court of Appeal, petitioner's shackling was justified by an essential state interest specific to petitioner's trial; namely, the security of persons in the courtroom in light of petitioner's threats to harm his trial counsel if he were not restrained. Because the trial court did not act unreasonably in ordering that petitioner be partially shackled during trial, this court need not engage in a prejudice analysis. See Crittenden v. Ayers, 624 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2010) (court did not reach the issue of whether the petitioner was prejudiced by shackling because the trial court's decision to permit physical restraints was not unreasonable).
The decision by the California Court of Appeal rejecting petitioner's shackling claim is not contrary or an unreasonable application of United States Supreme Court authority, nor is it "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
In his next ground for relief, petitioner claims that the trial court violated his right to due process in failing to instruct the jurors sua sponte that they must disregard the fact that petitioner had been placed in physical restraints. ECF No. 1 at 4.
The California Court of Appeal denied this claim, reasoning as follows:
Gueyger, 2014 WL 4071328, at **3-4.
In general, a challenge to jury instructions does not state a federal constitutional claim. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 119 (1982)); Gutierrez v. Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). In order to warrant federal habeas relief, a challenged jury instruction "cannot be merely `undesirable, erroneous, or even "universally condemned,'" but must violate some due process right guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973). The appropriate inquiry "is whether the ailing instruction . . . so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process." Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004) (quoting Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991)). Where the challenge is to a refusal or failure to give an instruction, the petitioner's burden is "especially heavy," because "[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law." Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 15 (1977). See also Villafuerte v. Stewart, 111 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 1997).
Because a failure to give a jury instruction is a trial error, petitioner is entitled to relief only if he can show prejudice. Dixon v. Williams, 750 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014). Prejudice is shown for purposes of habeas relief if the trial error had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993). A reviewing court may grant habeas relief only it if is "`in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of an error.'" Id. (quoting O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 437 (1995)).
The California Court of Appeal concluded that even if the trial court erred in failing to instruct petitioner's jury with CALCRIM No. 204, any error was harmless. This court agrees. As explained by the state appellate court, none of the evidence introduced at petitioner's trial supported his defense of self-defense. Specifically, there was no evidence that Ellis did anything before the stabbing that would have caused petitioner to believe he was in imminent danger of suffering injury. Mary Trejo, the only person who appeared to have seen the stabbing, saw petitioner attack Ellis without provocation. She testified that Ellis did not try to defend himself in any way before petitioner stabbed him. Reporter's Transcript on Appeal (RT) at 150. Ellis testified that after petitioner found his knife in Ellis' sock, he immediately grabbed the knife, stepped back, pulled the knife out of its sheath, and lunged at Ellis. Id. at 102-03. After Ellis saw the knife coming towards him, he "threw a punch" at petitioner to try to defend himself but did not hit him. Id. at 103. Ellis also testified that he did not verbally threaten petitioner or "physically go[ ] after him in any way" before petitioner lunged at him with the knife. Id. at 104-05. On cross-examination, Ellis testified that he "didn't strike first." Id. at 133. In light of the overwhelming evidence against petitioner and the lack of any evidence at all to support his defense, the trial court's failure to instruct the jury not to consider petitioner's restraints as evidence of his guilt would not have had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict in this case. See Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637. The conclusion of the California Court of Appeal to the same effect is not objectively unreasonable. See Towery v. Schriro, 641 F.3d 300, 307 (9th Cir. 2010) ("When a state court has found a constitutional error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's determination is objectively unreasonable"). Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief on his jury instruction claim.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant).
