STIPULATION REGARDING CONTINUANCE OF STATUS CONFERENCE; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRLL, Jr., District Judge.

Defendant, OMAR NUNO, by and through his counsel of record, TONI WHITE, and the GOVERNMENT hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on July 29, 2016.

2. By this stipulation, all of the undersigned defendants now move to continue the status conference until October 21, 2016, and to exclude time between July 29, 2016 and October 21, 2016 under Local Code T4. The GOVERNMENT does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. The undersigned defense counsel continue to need time to review discovery, including review of wiretap evidence, and to continue to conduct investigation, and to otherwise prepare for trial, or alternatively, resolution by way of written plea agreement. Additional discovery has been provided since the last status conference. Additionally, defendant Verenys Parra Arrellanez was added to the case in May and her counsel, Tasha Chalfant, also needs time to prepare.

b. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The GOVERNMENT does not object to the continuance.

d. The GOVERNMENT and counsel for the defendants are working toward resolution of the case.

g. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of July 29, 2016 and October 21, 2016 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.