SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Irene Mendoza ("Plaintiff"), seeks judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her application for Supplemental Security Income Benefits pursuant to Title XVI of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1381-83. The matter is currently before the Court on the parties' briefs, which were submitted, without oral argument, to the Honorable Sheila K. Oberto, United States Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff was born on February 8, 1967, and was 39 years old when she was initially found disabled as of January 9, 2006. (Administrative Record ("AR") 12; 95 (agency determination dated April 20, 2006).) On January 11, 2012, the agency found Plaintiff had medically improved as of January 1, 2012. (AR 76.) Plaintiff requested a hearing to dispute the determination, alleging she remained disabled due to depression, carpal tunnel syndrome, panic attacks, and sleeping problems. (AR 80.) On September 24, 2013, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified in a hearing before an ALJ. (AR 38-69.) In a decision dated November 20, 2013, the ALJ affirmed the cessation of benefits and found Plaintiff's "disability ended on January 1, 2012, and that [she] has not become disabled again since that date. (AR 12.)
On December 12, 2011, consultative examining psychiatrist Dr. Gil Schmidt, Psy. D., conducted a psychiatric examination at the request of the agency. (AR 328-35.) Dr. Schmidt noted Plaintiff was living with her boyfriend of more than two decades and her five children. (AR 328.) Plaintiff reporting attending school through the 10th grade, and dropping out because her family moved and she lacked parental support to finish school. (AR 329.) The longest she worked for an employer was three years, and she stopped working in 2001 "after having quit because she did not have transportation anymore and has not sought work since." (AR 329.)
Plaintiff was on time for her appointment, "observed to be socially interacting with other clients while waiting for their respective interviews," and her "behavior, mood and gait all appeared to be within normal limits." (AR 328.) Plaintiff reported suffering depression for the past two decades "because of marital discord," and that significant other was currently dating a younger woman. (AR 328.) Plaintiff reported that she had not found counseling beneficial, though Dr. Schmidt observed Plaintiff "has been in and out of counseling for crisis intervention only and has not appeared to work on any root issues that have been promoting the marital discord." (AR 329.) Dr. Schmidt opined that Plaintiff's "concerns appear to be situational depression." (AR 328.)
Plaintiff reported showering 2-3 times per week, preparing and cooking her own meals, and taking care of her own hygiene without prompting or assistance. (AR 331.) She reported sleeping between 8 and 12 hours at a time as well as a disturbed sleep pattern of repeated awakening to use the restroom. (AR 331.) Dr. Schmidt noted Plaintiff "is capable of both light and heavy duty domestic chores without any noted limitations." (AR 331.) Though Plaintiff reported suffering from obsessive-compulsive disorder, Dr. Schmidt found "no evidence suggested during her presentation that would be supportive of this diagnosis" and opined that Plaintiff "appeared to be over endorsing mental health symptoms." (AR 331-32 (observing Plaintiff to be "often times over endorsing symptoms both typical and atypical").)
Dr. Schmidt diagnosed Plaintiff as malingering, and assigned Plaintiff with a GAF
On January 10, 2012, reviewing agency psychiatrist Dr. Ida Hilliard, M.D., completed a psychiatric review technique form. (AR 350-63.) Dr. Hilliard concluded that Plaintiff's medically determinable personality disorder was not severe, and found Plaintiff was mildly impaired in her activities of daily living, ability to maintain social functioning, and ability to maintain concentration, persistence, and pace. (AR 358.) Dr. Hilliard concluded there was evidence of significant medical improvement in Plaintiff's depressive symptoms. (AR 360-62.)
Plaintiff saw Dr. Franco Song Seo, M.D., twice in 2013 at Kern County Mental Health. (AR 527-41.) On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff complained of pain in her knees and back, headaches, and carpal tunnel syndrome, and reported that she was unable to work due to her medical issues. (AR 533.) Plaintiff reported good response and compliance with her mental health medications, and requested to be continued on the same medications. (AR 533.) On examination, Plaintiff was appropriately dressed, made good eye contact, was cooperative, and her behavior was unremarkable. (AR 535.) Plaintiff's mood was sad, with affect congruent to mood and appropriate to situation and content. (AR 535-36.) Plaintiff's intensity, range and stability were normal, and though her speech was slow with low tone, the amount, clarity, and fluency of her speech was normal. (AR 536.) Though Plaintiff's concentration was "impaired," her intelligence was "below average," and her immediate and recent memory and insight were "poor" (AR 537), Dr. Seo observed that Plaintiff's thought process was logical, with unremarkable thought content, and she was oriented to person, place, date and time (AR 536-37). Dr. Seo diagnosed Plaintiff with mood disorder, opioid dependence, and personality disorder and assessed Plaintiff with a GAF scale score of 50, reflecting serious symptoms or a serious impairment in social, occupation, or school functioning. (AR 538-39.)
On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff was observed to be "much improved" and "hopeful about her future and recovery." (AR 531.) On examination, Plaintiff was observed to be anxious and euthymic and oriented to person, time and place, with unremarkable thought process, appropriate affect and cooperative behavior, good eye contact, normal speech, fair insight, judgment, and memory, intact concentration, and below average intelligence. (AR 528-29.) Despite these observations, Dr. Seo checked boxes indicating Plaintiff's "current disability" was "moderate," she was unable to work, her prognosis was "fair," and the expected length of treatment would be six months. (AR 532.) Dr. Seo recommended Plaintiff continue with her current medications and transferred her treatment back to her primary care physician. (AR 532.)
Plaintiff testified that she cannot mop and sweep because of her hands and back, but that she can fold clothes and can microwave food. (AR 46-47.) Plaintiff can use her fingers to pick up small things from the table, perform her own personal care, and tie her shoes. (AR 47.) She spends most of her day sleeping, lying down, or watching television. (AR 49.) Plaintiff takes Vicodin for the pain in her hands, but not for the pain in her back. (AR 50.) Plaintiff testified that she can sit of approximately 30 minutes at a time and that while her medications help with her depression, she experiences anxiety when "something comes up." (AR 52; 56.)
The ALJ asked the Vocational Expert ("VE") whether a hypothetical individual of Plaintiff's age and educational background who can lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally; sit, stand, and walk for six hours in an eight-hour day; frequently climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, and stairs; frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl; frequently reach, handle, finger, and feel with her bilateral upper extremities; should avoid extreme cold and wetness; and is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive unskilled work would be able to perform the requirements of any work in the national economy. (AR 64-65.) The VE testified such an individual could work as an assembler of small products, DOT 706.684-022, and inspector, DOT 559.687-074, both light, unskilled work with an SVP
The ALJ then asked the VE whether an individual who additionally would need to alternate sitting and standing at will and could not sit or stand more than 30 minutes at a time could work. (AR 66.) The VE testified, based on his experience, that such an individual could perform the requirements of small products assembler and inspector "as sit, stand stools are furnished" without erosion in the number of available jobs. (AR 66.)
The ALJ then asked whether an individual with the same total limitations, except that they could only lift a maximum of 10 pounds, could work. (AR 66-67.) The VE testified that such an individual could work as a bench hand assembler, DOT 715.684-026, table worker, DOT 739.687-182, and lens inserter, DOT 713.687-026, all unskilled, sedentary work with an SVP of 2. (AR 67.)
The ALJ finally asked whether an individual who would also be off task more than 15 percent of the work day would be able to work. (AR 67.) The VE testified such an individual could not work. (AR 67.)
On November 20, 2013, the ALJ issued a written decision and found that the April 20, 2006 decision finding Plaintiff disabled was the "comparison point decision" for the purpose of determining whether medical improvement had occurred. (AR 14.) At the time of the comparison point decision, Plaintiff had been unable to engage in sustained work activities due to depression and carpel tunnel syndrome. (AR 14.)
The ALJ found that as of January 1, 2012, Plaintiff had medically determinable impairments of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, spondylosis of the lumbar spine, depression, and personality disorder. (AR 14.) The ALJ determined that these impairments did not meet or equal a listed impairment. (AR 14.) The ALJ found that as of January 1, 2012, Plaintiff had medically improved so that she had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a range of sedentary work. (AR 14-15.)
The ALJ found that, beginning on January 1, 2012, Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a range of sedentary work, except that she is limited to
(AR 15.) The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, and had a marginal education but was able to communicate in English. (AR 20.) Given this RFC, the ALJ determined there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy Plaintiff could perform, including representative occupations bench hand assembler, DOT 715.684-026, table worker, DOT 739.687-182, and lens inserter, DOT 713.687-026, all sedentary work with an SVP of 2. (AR 21.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (AR 21-22.)
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on April 24, 2015, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final determination for purposes of judicial review. (AR 1-4.)
On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint before this Court seeking review of the ALJ's decision. (Doc. 1.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled as of the date of the written decision as required by Social Security Ruling
The ALJ's decision denying benefits "will be disturbed only if that decision is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error." Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999). In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Macri v. Chater, 93 F.3d 540, 543 (9th Cir. 1996). Instead, the Court must determine whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the Commissioner's findings. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007).
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance." Ryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008). "Substantial evidence" means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). The Court "must consider the entire record as a whole, weighing both the evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's conclusion, and may not affirm simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence." Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1035 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
An individual is considered disabled for purposes of disability benefits if he is unable to engage in any substantial, gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted, or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3) (A); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 23 (2003). The impairment or impairments must result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that are demonstrable by medically accepted clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and must be of such severity that the claimant is not only unable to do his previous work, but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial, gainful work that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)-(3), 1382c(a)(3)(B), (D).
The regulations provide that the ALJ must undertake a specific five-step sequential analysis in the process of evaluating a disability. In Step 1, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). If not, the ALJ must determine at Step 2 whether the claimant has a severe impairment or a combination of impairments significantly limiting her from performing basic work activities. Id. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c). If so, the ALJ moves to Step 3 and determines whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments that meet or equal the requirements of the Listing of Impairments ("Listing"), 20 § 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and is therefore presumptively disabled. Id. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If not, at Step 4 the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has sufficient RFC despite the impairment or various limitations to perform her past work. Id. §§ 404.1520(f), 416.920(f). If not, at Step 5, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant can perform other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. §§ 404.1520(g), 416.920(g). If a claimant is found to be disabled or not disabled at any step in the sequence, there is no need to consider subsequent steps. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to determine whether Plaintiff was disabled as of the date of the written decision as required by SSR 13-3p, failed to fully consider the medical opinion evidence of Plaintiff's treating physician Dr. Seo, and improperly discredited Plaintiff's subjective pain testimony. (Doc. 20.)
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by failing to adjudicate Plaintiff's disability status through the date of her decision. (Doc. 13, pp. 5-6.) This contention is without merit. As of the date of the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's disability "ended on January 1, 2012," and that Plaintiff "has not become disabled again since that date." (AR 12.) Plaintiff's assertion that "[t]he ALJ only considered [her disability] up to January 1, 2012" (Doc. 13, p. 6) is without basis or support in the record. The ALJ summarized and discussed evidence gathered throughout 2012 and 2013 in reaching her RFC assessment (AR 17-19), and it is unclear on what basis Plaintiff asks the Court to find otherwise. Throughout her opinion, including her review of the Plaintiff's testimony and the medical evidence, it is clear the ALJ fully considered the evidence relevant to Plaintiff's impairment through the date of her decision. The Court cannot find it a violation of SSR 13-3p to not use the magic words "through the date of this decision" when virtually all the evidence and testimony mentioned and analyzed comes from the period after the Plaintiff's disability was found to have ceased (see AR 17-19). "That is not to say that it could not have been made more technically clear, but it is doubtful that this oversight alone would justify a remand." Murr v. Colvin, No. 2:14-CV-161, 2015 WL 1746162, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 16, 2015).
Even though the ALJ did not use the precise "magic words" "through the date of the decision," there is no question that the ALJ specifically considered whether Plaintiff had been disabled as of January 1, 2012, or at any date between January 1, 2012, and the date of the decision. (AR 12.) Plaintiff's argument the ALJ committed reversible error is without merit.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred by refusing to credit a portion of Dr. Seo's opinion without providing any legitimate or specific reason for doing so. Plaintiff argues Dr. Seo found her to be severely limited in social functioning and unable to work, but the ALJ ignored this significant limitation in formulating Plaintiff's RFC and did not address Dr. Seo's opinion in this regard at all. The Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly discredited Dr. Seo's opinion as internally inconsistent and unsupported by his own clinical findings, and that any error in failing to explicitly address each portion of Dr. Seo's opinion was harmless.
The RFC is an assessment of an individual's ability to do sustained work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis of 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule. Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 96-8p. The RFC assessment considers only functional limitations and restrictions that result from an individual's medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments. Id.
"In determining a claimant's RFC, an ALJ must consider all relevant evidence in the record including, inter alia, medical records, lay evidence, and `the effects of symptoms, including pain, that are reasonably attributed to a medically determinable impairment.'" Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). The ALJ "is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC." Rounds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d. 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015). The determination of a claimant's RFC is wholly within the province of the ALJ. See SSR 96-8p. The RFC assessment is based on all the evidence in the record, and it is the ALJ's duty to consider and weigh that evidence. See id.
The ALJ found Plaintiff capable of performing a range of sedentary work with postural and manipulative limitations and limited to simple, routine, repetitive and unskilled work. (AR 15.) Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to take into account Dr. Seo's opinion that Plaintiff was severely limited in social functioning and would be unable to work. (Doc. 13, pp. 11-13.)
Plaintiff saw Dr. Seo twice in 2013. On April 25, 2013, Plaintiff complained that she had a lot of pain in her body, reported feeling depressed and anxious, and reported that "she has been adherent to Paxil and low dose Seroquel with good response." (AR 533.) On examination, Plaintiff was appropriately dressed and made good eye contact, was cooperative, and her behavior was unremarkable. (AR 535.) Plaintiff's speech was slow, with low tone, but the amount, clarity and fluency of her speech was normal; her thought process was logical, with unremarkable thought content; and Plaintiff was oriented to person, place, date and time. (AR 536-37.) Dr. Seo marked a box indicating that Plaintiff's ability to concentrate was impaired and that her immediate and recent memory and insight were poor, and diagnosed Plaintiff with mood disorder, opioid dependence, and personality disorder. (AR 538.) Dr. Song Seo assessed a GAF of 50, reflecting his assessment of Plaintiff's global functioning at the high end of "serious symptoms." (AR 539.) Though Plaintiff had been responding well to her current medications, Dr. Seo recommended increasing Plaintiff's dosage of Paxil. (AR 540.) When Dr. Seo saw Plaintiff for the second time on July 22, 2013, he opined that Plaintiff was "much improved," recommended she continue with her medications, transferred her treatment back to her primary care physician, and marked two boxes on the form indicating Plaintiff could not work and that her expected length of treatment would be six months. (AR 531-32.)
The ALJ discussed Dr. Seo's opinion and found it less than fully credible, noting that Dr. Seo's observations of Plaintiff's symptoms and July 2013 note stating Plaintiff had responded well to her medications and was stable, undermined his low GAF scale score assessment of 50. (AR 18.) Plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's credibility finding, and the ALJ did not err in weighing Dr. Seo's opinion. See Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041 (upholding rejection of physician's opinion where "ultimate conclusions . . . did not mesh with her objective data or history"); Warre v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (impairments that can be controlled effectively with medication are not disabling). See also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(3), (d)(4), 416.927(c)(4) (consistency of a medical opinion with the record as a whole is a factor to evaluate in giving weight to any particular medical opinion). Because Dr. Seo's medical opinion was properly rejected, the ALJ was not required to explicitly incorporate it into his RFC assessment.
The ALJ is entitled to formulate an RFC and resolve any ambiguity or inconsistency in the medical evidence, see Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001), and to formulate the RFC based on the entire record, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(3) (the RFC is based on all the relevant evidence, including diagnoses, treatment, observations, and opinions of medical courses, as well as observations by family members and the claimant's own subjective symptoms). In considering Plaintiff's mental abilities and limitations, the ALJ gave significant weight to the opinion of agency psychiatric consultant Dr. Schmidt, who had specifically opined Plaintiff was malingering, assessed a GAF score of 71-80, indicating transient symptoms and no more than slight impairment, and opined Plaintiff would stabilize with the right combination and dosage of medications. (AR 20.) Based on this evidence, as well as other testimony and evidence in the record, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff retains the ability to complete simple repetitive tasks. (AR 15.) Plaintiff's mental health functioning was therefore adequately accommodated by the ALJ's RFC when she imposed the restriction of simple, routine tasks. Sabin v. Astrue, 337 F. App'x 617, 621 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding the ALJ properly "determined the end result of [plaintiff's] moderate difficulties as to concentration, persistence, or pace was that she could do simple and repetitive tasks"); see also Stanley v. Astrue, No. 1:09-CV-1743 SKO, 2010 WL 4942818, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 30, 2010) ("in limiting Plaintiff to simple, repetitive tasks, the ALJ properly incorporated in his RFC finding [the doctor's] opinion that Plaintiff had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace").
Though Plaintiff is correct the ALJ was silent as to a portion of Dr. Seo's opinion — the checkmark indicating Plaintiff would be unable to work — the determination of disability is an issue that is reserved to the Commissioner. Thornsberry v. Colvin, 552 F. App'x 691, 692 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[A] doctor's opinion that a claimant is disabled is not itself a medical opinion but an issue reserved exclusively for the Commissioner") (citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d); SSR 96-5p, at *15 (July 2, 1996) (a disability determination is a finding reserved to the Commissioner; a statement by a medical source that a person is "unable to work" does not mean they are disabled). Moreover, even were this an issue on which Dr. Seo could opine, the ALJ was not required to individually reference every word of Dr. Seo's treating record in his decision, see Howard v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (the ALJ does not need to discuss every piece of evidence when interpreting the record), where the ALJ noted the agency opinion of Dr. Schmidt and expressly adopted the limitation for simple repetitive tasks to address Plaintiff's mental health functioning. See Lewis, 236 F.3d at 509 (ALJ resolves conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence).
In sum, the ALJ did not err in his assessment of Plaintiff's mental health functioning.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ failed to articulate clear and convincing reasons for discounting her statements regarding the severity and extent of his ongoing symptoms. The Commissioner contends the ALJ properly relied on evidence in the record that undermined the credibility of Plaintiff's subjective complaints.
In evaluating the credibility of a claimant's testimony regarding subjective pain, an ALJ must engage in a two-step analysis. Vasquez v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 586, 591 (9th Cir. 2009); Bunnell v. Sullivan, 947 F.2d 341, 344 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc). The ALJ must first determine whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged. Vasquez, 572 F.3d at 591. The claimant is not required to show that his impairment "could reasonably be expected to cause the severity of the symptom [he] has alleged; she need only show that it could reasonably have caused some degree of the symptom." Id. (quoting Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036). If the claimant meets the first test and there is no evidence of malingering, the ALJ can only reject the claimant's testimony about the severity of the symptoms if she gives "specific, clear and convincing reasons" for the rejection. Id.
The ALJ also may consider (1) the claimant's reputation for truthfulness, prior inconsistent statements, or other inconsistent testimony, (2) unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment, and (3) the claimant's daily activities. Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1041; see also Bray v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219, 1226-27 (9th Cir. 2009); Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1284 (9th Cir. 1996); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929. "If the ALJ's finding is supported by substantial evidence, the court may not engage in second-guessing." Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039.
The ALJ reviewed the medical record and Plaintiff's allegations that she is unable to perform all work due to her alleged impairments and other symptoms. (AR 16-19.) The ALJ found that while Plaintiff's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause his alleged symptoms, his statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of those symptoms were not entirely credible. (AR 19.) The ALJ found that
(AR 19.)
While the inconsistency of objective findings with subjective claims may not be the sole reason for rejecting subjective complaints of pain, Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997), it is one factor which may be permissibly considered with others, Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2004); Morgan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 600 (9th Cir. 1999). An ALJ's credibility finding may properly be based on the inconsistency between a claimant's subjective complaints and the objective medical evidence. See Batson v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 359 F.3d 1190, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). Here, the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff's testimony that she could not work as inconsistent with relative minimal objective findings. (AR 19; 407-08 (July 2012 examination concluding Plaintiff had no limitations in standing, walking, or sitting, no postural limitations, could lift and carry up to 10 pounds frequently and up to 20 pounds occasionally, and was capable of frequent manipulative activities); 531 (July 2013 mental health treating notes opining Plaintiff was "much improved").)
Where a plaintiff "complains about disabling pain but fails to seek treatment, or fails to follow prescribed treatment for the pain, an ALJ may use such failure as a basis for finding the complaint unjustified or exaggerated." Orn, 495 F.3d at 638. Here, Plaintiff only received treatment for her hand pain through pain medications, and explicitly denied needing pain medication for her back pain. (AR 50.) Plaintiff's argument that her reliance on pain medication is not somehow "conservative treatment" (Doc. 13, pp. 12-13) is unconvincing. This is not a case where Plaintiff had a history of surgical intervention, repeated nerve blocks or trigger point injections, and "copious amounts of narcotic pain medications" together bolstering her allegations of disabling pain. Cf. Lapeirre-Gutt v. Astrue, 382 Fed. Appx. 662, 664 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing ALJ's adverse credibility finding as unsupported by substantial evidence based on plaintiff's history of cervical fusion surgery in an attempt to relieve her pain symptoms followed by narcotic pain medications, occipital nerve blocks, and trigger point injections); Christie v. Astrue, No. CV 10-3448-PJW, 2011 WL 4368189, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2011) (reversing ALJ's adverse credibility finding as unsupported when plaintiff demonstrated a history of "many different treatment modalities, including narcotic pain medication, steroid injections, trigger point injections, epidural shots, and cervical traction," which while not necessarily "the most aggressive available" treatments, in combination convinced the court that "they are certainly not what the Court would categorize as conservative"); Huerta v. Astrue, No. EDCV 07-1617-RC, 2009 WL 2241797, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 22, 2009) (reversing ALJ's adverse credibility finding as unsupported by substantial evidence based on plaintiff's history of neck surgery, in combination with referral to an anesthesiologist for pain management and receipt of a series of epidural steroid injections into her cervical spine).
Further, Plaintiff's mental health treatment has been sporadic at best (see AR 17-18; 329 (though Plaintiff reported she had not found counseling beneficial, Dr. Schmidt observed Plaintiff "ha[d] been in and out of counseling for crisis intervention only and has not appeared to work on any root issues that have been promoting the marital discord"), and the ALJ appropriately considered her treatment history, or lack thereof, in assessing her credibility. Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) ("an ALJ may properly rely on `unexplained or inadequately explained failure to seek treatment or to follow a prescribed course of treatment'") (quoting Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1039). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(iv), (v) (treatment history and medication regimen are relevant to assessing credibility).
The ALJ permissibly discounted Plaintiff's credibility based on her history of generally conservative treatment. See SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *7 (an "individual's statements may be less credible if the level or frequency of treatment is inconsistent with the level of complaints"); Parra v. Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 750-51 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that "evidence of `conservative treatment' is sufficient to discount a claimant's testimony regarding severity of an impairment") (citing Johnson v. Shalala, 60 F.3d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995)); Tommasetti, 533 F.3d at 1040 (describing physical therapy as conservative treatment and noting that an ALJ may infer that a claimant's "response to conservative treatment undermines [his] reports regarding the disabling nature of his pain"); Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (as amended) (rejecting subjective pain complaints where petitioner's "claim that she experienced pain approaching the highest level imaginable was inconsistent with the `minimal, conservative treatment' that she received").
The ALJ also properly discounted Plaintiff's credibility based on her inconsistent statements regarding her ability to engage in some degree of daily activity. (AR 19.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i), 416.(c)(3)(i) (daily activities are relevant to assessing whether a claimant's statements are true); SSR 96-7p (same); Molina, 674 F.3d at 1113 (the ALJ may consider "whether the claimant engages in daily activities inconsistent with the alleged symptoms"). While the mere fact that a claimant engages in certain daily activities does not necessarily detract from his credibility regarding overall disability, daily activities support an adverse credibility finding if a claimant is able to spend a substantial part of his day engaged in pursuits involving the performance of physical functions or skills that are transferable to a work setting. Orn, 495 F.3d at 639; see also Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959. A claimant's performance of chores such as preparing meals, cleaning house, doing laundry, shopping, and interacting with others has been considered sufficient to support an adverse credibility finding when performed for a substantial portion of the day. See Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1175; Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2005); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 959.
Plaintiff's admitted daily activities, including doing light chores around the house, taking care of her personal needs, preparing simple meals, and concentrating long enough to complete puzzles undermine her allegations of disabling pain and suggest she is capable of performing the requirements of a reduced range of sedentary work. Thomas, 278 F.3d at 958-59 (the claimant's ability "to perform various household chores such as cooking, laundry, washing dishes, and shopping" suggested the ability to perform a reduced range of light work); Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997); Moncada v. Chater, 60 F.3d 521, 524 (9th Cir. 1995). See also Valentine v. Astrue, 574 F.3d 685, 694 (9th Cir. 2009) (ALJ properly recognized that daily activities "did not suggest [the claimant] could return to his old job" but "did suggest that [the claimant's] later claims about the severity of his limitations were exaggerated").
Finally, the ALJ permissibly found Plaintiff's credibility was weakened by her overall poor work record. (AR 19.) The ALJ is entitled to consider Plaintiff's work history in making a credibility determination. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 959 (9th Cir. 2002) (ALJ properly found poor work history and lack of propensity to work in lifetime negatively affected claimant's credibility regarding her inability to work). Plaintiff earned a total of $19,461.11 from 1996 through 2005, and only sporadic work history for the entire decade prior to her disability determination in 2006. (See AR 155.) Plaintiff does not have any past relevant work. (AR 20.) Plaintiff told consultative psychiatrist Dr. Schmidt that she stopped working in 2001 "after having quit because she did not have transportation anymore and has not sought work since." (AR 329.) The ALJ was entitled to consider Plaintiff's overall work history in discrediting her statements, and such reasoning was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Kimbrough v. Astrue, No. 1:11-CV-01410-SKO, 2013 WL 268700, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2013).
In sum, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Plaintiff's credibility.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and is based on proper legal standards. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. The Clerk of this Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, and against Plaintiff Irene Mendoza.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
