Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change

U.S. v. Brayton, CR-S-13-406 GEB. (2016)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20160804b29 Visitors: 33
Filed: Aug. 02, 2016
Latest Update: Aug. 02, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Timothy H. Delgado, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Shane Brayton, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Rod Simpson, Michael Petrik, Jr., Esq., and counsel for defendant Sarah Bastin, Shari G. Rusk, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By
More

STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Timothy H. Delgado, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Shane Brayton, John R. Manning, Esq., counsel for defendant Rod Simpson, Michael Petrik, Jr., Esq., and counsel for defendant Sarah Bastin, Shari G. Rusk, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on August 5, 2016.

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until September 2, 2016 and to exclude time between August 5, 2016 and September 2, 2016 under the Local CodeT-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:

a. This case includes over 200 pages of discovery and a video. b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the proposed plea agreements and discuss the relevant USSG calculations and sentencing factors. Additionally, defendant Rod Simpson is being housed at the Colusa County Jail which makes personal communications with his attorney difficult. c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The Government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of August 5, 2016 to September 2, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A)) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer