SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner Eric D.R.
Between January 1 and March 23, 2010, Petitioner and his friend Francisco B., both thirteen years old, sexually assaulted two neighbor girls, nine-year-old C.M. and eleven-year-old N.M., on at least three occasions. The victims were assaulted individually in locations including the "clubhouse" (a vacant shed on Petitioner's family's property), Francisco's basement, and near washing machines located at the side of Petitioner's home. One assailant would restrain the victim while the other performed one or more sexual acts on the victim, including oral, anal, and vaginal penetration using his penis and fingers. The assailants would then switch roles. The assailants threatened the victims with beatings, dog attacks, and the murder of their mother if they did not submit.
In an amended juvenile wardship petition in the Tulare County Superior Court, Petitioner was charged with sixteen felony counts: (1) one count of rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2)); (2-11) ten counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child (Cal. Penal Code § 288(b)(1)); (12) one count of forcible oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code § 288A(c)(1)); (13) one count of sexual penetration by foreign object with force and violence (Cal. Penal Code § 289(a)(1)); (14-15) two counts of attempted sodomy by use of force (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 288A(c)(2)); and (16) one count of oral copulation (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 288A(c)(2)). The juvenile petition also included special allegations that the crime involved more than one victim (Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(b)) and that nine of the counts involved substantial sexual conduct (Cal. Penal Code §§ 288 and 288.5).
On June 24, 2010, Petitioner admitted as true counts 2, 3, 6, 11, and 14, and the remaining eleven counts were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to the statutory term of 15 years on each of the five counts, for an aggregate sentence of 75 years to life. The trial court committed Petitioner to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). He was also required to register as a sex offender.
Petitioner filed a timely direct appeal to the California Court of Appeal on January 13, 2011. On January 19, 2012, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review on April 11, 2012.
On May 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the Tulare County Superior Court. The petition advanced the same claims as the direct appeal and added a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from trial counsel's representation to Petitioner that a guilty plea would result in his being confined in a group home.
On May 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the California Supreme Court, and a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus on July 10, 2013.
The Superior Court summarily denied the petition without prejudice on August 23, 2013, and the Supreme Court denied the habeas petition on October 2, 2013.
A person in custody as a result of the judgment of a state court may secure relief through a petition for habeas corpus if the custody violates the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 375 (2000). On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which applies to all petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed thereafter. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 322-23 (1997). Under the statutory terms, the petition in this case is governed by AEDPA's provisions because Petitioner filed it after April 24, 1996.
Habeas corpus is neither a substitute for a direct appeal nor a device for federal review of the merits of a guilty verdict rendered in state court. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332 n. 5 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring). Habeas corpus relief is intended to address only "extreme malfunctions" in state criminal justice proceedings. Id. Under AEDPA, a petitioner can prevail only if he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claim:
"By its terms, § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim `adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to the exceptions set forth in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2)." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011).
As a threshold matter, a federal court must first determine what constitutes "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71. To do so, the Court must look to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the Supreme Court's decisions at the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. The court must then consider whether the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." Id. at 72. The state court need not have cited clearly established Supreme Court precedent; it is sufficient that neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court contradicts it. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). The federal court must apply the presumption that state courts know and follow the law. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). The petitioner has the burden of establishing that the decision of the state court is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court precedent. Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9
"A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76. "A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as `fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 101 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). Thus, the AEDPA standard is difficult to satisfy since even a strong case for relief does not demonstrate that the state court's determination was unreasonable. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102.
Petitioner's first ground for relief sought an order of stay and abeyance to permit the exhaustion of two additional claims. The Court denied this motion on August 20, 2013. Doc. 5. Accordingly, the first claim is no longer before the Court.
As his second and third grounds for habeas relief, Petitioner seeks to set aside his admissions to counts 2, 3, 6, and 11 (four of ten pending counts of forcible lewd acts upon a child (Cal. Penal Code § 288(b)(1)), and 14 (one of two counts of attempted sodomy by use of force (Cal. Penal Code §§ 664 and 288A(c)(2)) of the wardship petition.
When a defendant admits that he committed the acts charged in the indictment, he "stands as a witness against himself." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Because the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects a defendant from compelled self-incrimination, a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Id. "The record must show that the defendant voluntarily relinquished his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury and his right to confront his accusers, and that he understood the nature of the charges and the consequences of his plea." Loftis v. Almager, 704 F.3d 645, 647 (9
As the second ground for relief, Petitioner contends that because he was never told that he would be subject to an aggregate sentence of 75 years in prison and because the juvenile court misrepresented its intent to commit him to a group home, his admission to the charges against him was not freely and voluntarily given. This contention lacks merit. The transcript of the plea hearing reflects the juvenile court's explicit statement of the range of consequences that the probation department could recommend to the court, including the potential 75-year sentence. In addition, Petitioner's contention that he understood that he was to be committed to a group home is based on the juvenile court's off-the-record prediction and is not consistent with statutory provisions governing commitment of delinquent juveniles in California.
The California Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's claim that the juvenile court misrepresented the potential consequences of admission, finding that "the record affirmatively demonstrate[d] on its face that [Petitioner] was aware of his rights and the direct consequence of his admissions." Eric D., 2012 WL 149774 at *5. The court found no evidence in the record to support Petitioner's assertions. In support of its findings, the court examined the juvenile court proceedings and discussed their implications in light of California law governing juveniles:
The record does not support Petitioner's contention that his admission was not knowing because the juvenile court failed to disclose the full range of potential commitments for the charges to which he admitted. As set forth in the state court's opinion quoted above, the juvenile court clearly and explicitly told Petitioner, "Your exposure maximum period of physical confinement is also 75 years to life, just like [F.B.]." Petitioner confirmed that he understood.
The juvenile court then set forth the full range of potential commitments available according to the probation department's recommendation. Although the state court summarized the juvenile court's initial discussion of possible outcomes, the juvenile court's specific disclosures are directly relevant to Petitioner's claim and are set forth below. Before setting forth the constitutional and other legal disclosures relevant to Petitioner's admission, the juvenile court stated:
Based on irrefutable evidence in the record, the state court reasonably concluded that the juvenile court fully disclosed the full range of potential dispositions following Petitioner's admissions of the acts constituting the crimes alleged in counts 2, 3, 6, and 11.
Based on the declarations of Petitioner and of his counsel before the juvenile court, Petitioner also contends that his admissions were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because he and his counsel understood the juvenile court to have promised placement in a local group home in the course of discussions leading the entry of admissions by Petitioner and Francisco B. Other than the declarations of Petitioner and his trial attorney, the record includes no evidence of such a representation by the juvenile court. Petitioner concedes that the juvenile court never "indicated a likely disposition on the record." Doc. 2 at 34. Notably, Petitioner was not present when the juvenile court allegedly predicted her assessment of a likely outcome. Respondent argues that if prior to entry of Petitioner's admission, the juvenile court stated a preference for group home placement over any other disposition, her remark was predictive, not promissory.
Following the juvenile court's adoption of the probation department's recommendation of commitment to DJJ, Petitioner did not argue that he had been promised a group home placement. Nor did he raise this argument in either his direct appeal or his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Although Respondent considers Petitioner to have raised this issue in his habeas petition to the Tulare County Superior Court (Lodged Doc. at 19-20), the undersigned disagrees. The state petition did not contend that the juvenile court misrepresented the ultimate sentence: it alleged that trial counsel misrepresented the likely disposition. As a result, the state court was never given an opportunity to adjudicate this claim on its merits.
Instead, Petitioner relies on state authority derived from cases addressing plea bargains in adult criminal prosecutions. See, e.g., People v. Cruz, 44 Cal.3d 1247, 1250 (1988) ("upon acceptance of a plea[] specifying the punishment available to the sentencing court, the court may not impose a punishment more severe than that specified in the [plea] bargain." (Doc. 2 at 33)); Cal. Penal Code § 1192.5 ("Where the plea is accepted by the prosecuting attorney in open court and is approved by the court, the defendant . . . cannot be sentenced on the plea and the court may not proceed as to the plea other than as specified in the plea"). Petitioner's authority is inapposite. Juvenile wardship petitions are not resolved under the California Penal Code but are instead authorized and governed by appropriate provisions of the California Welfare and Institutions Code. Despite the analogous nature of a minor's admission of guilt to an adult plea agreement, the differing provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code and the Penal Code distinguish the two procedures in ways that are relevant in analyzing Petitioner's claim.
Under California law, a person under 18 years of age who violates a state law may be adjudged to be a ward of the court. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 602(a). The juvenile court addressed the charges against Petitioner in such a wardship proceeding. "An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding." Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 203.
In a wardship proceeding, a minor may enter an admission or a plea of no contest, which is analogous to a guilty plea to the extent that it "constitutes an assent to all facts essential to a finding that the minor is a person described in [California Welfare and Institutions Code] section 602" (Minors violating laws defining crime; ward of court). In re John B., 215 Cal.App.3d 477, 484 (1989). A key difference is that unlike a plea bargain, a minor's admission is not part of a contracted plea bargain including a stipulated sentence. Instead, the disposition of the minor is determined following the minor's admission that he has violated the law defining the crime(s) of which he is accused and the juvenile court's determination that the minor is a person described in § 602. California law provides:
"A juvenile ward's treatment under the delinquency law has a different focus than punishment under adult criminal statutes. In re Edward C., 223 Cal.App. 4
The statutory procedure was followed in Petitioner's case. The juvenile court accepted Petitioner's admission, adjudged him to be a person described in § 602, and referred him to the probation department for evaluation and the parole officer's recommendation as to the disposition of the case. See 6 RT 48-49. The disposition hearing was scheduled to allow the probation officer sufficient time to evaluate Petitioner and to formulate a recommended disposition.
California law does not provide for a disposition decision before the probation department has had an opportunity to evaluate the minor, identify his rehabilitative needs, and submit its recommendation. Petitioner nonetheless urges this Court to consider the juvenile judge's alleged off-the-record comment that she was inclined to send Petitioner to a group home and was not considering DJJ as tantamount to a plea agreement specifying a particular sentence.
Since it was not raised below, the state court did not have an opportunity to address the juvenile court's alleged statement in light of California law. Petitioner also cites no precedent supporting his contention that his admission was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary in light of the juvenile court's ultimate failure to select Petitioner's disposition based on its off-the-record comment (1) before evaluation of Petitioner's needs and recommendation of an appropriate disposition in compliance with state statutes, and (2) despite clear and specific statements on the record of the full range of dispositions that might be imposed as a result of Petitioner's admission, up to and including the disposition actually imposed.
Finally, even if Petitioner and his counsel believed that the juvenile court had promised that the admission would result in a disposition of placement in a local group home before Petitioner's admission was placed on the record, the juvenile court's on-the-record comments clearly and forcefully set forth the full range of potential dispositions. Petitioner acknowledged his understanding on the record and neither questioned the juvenile court about the supposed agreement of group home placement nor objected that he had been promised group home placement. As a result, the undersigned finds Petitioner's claim that he relied on a promise of group home placement to lack credibility.
In support of his federal claim, Petitioner again quotes Francisco B.'s apparent confusion (6 RT 36:18-37:6) as evidence supporting Petitioner's failure to understand the juvenile court's disclosure regarding potential dispositions following admission. The state court rejected the exchange between the juvenile court and Francisco B. as proof of Petitioner's lack of understanding. This Court should not second-guess the state court's rejection of a meritless argument.
The state court reasonably concluded that the juvenile court fully disclosed Petitioner's possible commitments following his admission of claims 2, 3, 6, 11, and 14.
In his third claim, Petitioner contends that the juvenile court violated his due process rights by failing to admonish him that he could potentially be ordered to register as a sex offender.
The California Court of Appeal found no prejudicial error occurred as a result of the juvenile court's failure to disclose the potential requirement that Petitioner would be required to register as a sex offender.
Analyzing the claim under California law, the court stated that before a court accepts a defendant's admission to criminal charges against him, the court must advise the defendant of any direct consequences of his admission. In re Eric D., 2012 WL 149774 at *5. A direct consequence is one that has "a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant's punishment." Id. (quoting People v. Moore, 69 Cal.App. 4
Because California Penal Code § 290 automatically requires a person convicted as a sex offender to register, it is a direct consequence of an individual's conviction of any of the crimes enumerated in § 290. In re Eric D., 2012 WL 149774 at *6. As a result, a trial court is required to advise an adult defendant of the registration requirement before the court accepts a plea of guilty to any of the offenses enumerated in §290. Id.
The requirement is different when a minor makes an admission in juvenile court. Id. Under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 203, a juvenile court proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, and an order declaring a juvenile delinquent to be a ward of the court is not a criminal proceeding. Id. A minor's duty to register as a sex offender is governed by California Penal Code § 290.008, which applies only if the minor is committed to the DJJ. Id. Since at the time of Petitioner's admission, it was not certain that he would be committed to the DJJ, the registration requirement was a collateral consequence of Petitioner's admission. Id. As a result, the juvenile court was not required to disclose to Petitioner the possibility that he would be required to register as a sex offender. Id.
Even if the juvenile court's failure to advise Petitioner of the registration were error, the state court was only required to set the admission aside if the error were prejudicial to Petitioner. Id. To prove prejudice, a "defendant must demonstrate affirmatively that it is reasonably probable that such admonishment would have persuaded [the defendant] to deny the truth of the allegations." Id. (quoting In re Ronald E., 19 Cal. 3d at 321). The state court found that any error was harmless because the Petitioner did not establish prejudice:
The result under federal precedent would be the same. For a guilty plea to be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the defendant must be "fully aware of the direct consequences." Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. "[A] court conducting a plea colloquy must advise the defendant of the `direct consequences of his plea,' but need not advise him of `all the possible collateral consequences" of the plea. United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9
Because California Penal Code § 290.008(c) requires a minor who committed forcible lewd acts upon a child (counts 2, 3, 6, and 11, Cal Penal Code § 288) and attempted sodomy (count 14, Cal. Penal Code § 288) to register only upon release or parole from the DJJ, the state court reasonably held that the registration requirement was a collateral consequence. The Court should decline to grant habeas relief based on the juvenile court's failure to warn Petitioner of the possibility that he would be required to register as a sex offender.
As his fourth ground for habeas relief, Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner that his admission and plea would result in a commitment to a group home. Petitioner conceded that this claim was unexhausted. On August 20, 2013, the Court denied Petitioner's motion for stay and abeyance with regard to this claim. Accordingly, the Court need not address it.
As his fifth ground for habeas relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in failing to exercise its discretion in sentencing Petitioner. Petitioner conceded that this claim was not exhausted. On August 20, 2013, the Court denied Petitioner's motion for stay and abeyance with regard to this claim. Accordingly, the Court need not address it.
As his sixth ground for habeas relief, Petitioner contends that sentencing him to a prison term of 75 years to life was so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
Following Petitioner's admission of counts 2, 3, 6, 11, and 14, the juvenile court referred the case to the probation department for evaluation of Petitioner's rehabilitative needs and recommended disposition. In a contested disposition hearing, the probation department psychologist, Dr. Claudia Cerda, opined that Petitioner required intensive therapy exceeding that available in a group home placement.
In determining the sentencing term, the juvenile court had no discretion. California law required the Court to sentence Petitioner to a term of 15 years to life on each of the five counts to which Petitioner entered an admission. Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(b). Because the five counts involved separate victims on separate occasions, the five sentences had to be consecutive. Cal. Penal Code § 667.61(i). As a result, the aggregate sentence was 75 years to life.
The Court of Appeal rejected Petitioner's claim that his sentence was so excessive that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. In re Eric D., 2012 WL 149774 at *7. Applying the California constitutional standard for cruel and unusual punishment, the sentence was not so disproportionate to Petitioner's offenses that "`it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'" Id. (quoting In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 (1972).
The court also considered the federal standards of disproportionality set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983): "To determine whether a sentence is disproportionate, courts are to evaluate certain identified objective criteria including the seriousness of the offense, the penalty imposed, the sentences imposed on others who have committed the same or similar offenses, and the sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for the same or similar offenses." In re Eric D., 2012 WL 149774 at *8. Acknowledging Petitioner's argument, which focused on the first criteria, the court "agree[d] with the juvenile court that, while these offenses may have been [Petitioner's] first, they were serious." Id.
The Court set forth the statutory scheme for juvenile sentencing in California:
The appellate court found that the juvenile court had elected to follow the probation department's recommendation after reviewing and considering the case as a whole, and balancing Petitioner's age and lack of criminal record against the seriousness of the offenses. Id. The court further found that the juvenile court's statement that it lacked the discretion under § 667.61 to impose less than the statutorily mandated sentence constituted an explanation of how the juvenile court arrived at the maximum aggregate sentence of 75 years to life. Id. at **8-9. The appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim that the juvenile court had failed to consider the facts and circumstances of the offenses. Id. at *9. It concluded that having heard the defense arguments and having indicated its review of the record as a whole, the juvenile court was presumed to have considered the facts and circumstances in its decision to impose the maximum sentence. Id.
"Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const., amend. VIII. Courts determine whether punishment is cruel or unusual by looking beyond historical conceptions to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
Whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment requires the court to determine whether the term is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 72. What constitutes a grossly disproportionate sentence is unclear. Id. "[T]he only relevant clearly established law amenable to the `contrary to' or `unreasonable application of' framework is the gross disproportionality principle, the precise contours of which are unclear, applicable only in the `exceedingly rare' and `extreme' case." Id. at 73. Successful challenges based on disproportionality are "exceedingly rare." Solem, 463 U.S. at 289-90.
Citing to the synopses of Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 49 (2010), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 2457-58 (2012), Petitioner contends that "[i]n recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that imposition of a life sentence or its functional equivalent upon a minor constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Petitioner overgeneralizes the holdings of Graham and Miller.
Graham and Miller prohibited, as cruel and unusual, life sentences without parole for juveniles convicted of both homicide and offenses that are not homicide. Both decisions analyzed the proportionality standard by considering whether appropriate punishment varied when applied to juveniles as a category. The Court acknowledged that even for a juvenile offender convicted of an offense that is not homicide, a life sentence may be appropriate:
Petitioner's situation is also distinguishable from those of Graham and Miller in that he was not convicted of a crime in adult court and sentenced to a life term, but entered an admission in a juvenile wardship proceeding which resulted in his placement in a juvenile sexual offender treatment program in which he could receive therapy. The 75-years-to-life term is the maximum period for which Petitioner may be confined. As Petitioner participates in the treatment program, the Youth Authority Board will determine the actual duration of Petitioner's confinement. An individual such as Petitioner, who has been commit to the DJJ as a person described in § 602, "shall be discharged upon the expiration of a two-year period of control or when he or she attains 25 years of age, whichever occurs later, unless an order for further detention has been made by the committing court pursuant to Article 6 (commencing with Section 1800)." Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 1769.
No Supreme Court case holds that a juvenile offender convicted of crime(s) less than homicide, attempted homicide, or a felony triggering enhanced sentencing such as California's "three-strikes" law may not be sentenced to a life term with the possibility of parole. In fact, the Supreme Court's holding in Graham explicitly contemplated that a juvenile convicted of a nonhomicide crime could receive a life sentence as long as the sentence included a possibility of parole. In denying Petitioner's claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the California courts reasonably applied established law.
A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:
If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability "if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his. . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.
Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief debatable, wrong, or deserving of encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
The undersigned recommends that the Court deny the Petition for writ of habeas corpus with prejudice and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1). Within
IT IS SO ORDERED.
