Filed: Sep. 22, 2016
Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Hearing on September 23, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, the parties jointly move to set this matter for a Status Hearing/
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Hearing on September 23, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, the parties jointly move to set this matter for a Status Hearing/C..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER
GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for Status Hearing on September 23, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, the parties jointly move to set this matter for a Status Hearing/Change of Plea Hearing on October 21, 2016, and to exclude time between September 23, 2016, and October 21, 2016, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The United States provided discovery to defense counsel in this matter on March 6, 2015, including a 106 pages of paper documents and several audio recordings and photographs.
b) Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with her client, review the produced discovery, investigate the charges in this case, research and review issues related to the defendant's criminal history, and otherwise prepare for trial. Additionally, counsel for the defendant desires additional time to review the current plea offer from the United States and to discuss the offer with her client to determine the appropriate course of action for the defendant.
c) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. Indeed, counsel for the defendant is currently engaged in an unrelated state court trial that has required a substantial investment of time.
d) The United States does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of September 23, 2016 to October 21, 2016, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
