MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.

Through this class action, Plaintiffs Deborah DeCoteau and Lilliana Navia bring claims under various consumer protection statutes against Defendant FCA US LLC (f/k/a/Chrysler Group LLC). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief because Defendant knowingly manufactured and marketed vehicles known as "Dodge Darts" (hereafter, the "Dart") that were equipped with defective transmissions. Presently before the Court are Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") for failure to state a claim ("Motion to Dismiss") and Alternative Motion to Dismiss Request for Recall-Related Relief ("Recall Motion to Dismiss"). ECF Nos. 36-37. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs have not satisfied the requirement—set out in the Court's prior order—that they allege specific facts that plausibly support the existence of a defect for which Defendant is responsible in order to give Defendant sufficient notice to defend against their claims. Nor have they plausibly connected the existence of the alleged defect to the injuries they claim to have suffered. The Court therefore GRANTS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES the Plaintiffs' SAC with leave to amend. As a result, the Court need not consider the remaining arguments set forth in Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or the Recall Motion to Dismiss.

BACKGROUND1

Defendant designs and manufactures motor vehicles for sale in the United States and throughout the world. One such vehicle is the Dart. In 2012, Defendant began manufacturing and marketing Darts that were equipped with Dual Dry-Clutch Transmissions ("DDCT"). Defendant characterized the DDCT as a "best of both worlds" transmission that combined a manual transmission's fuel efficiency with an automatic transmission's ease of operation. Traditional manual transmissions require the driver to press a foot pedal to manually change gears. Typical automatic transmissions, on the other hand, obviate the need for manual shifting by substituting a torque converter for the use of a manual clutch. The torque converter transmits power from the engine to the transmission through a fluid medium. Since a clutch-operated gearbox transfers power from the engine more efficiently than a torque converter, automatic transmissions are generally less fuel efficient and slower-shifting than their manual counterparts. The DDCT uses two computerized clutches instead of a torque converter to directly engage and disengage the engine from the transmission, theoretically providing both greater convenience and increased fuel efficiency. The clutches in Defendant's DDCT are characterized as "dry," since unlike "wet" dual clutch systems, they are not bathed in oil.

Plaintiffs are California citizens, each of whom purchased a Dart equipped with a DDCT primarily for personal, family, or household use. Within a year of purchase, Plaintiffs noticed that their Darts would sometimes surge forward or hesitate before taking off from a stop. Approximately a year and a half after she purchased her Dart, Plaintiff DeCoteau experienced a problem in which the vehicle stopped moving while she was driving, as though it was stuck in park or neutral, although the engine continued to run. Plaintiff Navia similarly experienced rough and jerking transmission shifts. In addition, she contends that when she stopped her Dart, the vehicle would automatically move backward. According to Plaintiffs, "one or more design defects" contained in the DDCT's clutches caused these and a host of other problems. Because these problems severely affect a driver's ability to control speed, acceleration, and deceleration, Plaintiffs contend they present a safety hazard to DDCT-equipped Dart occupants. The defect also purportedly causes premature wear to the DDCT and related components. Each of Plaintiffs' causes of action depends on the existence of a defect.

Plaintiffs filed this suit in state court on December 4, 2014, and Defendant subsequently removed the case to this Court. ECF No. 1. On March 20, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("FAC") for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6),2 ECF No. 21, which the Court granted with leave to amend, ECF No. 29. On January 8, 2016, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). ECF No. 31. On March 9, 2016, Defendant filed two motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6): one to dismiss the claims brought against it and one to dismiss the injunctive relief sought by Plaintiffs. ECF Nos. 36-37.

STANDARD

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) "requires only `a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief' in order to `give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require detailed factual allegations. However, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. (citation omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a "legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the pleading must contain something more than "a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action")).

Furthermore, "Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (citation omitted). Thus, "[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirements of providing not only `fair notice' of the nature of the claim, but also `grounds' on which the claim rests." Id. (citing Wright & Miller, supra, at 94-95). A pleading must contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. If the "plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed." Id. However, "[a] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and `that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.'" Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be "freely given" where there is no "undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment . . . ." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors merit equal weight. Rather, "The consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . carries the greatest weight." Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that "the complaint could not be saved by any amendment." Intri-Plex Techs. V. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .")).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs' FAC "present[ed] a close question regarding the level of factual specificity necessary to plead claims based on product defects." Mem. & Order 5:10-11, ECF No. 29. Defendant's motion to dismiss was granted because Plaintiffs made only "a conclusory allegation that the Transmission Defect exists and is responsible for the injuries outlined in the FAC." Id. at 7:7-8. "[A]utomatic transmissions, including the DDCT, are complicated systems that demand more detailed factual allegations in order to identify a plausible defect." Id. at 7:8-10. In order to make a viable claim, "Plaintiffs must also plausibly connect the existence of the alleged defect to the injuries they claim to have suffered." Id. at 7:13-14.

In response, Plaintiffs narrowed their claim to the DDCT's clutches. Plaintiffs allege in their SAC that the clutches suffer from a design defect,3 rendering them "not robust enough for the application." SAC ¶ 14, ECF No. 31. While this would seem to indicate something along the lines of a deficiency in structural integrity,4 it is not entirely clear what the allegation means. Nowhere in Plaintiffs' SAC do they define what they intend by the phrase, "not robust enough," or indicate how insufficient "robustness" contributes to their alleged injuries. Plaintiffs' opposition to the motion, though, contends that "the DDCT's clutches are insufficiently robust because they operate without the heat management of a wet clutch system." Pls.' Opp'n to Mot. To Dismiss 5:14-15, ECF No. 39. Though all plausible inferences must be drawn in favor of the Plaintiffs in the pleading stage, it is not plausible to infer from the SAC that insufficient "robustness" is a result of the DDCT status as a "dry" system; the SAC makes no attempt to connect these two ideas. Though the DDCT is described as a "dry" system and the SAC explains generally what a "dry" system is, the SAC contains no allegation that foregoing the use of oil baths, as found in a "wet" system, renders the DDCT defective. Though this connection is made in Plaintiffs' opposition papers, the Court is not permitted to consider new allegations made outside of the complaint itself in response to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Schneider v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) ("In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff's moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss.").

Even assuming that the SAC sufficiently alleged the lack of a "wet" system made the clutches "not robust enough," Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly connect this alleged defect to the injuries they purportedly suffered. The SAC only states that "one or more design defects . . . cause" the complained of injuries. SAC ¶ 14, ECF No. 31. Once again, only in Plaintiffs' opposition papers do they provide the missing link. There, Plaintiffs claim that "it is plausible . . . that overheated and warped (`fried') clutches (which are caused by an inadequate cooling system in FCA's dry clutch design) are responsible for the symptoms that Plaintiffs allege." Pls.' Opp. To Mot. To Dismiss 2:4-6, ECF No. 39. As before, this Court may only consider the complaint itself. Nowhere in the complaint is this connection between the DDCTs being "dry" and the alleged injuries drawn. Indeed, there is not even any mention of overheating and warping of the clutches.5

Furthermore, in their opposition papers, Plaintiffs characterize the immediate cause of the alleged injuries to be "fried" clutches. However, only one of the two named plaintiffs' cars—Navia's—allegedly had "fried" clutches. SAC ¶ 49, ECF No. 31. As for Plaintiff DeCoteau, the SAC only includes the bare statement that "the defect in Plaintiff DeCoteau's vehicle is located in the clutches." Id. at ¶ 40. This is despite the immediately preceding paragraph, which alleges that the fault in Defendant's repairs was that its authorized dealer "was not able to program [the Transmission Control Module] correctly." Id. at ¶ 39. Thus, even if the allegation that the clutches were "not robust enough" were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and the connection between this alleged defect and the alleged injuries suffered were clearly laid out in the SAC, the defect—as described by Plaintiffs in their opposition papers—has only been alleged to exist in Plaintiff Navia's car, not Plaintiff DeCoteau's.

As discussed in this Court's prior order, the Ninth Circuit has not squarely addressed the level of detail necessary under these circumstances, nor is there any consensus at the district level. Compare Aguilar v. General Motors, LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00437, 2013 WL 5670888, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2013) (finding an allegation of a "steering defect that can result in potential failure of power steering . . . and a loss of steering control during the normal course of driving" sufficient to survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)), with Fontalvo ex rel. Fontalvo v. Sikorsky Aircraft Corp., 2013 WL 4401437, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013) (dismissing cause of action because the plaintiff failed to allege what particular component was defective or what aspects of the components design and manufacture made it defective).

The Court does not necessarily expect all plaintiffs to have to "plead the mechanical details" of a defect in order to state a claim. See Cholakyan v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, 796 F.Supp.2d 1220, 1237 n.60 (C.D. Cal. 2011). However, the level of specificity required appears to directly correlate to the complexity of the machinery in question. See, e.g., Yagman, 2014 WL 4177295, at *2 (requiring more detailed factual allegations where either engine or electrical system could have possibly been defective); Fontalvo, 2013 WL 4401437, at *4 (allegations about a "wide array of parts" that made helicopter defective were insufficient to state claims for strict products liability, negligence and breach of warranty). Accordingly, Plaintiffs must allege the specific facts that plausibly support their belief in the existence of a defect for which Defendant is responsible in order to give Defendant sufficient notice to defend against their claims, and plausibly connect the existence of the alleged defect to the injuries they claim to have suffered. Plaintiffs must do so in their complaint, and not in opposition papers. Plaintiffs' SAC falls short of these requirements, and accordingly Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend.

Because Plaintiffs' failure to plausibly allege the existence of a defect requires dismissal of the SAC in its entirety, the Court declines to consider Defendant's other arguments in support of its Motion. For the same reason, the Recall Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 36, is GRANTED with leave to amend. Plaintiffs are directed to file an amended complaint no later than sixty (60) days from the date of this order. Defendant's Recall Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 37, is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.