Filed: Sep. 29, 2016
Latest Update: Sep. 29, 2016
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER SHEILA K. OBERTO , Magistrate Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 3, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 17, 2017, and to exclude time between October 3, 2016, and January 17, 2017. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government has repre
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER SHEILA K. OBERTO , Magistrate Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 3, 2016. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 17, 2017, and to exclude time between October 3, 2016, and January 17, 2017. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government has repres..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 3, 2016.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until January 17, 2017, and to exclude time between October 3, 2016, and January 17, 2017.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 3,462 of Bates-numbered discovery, comprised of bank records, surveillance recordings, and store records, among other things. All of this discovery has been either Bates-numbered and produced directly to counsel in digital format and/or made available for inspection and copying.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to consult with their clients, conduct investigation, review discovery, discuss potential resolutions with their clients, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants also report that the defendants have recently suffered an unexpected loss of a close family member, which necessitates additional time for counsel to meet with clients to go over discovery and discuss the case.
d) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e) The government does not object to the continuance.
f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 3, 2016 to January 17, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
