ERICA P. GROSJEAN, Magistrate Judge.
Leonard Ransom, Jr. ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint alleges that certain prison officials filed false charges against him through prison disciplinary proceedings, which in one case led to a criminal case. Plaintiff was exonerated of these charges. In the meantime, Plaintiff had spent time in Administrative Segregation and also participated in parole proceedings that referenced the allegedly false charges. Plaintiff primarily claims that the false charges violated his due process rights.
For the reasons described below, the Court recommends dismissing Plaintiff's complaint with leave to amend. In order to state a claim for a violation of due process, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a liberty interest without Due Process. Here, Plaintiff was exonerated of the charges and not subjected to additional punishment as a result of the charges. Although he was placed in Administrative Segregation and the false charges were referenced in his parole hearing, these deprivations do not amount to a loss of a constitutionally protected liberty interest such that Plaintiff was entitled to procedural due process. Additionally, the mere filing of false disciplinary charges does not violate due process; rather it entitles a plaintiff to procedures to resolve the charges. If charges are filed in order to penalize Plaintiff for his exercise of constitutional rights, such a situation could be a violation of constitutional rights. It does not appear to be the case here, where Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendants filed false charges in retaliation for Plaintiff assaulting a fellow officer, which is not constitutionally protected conduct. Nevertheless, the Court recommends giving Plaintiff leave to amend to assert facts, if any, that would indicate that Defendants filed the charges in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising his constitutional rights.
The Court
Plaintiff initially agreed to stand on his original complaint, and the Court authorized service of that complaint. (ECF No. 16). However, Plaintiff then asked to correct two errors in his complaint: changing Defendant Castro's first initial from L. to J., and replacing the date "4/5/09" in paragraph 24 of the complaint to "5/5/09." (ECF No. 20). The Court denied this request and gave Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to make these changes. (ECF No. 22). Plaintiff proceeded to file an amended complaint with these changes. (ECF No. 24). Plaintiff's first amended complaint included only the defendants permitted by the Court's prior screening order, made the above-indicated changes, and was otherwise substantially similar to the prior complaint. (ECF No. 27). Accordingly, the Court found the first amended complaint appropriate for service. (
On June 7, 2016, Defendants Castro and Herrera filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 32). On July 7, 2016, defendant Brannum filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 38). On November 2, 2016, defendant Brannum filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's clarification and objection to defendant Brannum's reply in support of defendant Brannum's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 57). These motions are now before the Court.
Plaintiff alleges in his first amended complaint (ECF No. 24) that on March 4, 2009, while Plaintiff was incarcerated in Kern Valley State Prison, C/O Herrera and Sgt. Brannum approached Plaintiff's cell in order to transport Plaintiff to a medical appointment outside the prison. As they approached Plaintiff's cell, Plaintiff heard Herrera say to Brannum that "this is the one with the staff assault."
Approximately ten days prior, Herrera was involved in transporting Plaintiff to a court proceeding. During the transport, Herrera continued to ask Plaintiff about his case, which involved assault against a correctional officer that is a friend of Herrera's. Plaintiff alleges that during the previous transport, Herrera became angry at Plaintiff for his unwillingness to discuss his case.
Once Herrera and Brannum arrived at Plaintiff's cell, Plaintiff began to go through the routine unclothed body search procedures, including bending and squatting. When Plaintiff squatted, Herrera ordered Plaintiff to squat "all the way down." Plaintiff alleges that he told Herrera and Brannum that because he had a bad disc in his lower back, he could not squat all the way down. After that Plaintiff alleges that Herrera and Brannum became verbally abusive. Plaintiff told them to "get away from my door, I'm not going." Brannum told Plaintiff: "I'll say you assaulted my officer." Brannum and Herrera then left.
Approximately ten to fifteen minutes later, a sergeant arrived at Plaintiff's cell, and informed him that Herrera and Brannum accused him of grabbing Herrera through the tray slot. Plaintiff was then taken to a holding cage and was examined by a nurse in order to complete a Medical Report of Injury or Unusual Occurrence.
Upon Plaintiff's return to his cell, he discussed the incident with two other inmates. Both inmates told Plaintiff what they observed and heard, and that they would testify that Plaintiff did nothing wrong. Both inmates provided declarations under penalty of perjury. The same day, Plaintiff filed a staff complaint/inmate appeal regarding the issue.
On March 17, 2009, Plaintiff was formally charged (by a Rules Violation Report ("RVR")) with battery on a peace officer. According to the charging document, Herrera alleged that Plaintiff reached his right arm through the cell port and grabbed Herrera's wrist and forearm in an attempt to gain control of Herrera. Plaintiff was advised that the RVR would be referred to the Kern County District Attorney's Office for possible criminal prosecution.
On May 5, 2009, Lt. Castro interviewed Plaintiff regarding his staff complaint/inmate appeal. Plaintiff advised Castro that he had declarations from two witnesses to the event. Castro asked Plaintiff for the declarations, and he provided her with copies. Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff was served with another RVR, charging Plaintiff with falsification of records or documents for submitting a false declaration. Plaintiff alleges that the second RVR was based on Lt. Castro's interview of one of his witnesses, inmate Johnson. When Lt. Castro asked Johnson what he knew of "Ransom," Johnson indicated that he did not know anyone by that name. Plaintiff indicates that Johnson would have known Plaintiff by "J.R.," not Ransom.
Lt. Castro denied Plaintiff's appeal, finding that the officer and Sgt. Brannum did nothing wrong. Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Castro failed to interview the other witness, inmate Reed, failed to check Plaintiff's medical records, and failed to talk to Sgt. A. Day.
On May 15, 2009, Plaintiff was interviewed by C/O Chavez, the assigned investigative employee for the RVR charging Plaintiff with making a false declaration. Plaintiff explained to Chavez that Johnson knew him by a different name. Plaintiff alleges that C/O Chavez interviewed Johnson, and Johnson confirmed that he knew Plaintiff, and that Johnson had in fact authored the declaration.
On June 9, 2009, Plaintiff appeared for a previously scheduled Board of Parole hearing to determine his suitability for parole. Plaintiff alleges that "both RVR's of 3/4/09 and 5/5/09 were in the [Life Prisoner Evaluation for the Board of Parole Hearings] [R]eport authored by I. Garza, which was before the Board, and relied on (in large part) to justify an unsuitability finding, which prompted the Board to push back [Plaintiff's] next Board hearing to 6/9/19, based, in part, on false and unsubstantiated RVRs."
Plaintiff alleges that about three days later he was exonerated on the falsification of records charge. Plaintiff subsequently sent numerous Inmate Requests for Interviews to Lt. Castro, "to correct her error" and re-examine the appeal. Lt. Castro never responded to the requests.
On August 14, 2009, the Kern County District Attorney's Office accepted the case for prosecution and Plaintiff was arraigned on the charges of battery on a non-inmate. On September 10, 2010, the district attorney requested that the court dismiss the case in the interest of justice.
On July 22, 2011, a disciplinary hearing was conducted on Plaintiff's RVR charge of battery on a correctional officer. The Senior Hearing Officer, Lt. Randall, after reviewing the evidence, exonerated Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that the following factual findings were made by Lt. Randall:
Lt. Randall also noted that "numerous discrepancies have been identified within the documents provided for this RVR, to include due process violations that cannot be corrected at this institution. Therefore, this RVR is being dismissed in the interest of justice."
As to his injury, Plaintiff states that he was subject to Administrative Segregation for 82 days, during which both of his parents died. Additionally, the false charges were presented to the parole board and affected their decision to make an unsuitability finding against him. The false charges are still located in Plaintiff's Central File, on various 128-G's, Administrative Segregation documents, and BPH documents. "The mental, emotional, and physical deterioration of going through the court process when falsely accused, and the failure of Lt. J. Castro to rectify the matter, when falsely accused, by peace officers, cannot be overstated."
On October 17, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to file a supplemental brief in regards to defendant Brannum's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 54). The Court granted Plaintiff's motion. (ECF No. 55). On October 26, 2016, Plaintiff filed a "clarification and objection" to defendant Brannum's reply to Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 56). On November 2, 2016, defendant Brannum filed a motion to strike the clarification and objection. (ECF No. 57). On November 14, 2016, Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief in support of his opposition to defendant Brannum's motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 58). On November 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed opposition to defendant Brannum's motion to strike. (ECF No. 60).
Defendant Brannum argues that the "clarification and objection" should be stricken because it is an impermissible sur-reply. (ECF No. 57-1, p. 2). According to defendant Brannum, while the Court gave Plaintiff permission to file a supplemental brief, it did not give Plaintiff leave to file a sur-reply. (
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense of any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
The Court will strike Plaintiff's "clarification and objection."
Defendants Castro and Herrera filed a request that the Court take judicial notice of Plaintiff's original complaint in
"The Court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court's territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). However, "[g]enerally, the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is limited to the contents of the complaint."
The Court will deny Defendants Castro and Herrera's request for judicial notice. While the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff filed a complaint in a different case in this district, Defendants appear to be asking that the Court take judicial notice of facts asserted in that complaint. In other words, Defendants are attempting to use Plaintiff's own words against him. While Plaintiff's factual allegations in another complaint would be relevant for determining the underlying merits of the case, they are not properly the subject of judicial notice. Additionally, the scope of review at the motion to dismiss stage of a case is limited to the contents of the complaint.
The only remaining claims are against Defendants Brannum and Herrera for conspiracy, and against Defendant Castro for violation of due process. Defendants Brannum and Herrera move to have the conspiracy claim dismissed against them on the ground that Plaintiff has no constitutional right to be free from receiving false disciplinary charges and has not alleged that there was a conspiracy to violate a specific constitutional right (ECF Nos. 32-1, p. 8 & 38-1, p 8). Defendant Castro moves to have the claim against her dismissed because Plaintiff has no constitutional right to be free from receiving false disciplinary charges, because Castro is entitled to qualified immunity, and because Plaintiff received all the due process to which he was entitled. (ECF No. 32-1, p. 7).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is properly granted where the complaint lacks "a cognizable legal theory" or "sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory."
In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court generally considers only the contents of the complaint and accepts as true the facts alleged in the complaint.
In the Court's screening order, the Court upheld a claim against Defendants Brannum and Herrera for conspiracy on the basis that "[t]he facts alleged indicate that Brannum, in the presence of Herrera and Plaintiff, stated his intention to falsely charge Plaintiff with staff assault. Plaintiff alleges that Herrera falsely accused him, and that Plaintiff was exonerated based upon false testimony of Herrera." (ECF No. 9) The Court cited law indicating that there must be a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights,
Plaintiff alleges that the filing of false charges, which resulted in criminal charges, violated his Due Process rights and his constitutional right against malicious prosecution. (ECF No. 52, at p. 8-9).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
After hearing processes, Plaintiff was exonerated and the charges were dropped, so Plaintiff did not suffer any punishment or deprivation of a liberty interest directly as a result of the false charges. However, Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights were nevertheless violated because he suffered from the false rules violations reports themselves. Additionally, while the RVR charges were pending, Plaintiff was subjected to administrative segregation and his parole proceedings were negatively influenced by the charges.
The Court analyzes these questions below.
A conspiracy claim brought under section 1983 requires proof of "an agreement or meeting of the minds to violate constitutional rights."
The Court has reviewed the law on this subject in depth and finds that filing false allegations by itself does not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights so long as (1) the prisoner receives procedural due process before there is a deprivation of liberty as a result of false allegations, and (2) the false allegations are not in retaliation for the prisoner exercising constitutional rights. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held in
Thus, Plaintiff's claim for conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights based on Defendants Brannum and Herrera merely submitting a false rules violation report does not state a cognizable claim for violation of the United States Constitution. The facts alleged in the first amended complaint do not show that the disciplinary proceedings that resulted lacked due process, and indeed Plaintiff was exonerated and did not receive any punishment as a result of those proceedings. Even taking as true that Defendants Brannum and Herrera conspired to file a false rules violation report against Plaintiff, this alone does not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights.
That does not mean that filing false charges comports with prison regulations or state law. The question before this Court, however, is whether filing false allegations violated Plaintiff's rights under the United States Constitution. So long as Plaintiff received the appropriate procedures after receiving the false charges against him, the fact that he received false prison disciplinary charges does not violate his constitutional rights.
In Plaintiff's opposition, Plaintiff refers to the law regarding malicious prosecution and states that because the false charges resulted in criminal charges being filed allegedly without probable cause, his constitutional rights were violated because he was maliciously prosecuted. The Court notes that the Supreme Court currently has before it a case (
The Ninth Circuit has held that merely filing false criminal charges, i.e. malicious prosecution, does not violate a Plaintiff's constitutional rights; instead a plaintiff must allege that the false criminal charges were filed in order to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights. The Ninth Circuit explained the rule as follows: "In [the Ninth] circuit, the general rule is that a claim of malicious prosecution is not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if process is available within the state judicial system to provide a remedy. However, an exception exists to the general rule when a malicious prosecution is conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights."
The
Similar to the business operator in Poppell, Awabdy does not assert that he has a substantive due process right under the constitution to be free from malicious prosecution. . . . Rather, . . . Awabdy contends that the defendants conspired to deprive him of: (1) his First Amendment free speech rights by unlawfully interfering with his campaign for reelection; (2) his right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by intentionally causing the District Attorney to bring an unfounded action against him because of racial animus towards Arab Americans; and (3) his Thirteenth Amendment rights by using a criminal prosecution to coerce him into repaying a debt. We hold that the district court erred in ruling, as a matter of law, that First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendment injuries cannot provide a basis for asserting a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983. We further conclude that, because Awabdy properly alleged that the defendants engaged in malicious conduct with the purpose of depriving him of his constitutional rights to free speech and equal protection, he stated a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 with respect to the alleged First and Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Here, Plaintiff's complaint does not allege that the false charges were made in retaliation or for the purpose of depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional rights. Instead, Plaintiff's complaint appears to allege that the false charges were filed in retaliation for Plaintiff assaulting another correctional officer. Assaulting an officer is not constitutionally protected conduct and thus false charges filed in retaliation for that assault does not establish a constitutional violation (again, it is possible that such allegations state a state law claim for malicious prosecution, but they do not state a federal section 1983 claim).
These legal standards were not fully set out in the Court's screening order, which upheld a claim for conspiracy. Accordingly, the Court recommends giving Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint.
The second question in evaluating whether Plaintiff states a claim against Defendants Brannum and Herrera for conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights is whether Plaintiff unconstitutionally suffered from the false charges because he was confined to Administrative Segregation and because the false charges were used in his parole hearing before the hearing process on the false charges concluded in his favor. Again, a plaintiff's rights to due process are violated with a Plaintiff is deprived of a significant liberty interest without due process. Here, Plaintiff was put into Administrative Segregation and met with the parole board before he received procedural due process on the false charges through the hearing process. Thus, the Court must evaluate whether the placement in Administrative Segregation and use of the charges at a parole hearing constituted a significant deprivation of a liberty interest entitling Plaintiff to due process.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in determining if disciplinary proceedings resulting in 30 days solitary confinement had to comply with Due Process, provided the following guidance in determining when there is a deprivation of liberty interests such that procedural due process is due in the prison context:
Thus, in
Applying the
That said, if Plaintiff's parole were truly denied solely because of false charges, Plaintiff may have a constitutional claim, but that claim would be proper as a habeas corpus petition—not section 1983, because it challenges the legality of his confinement.
The second claim that the Court upheld during screening was a claim against Defendant Castro for violation of due process. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Castro issued a false RVR against Plaintiff. Plaintiff also seems to allege that Defendant Castro violated his due process rights when she denied his inmate staff complaint/inmate appeal, which was filed in regards to the incident on March 4, 2009, before Plaintiff was formally charged with the RVR for battery on a police officer (ECF No. 24, pgs. 6-7). Defendant Castro found that "the officer" and defendant Brannum did nothing wrong. Plaintiff alleges that, during her investigation of Plaintiff's grievance against Brannum, Defendant Castro failed to interview a witness, failed to check Plaintiff's medical records, and failed to talk to Sgt. A. Day. Based on the facts alleged in the first amended complaint it appears that Defendant Castro was not involved in investigating the RVR against Plaintiff for battery on a peace officer.
Defendant Castro argues that the claim against her should be dismissed because there is no constitutional protection against false charges, because Defendant Castro has qualified immunity for issuing the RVR, and because Plaintiff received all of the due process to which he was entitled. (ECF No. 32-1, p. 9).
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Castro violated his procedural due process rights and his substantive due process rights, and that she is not entitled to qualified immunity. (ECF No. 108-15).
As discussed above, the Due Process Clause protects against the deprivation of liberty without due process of law.
"[A prison] grievance procedure is a procedural right only, it does not confer any substantive right upon the inmates."
"Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not apply."
As to Plaintiff's claim regarding the allegedly false RVR issued by Defendant Castro, as analyzed above, Defendant Castro's issuance of a false charge against Plaintiff does not by itself state a violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. A plaintiff must allege that the false charges were brought in order to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Here, there are no such allegations.
In fact, based on the facts alleged in the complaint, the false RVR seems to have been issued based on a misunderstanding. Defendant Castro asked an inmate who signed a declaration supporting Plaintiff's story what knowledge he had of Plaintiff, but apparently used a name for Plaintiff that the inmate did not know. Because the name was unfamiliar to the inmate, he said he had no knowledge of Plaintiff. Based on that, Defendant Castro apparently thought Plaintiff falsified the declaration, and so issued the RVR for falsification of records or documents. There is no allegation or indication that this was done with the intent to deprive Plaintiff of a constitutional right.
As to the required procedural due process, it appears that Plaintiff received procedural due process in the adjudication of the RVR for falsification of documents. There are no allegations in the first amended complaint that Plaintiff was not provided the procedural protections required by
As to the claim that Defendant Castro failed to interview a witness, failed to check Plaintiff's medical records, and failed to talk to Sgt. A. Day in regards to Plaintiff's separate staff complaint/inmate appeal against Castro, this too does not state a claim for violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. The procedures involved here concern Plaintiff's grievance against an officer and would not result in a loss of any liberty interest by Plaintiff. As discussed in the law cited above, there is no due process required in processing a prison grievance because there is no chance of depriving Plaintiff of a protected liberty interest. Accordingly, even if defendant Castro failed to thoroughly investigate Plaintiff's staff complaint/inmate appeal, she did not violate Plaintiff's due process rights.
Plaintiff is mistaken in his reliance on
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Castro somehow deprived Plaintiff of his due process right to a fair and impartial investigation with respect to the criminal charges against him, and effectively denied Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard. (ECF No. 46, p. 112). However, based on the facts in the first amended complaint, Defendant Castro was only was involved in investigating Plaintiff's staff complaint/inmate appeal. (ECF No. 24, pgs. 7-8). She appears to have had no responsibility for anything related to the criminal case against Plaintiff for battery on a non-inmate. Moreover, it appears that Plaintiff was exonerated for the criminal charges, and thus can only state a constitutional claim if the false charges were done in retaliation for Plaintiff exercising constitutional rights.
Both Plaintiff and Defendant Castro discuss Plaintiff's parole hearing. As analyzed above, Plaintiff's due process rights were not violated by the fact that the administrative segregation and parole proceedings took place before the disciplinary hearings were concluded because the false charges were just one part of a process, which included the ability for Plaintiff to explain those charges (again, if Plaintiff alleges that the false charges were solely responsible for him losing parole, he could have a constitutional claim, but it would be a petition for habeas corpus).
Therefore, based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that the claim against Defendant Castro for violation of Plaintiff's due process rights be dismissed, with leave to amend.
Because the Court has found that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant Castro, the Court need not address the issue of qualified immunity.
The Court finds that Defendants Herrera and Castro's motion to dismiss should be granted, and that Defendant Brannum's motion to dismiss should be granted. The claim for conspiracy against defendants Herrera and Brannum and the claim for violation of due process against Defendant Castro should be dismissed.
The Court recommends giving Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint to the extent he believes he can assert factual allegations that any defendant filed false charges against Plaintiff in order to deprive him of constitutional rights, such as in retaliation for exercising such rights, as discussed above.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing,
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Court Judge assigned to this action pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). Within
Further, it is ORDERED that defendant Brannum's motion to strike Plaintiff's clarification and objection to defendant Brannum's reply in support of defendant Brannum's motion to dismiss is GRANTED and Plaintiff's "clarification and objection" (ECF No. 56) is STRICKEN from the record.
It is further ORDERED that defendants Castro and Herrera's request for judicial notice (ECF No. 32-2) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
