Filed: Jan. 19, 2017
Latest Update: Jan. 19, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 12, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until January 26, 2017, and to exclude time between January 12, 2017, and January 26, 2017, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the follo
Summary: STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 12, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until January 26, 2017, and to exclude time between January 12, 2017, and January 26, 2017, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the follow..
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STIPULATION TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 12, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, the parties move to continue the status conference until January 26, 2017, and to exclude time between January 12, 2017, and January 26, 2017, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has produced discovery in the form of investigative reports and related documents, as well photographs and video evidence, which the defendant requires additional time to review, discuss with his counsel, and pursue investigation.
b) Defense counsel believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 12, 2017 to January 26, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
The Court, having received, read, and considered the parties' stipulation, and good cause appearing therefore, adopts the parties' stipulation in its entirety as its order. It specifically finds the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court further finds the ends of justice are served by granting the requested continuance and outweigh the best interests of the public and defendant in a speedy trial.
Time from the date the parties stipulated, up to and including January 26, 2017, shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and(B)(iv) (Local Code T4). It is further ordered January 12, 2017 status conference shall be continued until and January 26, 2017, at 10:00 a.m.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
