Filed: Feb. 03, 2017
Latest Update: Feb. 03, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 6, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, the parties jointly request that the Court vacate the February 6, 2017 status hearing and set this matter for jury trial to commence on August 1, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. and trial confirmation hearing on May 8, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. Additionally, the parties jointly
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 6, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, the parties jointly request that the Court vacate the February 6, 2017 status hearing and set this matter for jury trial to commence on August 1, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. and trial confirmation hearing on May 8, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. Additionally, the parties jointly ..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on February 6, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, the parties jointly request that the Court vacate the February 6, 2017 status hearing and set this matter for jury trial to commence on August 1, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. and trial confirmation hearing on May 8, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. Additionally, the parties jointly request that the Court exclude time under Local Codes T2 and T4 between February 6, 2017, and August 1, 2017 owing to the need for defense counsel to prepare for trial and the complexity of this case.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to prepare for trial in this matter. This matter involves a year-long investigation. The discovery includes hours of wiretapped conversation in the Spanish language. Counsel for the defendants need time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and prepare for the trial in this matter.
b) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
c) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
d) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of February 6, 2017 to August 1, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
