STIPULATION AND [PROPOSED] ORDER FOR CONTINUANCE OF STATUS HEARING AND FOR EXCLUSION OF TIME

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., District Judge.

Defendant David Smith, by and through Linda M. Parisi, his counsel of record, and plaintiff, by and through its counsel, Assistant United States Attorney Justin Lee, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. This matter is set for status on March 10, 2017.

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now moves to continue the status conference until March 24, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. and to exclude time between March 10, 2017 and March 24, 2017 under Local Code T4. The United States does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for Mr. Smith needs to postpone 2 weeks due to counsel conducting further legal research.

b. The United States Attorney agrees to the continuance.

c. All counsel agrees to the continuance.

d. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 10, 2017 and March 24, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local CodeT4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

Based on the reasons set forth in the stipulation of the parties filed on March 8, 2017, and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the status conference currently set for March 10, 2017, be vacated and that a status conference be set for March 24, 2017, at 9:00 a.m. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, for the reasons stated in the parties' stipulation, the time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act is excluded during the time period of March 10, 2017 and March 24, 2017, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code 25.