Filed: Mar. 13, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 13, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 14, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between March 14, 2017, and April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the fo
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 14, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between March 14, 2017, and April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the fol..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 14, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., and to exclude time between March 14, 2017, and April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) Counsel for Defendant desire additional time to continue to review discovery, conduct investigation, engage in negotiations, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
b) Additionally, the parties require more time to discuss and research a legal issue related to the disposition of the case.
c) Counsel for defendant believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 14, 2017 to April 18, 2017 at 9:15 a.m., inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
