ORDER

KENDALL J. NEWMAN, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Jeffrey Edmonds seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying plaintiff's application for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI, respectively, of the Social Security Act ("Act").1 In his motion for summary judgment, plaintiff principally contends that the Commissioner erred by finding that plaintiff was not disabled from June 15, 2008, his alleged disability onset date, through the date of the final administrative decision. (ECF No. 12.) The Commissioner opposed plaintiff's motion and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 15.) No optional reply brief was filed.

For the reasons that follow, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was born on March 17, 1962, has a ninth grade education, can communicate in English, and previously worked as a landscape laborer, taxi driver, and fast food cook. (Administrative Transcript ("AT") 19, 30, 191, 193-94.)2 On June 27, 2012, plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI, alleging that his disability began on June 15, 2008, and that he was disabled due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder ("COPD"), asthma, emphysema, lower back pain, carpal tunnel, gout, arthritis, anxiety, comprehension problems, and depression. (AT 10, 75-76, 175, 177, 192.) After plaintiff's application was denied initially and on reconsideration, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), which took place on June 25, 2014, and at which plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. (AT 10, 24-52.) The ALJ subsequently issued a decision dated October 15, 2014, determining that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from June 15, 2008, plaintiff's alleged disability onset date, through the date of the ALJ's decision. (AT 10-19.) The ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied plaintiff's request for review on January 27, 2016. (AT 1-3.) Plaintiff then filed this action in federal district court on March 30, 2016, to obtain judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision. (ECF No. 1.)

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, plaintiff argues that the ALJ erroneously determined at step two of the sequential disability evaluation process that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

IV. DISCUSSION

Summary of the ALJ's Findings

The ALJ evaluated plaintiff's entitlement to DIB and SSI pursuant to the Commissioner's standard five-step analytical framework.3 As an initial matter, the ALJ determined that plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act for purposes of DIB through December 31, 2009. (AT 12.) At the first step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 15, 2008, plaintiff's alleged disability onset date. (Id.) At step two, the ALJ found that plaintiff had the following severe impairments: chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, hypertension, obstructive sleep apnea, and obesity. (Id.) However, at step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (AT 16.)

Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ assessed plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") as follows:

(AT 16.)

At step four, the ALJ determined, in reliance on the VE's testimony, that plaintiff was capable of performing his past relevant work as a taxi driver (with a specific vocational preparation ["SVP"] level of 3) and fast food cook (with a SVP level of 5). (AT 19.) Thus, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, from June 15, 2008, through the date of the ALJ's decision. (Id.)

Plaintiff's Substantive Challenges to the Commissioner's Determinations

In this case, the consultative examining psychologist who evaluated plaintiff, Dr. Miles White, diagnosed plaintiff with a mood disorder not otherwise specified and borderline intellectual functioning. (AT 286.) As noted above, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in finding that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment at step two.

Under the Commissioner's regulations, an impairment or combination of impairments is deemed to be severe at step two if it "significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 404.1521(a). "When we talk about basic work activities, we mean the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. Examples of these include—(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying or handling; (2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking; (3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions; (4) Use of judgment; (5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and (6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b). As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained, "the step-two inquiry is a de minimis screening device to dispose of groundless claims. An impairment or combination of impairments can be found not severe only if the evidence establishes a slight abnormality that has no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work." Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1290 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Under the applicable standard, the ALJ properly determined that plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment at step two. As the ALJ noted, although plaintiff was receiving no mental health treatment and taking no prescription medication at the time that he was evaluated by Dr. White in October 2012, Dr. White assessed plaintiff as having mild or no limitations in almost all of the mental functioning domains, noting that plaintiff's "overall presentation reflected the presence of these psychological symptoms [anxiety and depression], but they were nonpervasive and mild in range of impairment." (AT 279, 281, 286-87.) Indeed, plaintiff himself described his mental symptoms as "fleeting and not pervasive in nature." (AT 281.) Additionally, the state agency psychologists who reviewed plaintiff's records opined that plaintiff's mental impairments were non-severe. (AT 14, 61, 83.)

Plaintiff makes much of the fact that Dr. White found that plaintiff had marked restrictions in his ability to follow and complete detailed and complex instructions. (AT 286.) As an initial matter, plaintiff fails to explain how any marked restriction with respect to detailed and complex instructions necessarily renders plaintiff's mental impairments severe, given that it does not significantly limit a basic work activity as defined in the Commissioner's regulation. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b) (referring to, inter alia, understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions).4

Moreover, even assuming, without deciding, that the ALJ technically erred by not finding a severe mental impairment at step two, that error was harmless. See Curry v. Sullivan, 925 F.2d 1127, 1129 (9th Cir.1990) (harmless error analysis applicable in judicial review of social security cases); Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) ("we may not reverse an ALJ's decision on account of an error that is harmless"). Plaintiff's RFC here was essentially for medium work with some environmental restrictions, and plaintiff does not challenge the ALJ's findings in that regard. (AT 16.) Even if the ALJ had included a limitation to non-detailed, non-complex work in the RFC, plaintiff would have been deemed not disabled at step five based on the Grids, because the Grids take administrative notice of the numbers of unskilled jobs that exist throughout the national economy at various functional levels. 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, § 200.00(b); see also Barbosa v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4929420, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2014) (finding simple, routine work consistent with unskilled work); Chase v. Colvin, 2014 WL 4544096, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 12, 2014) (same). As such, any error was inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination.

V. CONCLUSION

In sum, the court finds that the ALJ's decision is free from prejudicial error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12) is DENIED.

2. The Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.

3. The final decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED, and judgment is entered for the Commissioner.

4. The Clerk of Court shall close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.