Filed: Mar. 29, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 29, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE, AND TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 11, 2017, and to exclude time between March 30, 2017, and May 11, 2017, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a)
Summary: STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE, AND TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 11, 2017, and to exclude time between March 30, 2017, and May 11, 2017, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) T..
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STIPULATION AND ORDER TO CONTINUE STATUS CONFERENCE, AND TO EXCLUDE TIME UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 11, 2017, and to exclude time between March 30, 2017, and May 11, 2017, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has produced over 25,000 pages of discovery associated with this case, including tax returns, bank and credit card statements, investigative reports, and other documents. The government has also made electronic devices and physical evidence available for review.
b) Counsel for the defendants need additional time to meet with their respective clients in order to discuss the evidence and a potential resolution.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 30, 2017, to May 11, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv), Local Code T4, because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
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4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
