Filed: Mar. 29, 2017
Latest Update: Mar. 29, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 18, 2017, and to exclude time between March 30, 2017, and May 18, 2017, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government has r
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2017. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 18, 2017, and to exclude time between March 30, 2017, and May 18, 2017, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The government has re..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, Jr., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on March 30, 2017.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 18, 2017, and to exclude time between March 30, 2017, and May 18, 2017, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 6,600 Bates-stamped pages of investigative reports, photographs, audio recordings, and other materials. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying, and approximately 1,000 pages of materials from certain email accounts was produced to the defendants between March 6, 2017, and March 17, 2017.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time review the recently produced discovery, consult with their respective clients, conduct investigation, and otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 30, 2017 to May 18, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
