SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
On March 24, 2017, Defendants sent a letter to the Court (the "Letter"), in which they request, in relevant part, a second round of "dispositive motion[s]" in this case. Plaintiff G.P.P., Inc., d/b/a Guardian Innovative Solutions ("GIS") sent its response to the Letter to the Court on March 27, 2017. The Court then held an informal conference regarding the Letter on March 28, 2017. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS GIS's request in the Letter for a second round of summary judgment motions, subject to the limitations provided herein.
"District courts have discretion in determining whether to permit successive motions for summary judgment." Brazill v. Cal. Northstate Coll. of Pharmacy, LLC, No. CIV. 2:12-1218 WBS GGH, 2013 WL 4500667, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2013) (citing Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010)). "A successive motion for summary judgment is particularly appropriate on an expanded factual record and to foster the `just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution' of lawsuits." Rodriguez v. Ryan, No. CV-11-1373-PHX-NVW (JFM), 2013 WL 11311297, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 12, 2013) (quoting Hoffman, 593 F.3d at 911-12).
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit cautioned that second or successive motions for summary judgment present "the potential for abuse of the procedure." Hoffman, 593 F.3d at 911. As such, courts "retain discretion to weed out frivolous or simply repetitive motions." Id. (citation omitted). Further, courts have declined to permit second or successive motions for summary judgment where the motion was based on "evidence that could . . . have been obtained and included in [the] first motion for summary judgment." Armentero v. Willis, No. CIV S-08-2790 GGH P, 2013 WL 144253, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2013).
In this case, the Court permitted limited "Additional Discovery," as defined and delineated in the Court's March 14, 2017 order.
The Court ORDERS the following regarding the schedule for this potential second round of summary judgment motions, as well as other relevant dates in this matter:
The Court CAUTIONS the parties that it will not entertain requests to continue or extend any deadlines associated with potential additional motions for summary judgment.
This additional opportunity for summary judgment motions shall be limited"it is not an opportunity for summary judgment motions on any topic. Instead, this opportunity for additional summary judgment motions shall be specifically tailored to the expanded factual record in this case relating to the Additional Discovery.
The Court therefore ORDERS that this additional round of potential summary judgment motions is subject to the following limitations. First, if any party moves for summary judgment on any claim or issue, that party must explicitly and clearly demonstrate in its summary judgment briefing how the new grounds to move on that claim or issue arose out of and directly relate to the Additional Discovery, as delineated in the Court's March 14, 2017 order. (See Doc. 177 at 3.) In other words, if a party could have raised a motion for summary judgment during the initial summary judgment round in this case before the Additional Discovery, they may not raise that motion during this second round of summary judgment. See, e.g., Fujifilm Corp. v. Motorola Mobility LLC, Case No. 12-cv-03587-WHO, 2015 WL 1265009, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (denying a motion as an impermissible second motion for summary judgment because "the motion [was] based on previously available evidence"); Purchase Partners, LLC v. Carver Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 09 Civ. 9687(JMF), 2013 WL 1499417, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2013) ("The law is clear that it is improper for a party to file a successive motion for summary judgment which is not based upon new facts and which seeks to raise arguments it could have raised in its original motion." (citation omitted)).
For example, the parties previously raised numerous motions in limine that the Court denied because they were, in effect, motions for summary judgment in disguise. (See, e.g., Doc. 179 at 40, 65-67.) The parties are not permitted to again raise these motions at the posture of the second round of summary judgment motions unless the moving party explicitly and clearly demonstrates in their summary judgment briefing how the new grounds to move on each claim or issue arose out of and directly relate to the Additional Discovery. Cf. Larsgard v. Corizon Health, Inc., No. CV 13-01747-PHX-SPL (JFM), 2014 WL 5340581, at *12 (D. Ariz. Oct. 21, 2014) (excluding arguments regarding a particular claim from the scope of a second round of summary judgment motions because the party "did not move for summary judgment on [that] claim before the original dispositive-motions deadline").
Additionally, the Additional Discovery pertained solely to "the Product Language under the Ohio, Indiana, Midwest, Alabama, and Tennessee Agreements, as well as the meaning of `Guardian Labeled Distributor Products' under the Pennsylvania Agreement." (Doc. 177 at 3.) The Additional Discovery thus did not include discovery related to the Product Language under the Florida, Mid-Atlantic, and Cook County Agreements. (See id.) As the Product Language under these three agreements was excluded from the Additional Discovery, GIS may not use this second round of summary judgment motions to request that the Court alter its prior summary judgment rulings regarding the Product Language under the Florida, Mid-Atlantic, and Cook County Agreements. Those rulings are now the law of this case and the Court will not disturb them through this second round of summary judgment motions. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 146 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Under the doctrine of law of the case, a court is generally precluded from reconsidering an issue that has already been decided by the same court, or a higher court in the identical case." (citation omitted)).
The Court also notes that any attempt by GIS to use this additional round of summary judgment motions to revisit the Court's prior summary judgment rulings regarding the Product Language under the Florida, Mid-Atlantic, and Cook County Agreements would constitute an abuse of this procedure. As stated by the Court at the hearing regarding the parties' motions in limine, GIS created the need for the Additional Discovery"which resulted in additional costs to Defendants and the continuance of the trial date"by failing to adequately produce evidence during the initial discovery period that GIS eventually intended to rely on at trial. (See Doc. 179 at 68-69.) While the Court found that the sanction of exclusion of this evidence was not appropriate under the pertinent standard, (see id. at 69-70), this finding does not provide an opening for GIS to abuse the opportunity for a second round of summary judgment motions"and waste Defendants' resources"by using its prior failure to disclose this evidence as a means to reopen the Court's rulings regarding the Product Language under the Florida, Mid-Atlantic, and Cook County Agreements. Cf. L-3 Commc'ns Corp. v. Jaxon Eng'g & Maint., Inc., 125 F.Supp.3d 1155, 1162-63 (D. Colo. 2015) (assuming that a party "filed their initial summary judgment motion . . . as a matter of litigation strategy" and denying the party's request to file a successive summary judgment motion because, "[h]aving gambled and lost on that strategy, [the court] sees no reason why the [party] should now be relieved of the consequences of that decision").
The Court CAUTIONS the parties that if a party fails to explicitly and clearly demonstrate in its potential summary judgment briefing how the new grounds to move on each claim or issue arose out of and directly relate to the Additional Discovery, then the Court shall deny the motion as to that claim or issue for failing to adhere to the limitations provided in this Order without reaching the merits of the motion.
Second, given that the parties were already accorded a full opportunity to file summary judgment motions and the extremely limited scope of any permissible additional motions for summary judgment, the Court finds that the length of briefs associated with any additional motions for summary judgment shall be properly limited. In particular, if a party elects to file an additional motion for summary judgment, any brief in support of that motion may not exceed fifteen pages. Additionally, any opposition to an additional motion for summary judgment may not exceed fifteen pages and any reply in support of an additional motion for summary judgment may not exceed eight pages. Further, the parties may not use formatting techniques to evade these page limits, such as using less than twelve-point font or single-line spacing. See, e.g., E.D. Cal. Local Rule 130 (providing the local rule regarding the "general format of documents").
The Court CAUTIONS the parties that these limitations on the length of permissible briefs associated with additional motions for summary judgment shall be strictly enforced. If any party files a brief that exceeds these limits, the Court shall strike the infringing portion of the brief"e.g., the last three pages of an eighteen-page brief in support of an additional motion for summary judgment"without consideration as to the arguments provided therein.
Third, given the narrow scope of permissible additional motions for summary judgment, Defendants may only file a single, joint additional motion for summary judgment. GIS may similarly file only a single additional motion, if it so chooses.
(Doc. 177 at 3.)