SHEILA K. OBERTO, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner Esteban Hernandez, who is detained by the Department of Homeland Security, moves for reconsideration of the Court's November 22, 2016, order adopting findings and recommendations to dismiss his petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The petition sought (1) release and review of Petitioner's continued detention, and (2) release or waiver of the bond requirement on which Petitioner's release is contingent. Respondents opposed the motion, contending that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order Petitioner released or to review the amount set as bond.
On July 20, 2016, after reviewing the record and applicable law, the Magistrate Judge entered findings and recommendations to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court entered an order adopting the findings and recommendations on November 22, 2016.
Reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interest of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003). Courts generally refuse to reopen decided matters. Magnesystems, Inc. v. Nikken, Inc., 933 F.Supp. 944, 948 (C.D.Cal. 1996). "[T]here would be no end to a suit if every obstinate litigant could, by repeated appeals, compel a court to listen to criticisms on their opinions, or speculate on chances from changes of its members." Roberts v. Cooper, 61 U.S. 467, 481 (1857).
To succeed, a party must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision. See Kern-Tulare Water Dist. v. City of Bakersfield, 634 F.Supp. 656, 665 (E.D.Cal. 1986), affirmed in part and reversed in part on other grounds, 828 F.2d 514 (9
As his basis for reconsideration, Petitioner argues that the court erred in determining that it lacked jurisdiction to review Petitioner's continued detention, or to waive the bond required for Petitioner's release. Relying on Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157 (9
"[A]liens facing prolonged detention while their petitions for review of their removal orders are pending are entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge." Singh, 638 F.3d at 1200 (citing Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9
In the course of reaching its decision, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention that federal courts lacked jurisdiction to address Singh's constitutional claims under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e),
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this statutory bar applies only to "a `discretionary judgment' by the Attorney General or a `decision' that the Attorney General has made regarding detention or release." Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516 (2003). The Supreme Court distinguished such claims from constitutional challenges, such as Kim's habeas petition challenging the constitutionality of the statutory framework for detention of aliens, from challenges to the Attorney General's discretionary determinations under § 1226, such as the determination to detain an alien during removal proceedings or the amount set for the detainee's bond. Id.
In Leonardo, the Ninth Circuit again held that it had habeas jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and claims of legal error. Leonardo alleged that he had been detained for a prolonged period without bond and that his bond hearing violated due process. 646 F.3d at 1159, 1160. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court for dismissal of the petition because of Leonardo's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing his habeas petition. Id. at 1161.
In contrast to Singh and Leonardo, the petition in this case does not allege a constitutional claim or a claim of legal error in Petitioner's detention or bond hearings. Instead, the petition alleges that Petitioner's "detention has become prolonged" and "indefinite and potentially permanent." Doc. 1 at 1. Although Petitioner had been provided with both an initial hearing on detention and bail, and the custody status review required by Casas as his detention became prolonged, the immigration court determined not to release Petitioner from custody. Doc. 1 at 25. The decision stated, "A review of your criminal history, Assault, Burglary, Fraud and Grand Theft indicates you may be a threat to the community if released from custody." Id. Petitioner conceded to the immigration court that he had returned to the United States three times following previous removal orders.
The petition challenged the immigration court's finding that Petitioner may be a threat to the community (Doc. 1 at 1) and sought a waiver of the bond required for his release (Doc. 1 at 6). Although Petitioner labels them as due process violations, these claims challenge the Attorney General's discretionary determinations to (1) detain Petitioner and (2) require a set amount of bond ($18,000) for Petitioner's release pending resolution of his appeal claiming U.S. citizenship through his grandmother. Under § 1226(e), a district court lacks habeas jurisdiction over challenges to the Attorney General's discretionary determinations.
A petitioner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition, but may only appeal in certain circumstances. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). The controlling statute in determining whether to issue a certificate of appealability is 28 U.S.C. § 2253, which provides:
If a court denies a habeas petition, the court may only issue a certificate of appealability "if jurists of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Although the petitioner is not required to prove the merits of his case, he must demonstrate "something more than the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith on his. . . part." Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 338.
Reasonable jurists would not find the Court's determination that it lacks jurisdiction over the Attorney General's discretionary determinations concerning Petitioner's detention and the amount of bond to be debatable or wrong, or conclude that the issues presented required further adjudication. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability.
The undersigned recommends that the Court deny the motion for reconsideration of its prior judgment and decline to issue a certificate of appealability.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1). Within
IT IS SO ORDERED.