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U.S. v. Yanez-Barber, 2:16 CR 039 JAM. (2017)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20170501j36 Visitors: 18
Filed: Apr. 26, 2017
Latest Update: Apr. 26, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Juan Carlos Yanez-Barber, Dina L. Santos, Esq., counsel for defendant Claudia Ryan-Barbour, Shari Rusk, Esq., and counsel for defendant Colin Ryan-Barbour, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous o
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Jason Hitt, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Juan Carlos Yanez-Barber, Dina L. Santos, Esq., counsel for defendant Claudia Ryan-Barbour, Shari Rusk, Esq., and counsel for defendant Colin Ryan-Barbour, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on May 2, 2017.

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until June 13, 2017 at 9:15 a.m. and to exclude time between May 2, 2017 and June 13, 2017 under Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:

a. On March 21, 2016, The United States has produced 201 pages of discovery as well as numerous audio files. b. Counsel for the defendants need additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. c. Counsel for the defendants believe the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The Government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of May 2, 2017, to June 13, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv), corresponding to Local Code T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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