Filed: Jun. 08, 2017
Latest Update: Jun. 08, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB , District Judge . STIPULATION The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. The parties appeared before this Court on June 5, 2017, for a status conference in the above-captioned matter. The matter was continued to July 24, 2017, for a motion hearing and further status confe
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER WILLIAM B. SHUBB , District Judge . STIPULATION The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. The parties appeared before this Court on June 5, 2017, for a status conference in the above-captioned matter. The matter was continued to July 24, 2017, for a motion hearing and further status confer..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.
STIPULATION
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through defendant's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. The parties appeared before this Court on June 5, 2017, for a status conference in the above-captioned matter. The matter was continued to July 24, 2017, for a motion hearing and further status conference.
2. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. The government produced to defense counsel discovery associated with this case including the discovery produced in the related case United States v. Katakis, et al., 11-CR-0511 WBS, which consists of approximately 225 GB of electronic records.
b. Counsel for defendant desires additional time to consult with his client, to review discovery, to research and prepare a motion to dismiss the information, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c. To the extent the Speedy Trial Act applies, counsel for defendant believes that failure to exclude time would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings and to the extent the Speedy Trial Act applies, the ends of justice served by granting this request outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. To the extent the Speedy Trial Act applies and for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, within which trial must commence, the time period of June 5, 2017 to July 24, 2017, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(ii) and (iv), Local Codes T2 and T4, because the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
3. If and when defense counsel files a motion to dismiss the information due June 19, 2017, time will also be excludable during the pendency of the motion pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D).
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
