SCHEDULING ORDER

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO RE-SEND COPY OF ITS SEPTEMBER 16, 2016 ORDER (ECF No. 23)

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIMEAS MOOT (ECF No. 48)

ERICA P. GROSJEAN, Magistrate Judge.

This Court conducted a scheduling conference on June 12, 2017. Plaintiff John Keller telephonically appeared on his own behalf. Counsel Diana Esquivel telephonically appeared on behalf of defendants Office of Correctional Safety, Sergeant M. West, and G. Garrett. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b), this Court now issues the following order.

I. IDENTIFICATION OF JOHN DOE DEFENDANTS

As the Court indicated in its September 16, 2016 screening order (ECF No. 23), this case is proceeding on three claims as follows:

In its September 16, 2016 screening order, the Court went on to discuss the defendants that were to be included in this case and served with process. (ECF No. 23, pp. 10-11.)

As of the date of this order, three defendants have been served with process: Office of Correctional Safety, Sergeant M. West, and G. Garrett. Service of process was attempted upon another defendant, Institutional Gang Investigator, but the summons was returned unexecuted because the individual could not be identified with the information provided. (ECF No. 30.)

At the June 12, 2017 hearing, the Court and the parties discussed identifying the appropriate defendants for Plaintiff's claims in this case. Counsel for defendants indicated that it has initially disclosed documents to Plaintiff that would assist him with identifying the appropriate defendants for this case, including the identity of the John Doe and Institutional Gang Investigator defendants involved with Plaintiff's allegations in claims 1 and 3. Plaintiff indicated that his present confinement restrictions likely have prevented him from viewing these initial disclosures.

To facilitate the identification of the appropriate defendants for claims 1 and 3, defense counsel offered to send Plaintiff a letter that describes all of the individuals involved with Plaintiff's alleged gang validation, re-validation and other CDCR assessments concerning Plaintiff's placement in solitary confinement from 2008-2015. The Court directed defense counsel to send the letter to Plaintiff, as offered, and also to file a copy of the letter with the Court.

With respect to claim 2, the medical claim, defense counsel indicated that information required to name the appropriate defendants would likely be contained in Plaintiff's medical file, but her clients could not access the Plaintiff's medical file. Plaintiff indicated that he would seek access to his medical file in order to name the appropriate defendants for claim 2.

The Court directed Plaintiff, after he has had an opportunity to review the letter from defense counsel and his medical file, to file a motion naming the appropriate defendants for this case. Additionally, the Court opened discovery and explained the various types of discovery available to Plaintiff, which are more specifically described below in this order. The Court, then, set a discovery conference for September 25, 2017 to follow-up on the status of the naming of the appropriate defendants in this case and setting the remainder of the discovery schedule.

To facilitate the filing of Plaintiff's motion, the Clerk is directed to re-send Plaintiff a copy of its September 16, 2016 screening order (ECF No. 23).

II. STATUS CONFERENCE

A status conference has been set for September 25, 2017, at 1:30 p.m. Parties have leave to appear by phone. To join the conference, each party is directed to call the toll-free number

(888) 251-2909 and use Access Code 1024453.

III. SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE

The parties expressed interest in an early settlement conference. An order setting a settlement conference before another magistrate judge will issue at a later date.

IV. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

On January 4, 2017, the Court issued an order directing the parties to make initial disclosures. (ECF No. 35.) Plaintiff filed a motion for extension of time on March 9, 2017 requesting relief from this order. (ECF No. 48.) Plaintiff articulated the restrictions preventing him from fully complying with the Court's order both in the motion and at the June 13, 2017 hearing.

At the June 13 hearing, the Court discussed the additional information required by Plaintiff and Plaintiff supplemented this information as well as he could orally. Plaintiff agreed to send information regarding any 602 grievance regarding his gang validation when those documents become available to him.

Accordingly, the March 9 motion for extension of time (ECF No. 48) is DENIED as MOOT.

V. DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

The parties are now granted leave to serve discovery in addition to that provided as part of initial disclosures. Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1, 16, and 26-36, discovery shall proceed as follows:

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ORDER FINDING COGNIZABLE CLAIMS

ORDER FOR THIS CASE TO PROCEED AGAINST THE OFFICE OF CORRECTIONAL SAFETY, THE INSTITUTIONAL GANG INVESTIGATOR, SERGEANT M. WEST, G. GARRETT, AND JOHN DOES FOR VIOLATION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT BASED ON CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT AND DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO SERIOUS MEDICAL NEEDS AND FOR VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT BASED ON LACK OF DUE PROCESS ORDER FINDING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT APPROPRIATE FOR SERVICE AND FORWARDING SERVICE DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF FOR COMPLETION AND RETURN WITHIN THIRTY DAYS

(Doc. 22.)

THIRTY DAY DEADLINE

I. BACKGROUND

John Keller ("Plaintiff") is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis with this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On May 2, 2016, Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action. (ECF No. 1.) On May 17, 2016, this Court issued an order finding cognizable claims against Defendant Institutional Gang Investigator for adverse conditions of confinement under the Eighth Amendment and violation of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, and dismissing other claims with leave to amend. (ECF No. 11) Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on June 24, 2016, which is before this Court for screening. (ECF No. 22)1

Plaintiff has alleged that he was wrongly placed in solitary confinement based on a false gang violation for six and a half years, and that he suffered mental illness as a result. He also alleges that he was denied medical care for his mental illness. The Court has screened Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint and is allowing it to go forward and be served on the defendants named in Plaintiff's complaint.

The next step is for Plaintiff to fill out certain forms that are described in this order and return them to the Court in thirty days to allow the Court, through the US Marshalls, to serve this complaint on Defendants. Defendants will then respond to the complaint and the Court will issue an order after that time describing how to go forward with the case.

II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally "frivolous or malicious," that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2). "Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

A complaint is required to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts "are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences." Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To state a viable claim, Plaintiff must set forth "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id. While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.

III. SUMMARY OF COMPLAINT

The events at issue in the Complaint allegedly occurred at North Kern State Prison (NKSP) in Delano, California, when Plaintiff was incarcerated there in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). Plaintiff names as defendants the Office of Correctional Safety, the Institutional Gang Investigator (IGI), M. West, correctional officer G. Garrett, and John Does IGI Supervisors. ("Defendants"). Plaintiff's factual allegations follow.

Plaintiff alleges that the IGI, acting on direction from their superior supervisors, held Plaintiff in isolation and solitary confinement for six and a half years on false gang validation charges. Plaintiff suffered mental health issues and emotional distress. Plaintiff attempted suicide three times. He now suffers from permanent mental health issues of schizophrenic paranoia and psychotic behavior, among others.

Plaintiff alleges cruel and unusual punishment and deliberate indifference to his mental health care, and lack of due process.

IV. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS

The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

"[Section] 1983 `is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides `a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing "under color of state law"). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, "within the meaning of § 1983, `if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.'" Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). "The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a `series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict' constitutional harms." Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation "closely resembles the standard `foreseeability' formulation of proximate cause." Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

A. Eighth Amendment—Conditions of Confinement

"It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which [the prisoner] is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment." Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Conditions of confinement may, consistent with the Constitution, be restrictive and harsh. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981); Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2006); Osolinski v. Kane, 92 F.3d 934, 937 (9th Cir. 1996); Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1531 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc). Prison officials must, however, provide prisoners with "food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety." Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000); Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982); Wright v. Rushen, 642 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (9th Cir. 1981).

When determining whether the conditions of confinement meet the objective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court must analyze each condition separately to determine whether that specific condition violates the Eighth Amendment. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1107; Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1246-47; Wright, 642 F.2d at 1133. "Some conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation `in combination' when each would not do so alone, but only when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise — for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue blankets." Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991); see also Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010); Osolinski, 92 F.3d at 938-39; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1107; Wright, 642 F.2d at 1133. When considering the conditions of confinement, the Court should also consider the amount of time to which the prisoner was subjected to the condition. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978); Hearns v. Terhune, 413 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2005); Hoptowit, 682 F.2d at 1258. As to the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis, prisoners must establish prison officials' "deliberate indifference" to unconstitutional conditions of confinement to establish an Eighth Amendment violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303. This Court has found that "placement of seriously mentally ill inmates in the harsh, restrictive and non-therapeutic conditions of California's administrative segregation units for non-disciplinary reasons for more than a minimal period necessary to effect transfer to protective housing or a housing assignment violates the Eighth Amendment." Coleman v. Brown, 28 F.Supp.3d 1068, 1099 (E.D.Cal. 2014).

Based on Plaintiff's allegations that he was held in isolation, despite mental illness, for non-disciplinary reasons from September 3, 2008 until May 7, 2015, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on conditions of confinement.

B. Eighth Amendment—Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs

The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution entitles Plaintiff to medical care, but it is violated only when a prison official acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs. Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds, Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 1082-83 (9th Cir. 2014); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2012); Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006).

Plaintiff "must show (1) a serious medical need by demonstrating that failure to treat [his] condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and (2) that "the defendant's response to the need was deliberately indifferent." Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096).

Deliberate indifference is shown by "(a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner's pain or possible medical need, and (b) harm caused by the indifference." Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122 (citing Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096). The requisite state of mind is one of subjective recklessness, which entails more than ordinary lack of due care. Snow, 681 F.3d at 985 (citation and quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1122.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him access to mental health care and that such denial was motivated with malice with intent to force Plaintiff to debrief. Although Plaintiff's allegations are brief and lack specificity, liberally construed, Plaintiff states a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

C. Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects prisoners from being deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The procedural guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses apply only when a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest is at stake. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1977); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972); Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2003); Neal v. Shimoda, 131 F.3d 818, 827 (9th Cir. 1997); Erickson v. United States, 67 F.3d 858, 861 (9th Cir. 1995); Schroeder v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir. 1995); Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993).

Liberty interests can arise both from the Constitution and from state law. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983). The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in avoiding "more adverse conditions of confinement." Id. The Due Process Clause itself does not confer on inmates a liberty interest in being confined in the general prison population instead of administrative segregation. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 466-68; see also May v. Baldwin, 109 F.3d 557, 565 (9th Cir. 1997) (convicted inmate's due process claim fails because he has no liberty interest in freedom from state action taken within sentence imposed and administrative segregation falls within the terms of confinement ordinarily contemplated by a sentence) (quotations omitted); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff's placement and retention in the SHU was within range of confinement normally expected by inmates in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life and, therefore, plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in being free from confinement in the SHU) (quotations omitted).

With respect to liberty interests arising from state law, the existence of a liberty interest created by prison regulations is determined by focusing on the nature of the deprivation. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 481-84. Liberty interests created by prison regulations are limited to freedom from restraint which "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id. at 484; see also Myron v. Terhune, 476 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 2007); Jackson, 353 F.3d at 755; Serrano v. Francis, 345 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003); Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003). When conducting the Sandin inquiry, Courts should look to Eighth Amendment standards as well as the prisoners' conditions of confinement, the duration of the sanction, and whether the sanctions will affect the length of the prisoners' sentence. See Serrano, 345 F.3d at 1078; Ramirez, 334 F.3d at 861; Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1996). The placement of an inmate in the SHU indeterminately may amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest of "real substance" within the meaning of Sandin. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224. The "atypicality" prong of the analysis requires not merely an empirical comparison, but turns on the importance of the right taken away from the prisoner. See Carlo v. City of Chino, 105 F.3d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1997). A plaintiff must assert a "dramatic departure" from the standard conditions of confinement before due process concerns are implicated. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485-86; see also Keenan, 83 F.3d at 1088-89.

Plaintiff alleges that he is mentally challenged and was held in solitary confinement for more than six years on false charges that he was a gang associate. While Plaintiff has not described in detail the conditions of his confinement in segregation, it is sufficient that he alleges he was detained in isolation for more than six years on false charges. It is true that "[s]ome conditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment violation `in combination' when each would not do so alone." Chappell v. Mandeville 706 F.3d 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Wilson, 501 U.S. at 304). Plaintiff alleges that he suffers from severe and lasting mental health issues as a result of his detention. Based on these allegations, the Court finds that Plaintiff's detention was a "dramatic departure" from the standard conditions of confinement, and therefore Plaintiff had a liberty interest in avoiding his detention.

The assignment of validated gang members to the SHU is an administrative measure rather than a disciplinary measure, and is "essentially a matter of administrative segregation." Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997)). As such, Plaintiff is entitled to the minimal procedural protections set forth in Toussaint, such as notice, an opportunity to be heard, and periodic review. Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287 (citing Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100). Due process also requires that there be an evidentiary basis for the prison officials' decision to place an inmate in segregation for administrative reasons. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985); Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1104-05. This standard is met if there is "some evidence" from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be deduced. Id. at 1105. The standard is only "minimally stringent" and the relevant inquiry is whether there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the prison decision-makers. Cato v. Rushen, 824 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1987). The "some evidence" standard applies to an inmate's placement in the SHU for gang affiliation. See Bruce, 351 F.3d at 1287-88.

When a prisoner is placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must, within a reasonable time after the prisoner's placement, conduct an informal, non-adversary review of the evidence justifying the decision to segregate the prisoner. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); Mendoza v. Blodgett, 960 F.2d 1425, 1430 (9th Cir. 1992), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100, abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. The Supreme Court has stated that five days is a reasonable time for the post-placement review. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477. Before the review, the prisoner must receive some notice of the charges and be given an opportunity to respond to the charges. See id. at 476; Mendoza, 960 F.2d at 1430-31; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100. The prisoner, however, is not entitled to "detailed written notice of charges, representation of counsel or counsel-substitute, an opportunity to present witnesses, or a written decision describing the reasons for placing the prisoner in administrative segregation." Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1100-01 (citations omitted). After the prisoner has been placed in administrative segregation, prison officials must periodically review the initial placement. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9; Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101. Annual review of the placement is insufficient. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101.

Plaintiff alleges that he is not a gang member, and that he was put in solitary confinement "because of my reading material of afrocentric literature." Liberally construed, these allegations are sufficient to state a cognizable claim for violation of Plaintiff's rights to due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

V. APPROPRIATE DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff's list of Defendants includes Institutions: Institutional Gang Investigator and the Office of Correctional Safety at Sacramento; specific individual defendants: Sgt M. West and G. Garrett; and Doe Defendants: I.G.I. Supervisors. Plaintiff's factual allegations do not describe how specific individuals made the decision to place Plaintiff in solitary confinement or deny him medical care. Plaintiff indicates that "I do not no [sic] the personal names of the John Doe's but CDC office of Correctional Safety."

While the Court would prefer to have more detailed allegations against specific defendants in order to assess each claim against them individually, the Court understands that Plaintiff is likely not aware of the specific persons involved at this time. Plaintiff amended his named Defendants in response to the Court's first screening order, including removal of the warden, and provides greater detail in this amended complaint. The Court will allow this complaint to proceed against the listed defendants at this time, but expects that further clarification of the appropriate defendants will be done after the Defendants have appeared and provided discovery or clarification as to their role. The Court is not determining at this time that the named Defendants are the correct ones for each of Plaintiff's claims. But the Court believes that Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint sufficiently states a claim against these defendants to go forward to the next stage.

The Court also notes that unidentified, or "John Doe" defendants must be named or otherwise identified before service can go forward. "As a general rule, the use of `John Doe' to identify a defendant is not favored." Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe defendants cannot be served by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified them as actual individuals and amended his complaint to substitute names for John Doe or Jane Doe. For service to be successful, the Marshal must be able to identify and locate defendants.

Therefore, the Court is allowing Plaintiff's complaint regarding John Does to go forward at this time, but will require Plaintiff to identify specific individuals as the litigation proceeds and before those individuals can be served.

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint states cognizable claims for violation of the Eighth Amendment based on conditions of confinement and deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, as well as for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for lack of due process in deprivation of a liberty interest.

The Court will allow these claims to go forward against Defendants Office of Correctional Safety, Institutional Gang Investigator, Sergeant M. West, correctional officer G. Garrett, and John Does IGI Supervisors. It is likely that there will be further clarification of the appropriate defendants for each claim as the case continues, based on information from Defendants.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

IT IS SO ORDERED.