Filed: Jun. 13, 2017
Latest Update: Jun. 13, 2017
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, THOMAS ARTHER WITTEN., by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 15, 2017 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 3, 2017, at 9:30 a.m.
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER TROY L. NUNLEY , District Judge . Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, THOMAS ARTHER WITTEN., by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 15, 2017 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 3, 2017, at 9:30 a.m.,..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.
Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and the defendant, THOMAS ARTHER WITTEN., by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on June 15, 2017
2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until August 3, 2017, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between June 15, 2017 and August 3, 2017 under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a. Defense counsel has just substituted in as attorney of record in this matter and needs time to review the file and meet with the client. Additionally, counsel has been assigned a courtroom in Sacramento County Superior Court and is expected to begin trial in the case of People v. Ricco Stewart on June 15, 2017.
b. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d. The government does not object to the continuance.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 15, 2017, to August 3, 2017, at 9:30 a.m. inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
