STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, Jr., Senior District Judge.

CASE STATUS

On June 23, 2017, Attorney Jan Karowsky was appointed to represent the defendant. Although defense counsel has diligently reviewed the discovery, there are extensive CD's, DVD's and physical exhibits which must be reviewed in order effectively to advise the defendant. Moreover, the defendant has raised a number of legal issues which are being researched but which still require additional time for conclusions to be derived and discussed.

STIPULATIONS

Regarding the above-captioned action, Plaintiff, United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant, by and through his counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, the above-captioned action was set for status conference on August 11, 2017.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference in this case to September 29, 2017, and to exclude time between August 11, 2017 and September 29, 2017, under Local Code T4. The government does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate and request that the Court find the following:

a. Counsel for defendant requires additional time to consult with his client and to conduct investigation and research related to a number of relevant issues raised by the defendant and needs additional time for the preparation.

b. Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny him the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation in the pending case, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

c. The government does not object to the continuance.

d. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case for the reasons cited, as requested, outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

e. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 11, 2017, to September 29, 2017 inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T2] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of the parties, it is ordered that the August 11, 2017 status conference hearing be continued to September 29, 2017 at 9:00 a.m. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from August 11, 2017, up to and including the September 29, 2017 status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.