EDMUND F. BRENNAN, Magistrate Judge.
Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel with a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner challenges a judgment of conviction entered against him on April 11, 2012 in the Sacramento County Superior Court on charges of robbery and assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury. He also challenges the decision to deny him probation and sentence him to a twelve year prison term. He seeks federal habeas relief on the following alleged grounds: (1) the trial court's denial of his motion for severance violated his due process rights; (2) the trial court's denial of his motion for new trial violated his due process rights; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the gang enhancement; and (4) alternatively, the trial court's denial of probation was fundamentally unfair. Upon careful consideration of the record and the applicable law, it is recommended that petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief be denied.
In its unpublished memorandum and opinion affirming petitioner's judgment of conviction on appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District provided the following factual summary:
People v. Anaya, No. C071698, 2014 WL 6610223, at *1-2 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2014), review denied (Jan. 28, 2015).
An application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody under a judgment of a state court can be granted only for violations of the Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). A federal writ is not available for alleged error in the interpretation or application of state law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1,5 (2010); Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 2000).
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets forth the following standards for granting federal habeas corpus relief:
For purposes of applying § 2254(d)(1), "clearly established federal law" consists of holdings of the United States Supreme Court at the time of the last reasoned state court decision. Thompson v. Runnels, 705 F.3d 1089, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Greene v. Fisher, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 38 (2011); Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000)). Circuit court precedent "may be persuasive in determining what law is clearly established and whether a state court applied that law unreasonably." Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859 (quoting Maxwell v. Roe, 606 F.3d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 2010)). However, circuit precedent may not be "used to refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court jurisprudence into a specific legal rule that th[e] [Supreme] Court has not announced." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1450 (2013) (citing Parker v. Matthews, 132 S.Ct. 2148, 2155 (2012) (per curiam)). Nor may it be used to "determine whether a particular rule of law is so widely accepted among the Federal Circuits that it would, if presented to th[e] [Supreme] Court, be accepted as correct. Id. Further, where courts of appeals have diverged in their treatment of an issue, it cannot be said that there is "clearly established Federal law" governing that issue. Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006).
A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if it applies a rule contradicting a holding of the Supreme Court or reaches a result different from Supreme Court precedent on "materially indistinguishable" facts. Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640 (2003). Under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from the Supreme Court's decisions, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
If the state court's decision does not meet the criteria set forth in § 2254(d), a reviewing court must conduct a de novo review of a habeas petitioner's claims. Delgadillo v. Woodford, 527 F.3d 919, 925 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Frantz v. Hazey, 533 F.3d 724, 735 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) ("[I]t is now clear both that we may not grant habeas relief simply because of § 2254(d)(1) error and that, if there is such error, we must decide the habeas petition by considering de novo the constitutional issues raised.").
The court looks to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for the state court judgment. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 859; Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). If the last reasoned state court decision adopts or substantially incorporates the reasoning from a previous state court decision, this court may consider both decisions to ascertain the reasoning of the last decision. Edwards v. Lamarque, 475 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). "When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Richter, 562 U.S. at 99. This presumption may be overcome by a showing "there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely." Id. at 785 (citing Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991)). Similarly, when a state court decision on a petitioner's claims rejects some claims but does not expressly address a federal claim, a federal habeas court must presume, subject to rebuttal, that the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 133 S.Ct. 1088, 1091 (2013).
Where the state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, a federal habeas court independently reviews the record to determine whether habeas corpus relief is available under § 2254(d). Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003). "Independent review of the record is not de novo review of the constitutional issue, but rather, the only method by which we can determine whether a silent state court decision is objectively unreasonable." Himes, 336 F.3d at 853. Where no reasoned decision is available, the habeas petitioner still has the burden of "showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98.
A summary denial is presumed to be a denial on the merits of the petitioner's claims. Stancle v. Clay, 692 F.3d 948, 957 & n. 3 (9th Cir. 2012). While the federal court cannot analyze just what the state court did when it issued a summary denial, the federal court must review the state court record to determine whether there was any "reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Richter, 562 U.S. at 98. This court "must determine what arguments or theories . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court." Id. at 102. The petitioner bears "the burden to demonstrate that `there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.'" Walker v. Martel, 709 F.3d 925, 939 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 98).
When it is clear, however, that a state court has not reached the merits of a petitioner's claim, the deferential standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply and a federal habeas court must review the claim de novo. Stanley, 633 F.3d at 860; Reynoso v. Giurbino, 462 F.3d 1099, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006); Nulph v. Cook, 333 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner, by way of his first ground for federal habeas relief, contends that the trial court's denial of his motion for severance violated his due process rights. ECF No. 1 at 26-32.
Anaya, 2014 WL 6610223, at *2-3.
After the Court of Appeal rejected his severance arguments, petitioner raised this issue in a petition for review filed in the California Supreme Court. Lodg. No. 7 (Petition for Review) at 10-17. The Supreme Court summarily denied his petition for review. Lodg. No. 8 (Denial of Petition for Review).
In evaluating a severance claim federal courts do not look to either the state law governing severance in state trials or the procedural rights to severance afforded in federal trials. Grisby v. Blodgett, 130 F.3d 365, 370 (9th Cir. 1997). Instead, the relevant question is "whether the state proceedings satisfied due process." Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 919-20 (9th Cir. 1991). "There is no prejudicial constitutional violation unless simultaneous trial of more than one offense . . . actually render[ed] petitioner's state trial fundamentally unfair and hence, violative of due process." Davis v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 638 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner bears the burden of proving that the denial of severance rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, Grisby, 130 F.3d at 370, and must establish that prejudice arising from the failure to grant a severance was so "clear, manifest, and undue" that he was denied a fair trial. Lambright v. Stewart, 191 F.3d 1181, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Throckmorton, 87 F.3d 1069, 1071-72 (9th Cir. 1996)).
The court finds that the trial court's denial of petitioner's severance motion did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. As the Court of Appeal noted, Joel Anaya's participation in petitioner's crime and his gang affiliation would have been admissible even if the siblings had been tried separately. Anaya, 2014 WL 6610223, at *2; see also Cal. Evid.Code § 1101(b). Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury to "consider the evidence as it applies to each defendant" and to "decide each charge for each defendant separately." Lodg. No. 1 (Clerk's Transcript) at 169. Petitioner has not presented any evidence, other than his own speculation, that the jury ignored these instructions. See Park v. California, 202 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In order to demonstrate actual unfairness, however, [petitioner] must show that the jury was actually inflamed.") To the contrary, juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). Finally, petitioner's argument that the siblings had "substantially different strategies that necessitated severance of their cases" is unsupported by any convincing legal or factual rationale. ECF No. 1 at 29. It may be, as petitioner believes, that his chances of acquittal would have improved had severance been granted. It is well established, however, that "defendants are not entitled to severance merely because they may have a better chance of acquittal in separate trials." Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993). Accordingly, the court finds that the trial court's decision to deny petitioner's motion for severance did not violate his due process rights.
In his second ground for relief, petitioner claims that his due process rights were violated when the trial court denied his motion for new trial. He contends that a new trial was warranted because of the prejudicial decision not to sever his trial from his brother's. The Court of Appeal, having already concluded that the decision not to sever was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion, rejected this argument. It reasoned:
Anaya, 2014 WL 6610223, at *3. Petitioner also raised this argument in his summarily denied petition to the California Supreme Court. Lodg. No. 7 (Petition for Review) at 18-20.
The court has already concluded that the decision to deny petitioner's motion to sever did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. Accordingly, the court also finds that the decision to deny his motion for new trial was not a violation of his due process rights. Nor was the decision contrary to clearly established federal law.
Petitioner's next claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support his gang enhancement. He argues that only the testimony of the gang expert witness supported the enhancement and the jury "apparently ignored all other facts and circumstances established by the defense." ECF No. 1 at 35-36. He notes that evidence was presented showing that he had no gang-related tattoos and no gang affiliation since the age of fifteen. Id. at 36. Additionally, he argues that the victim himself gave no indication that the crime was gang related. Id. The Court of Appeal rejected his argument, reasoning:
Anaya, 2014 WL 6610223, at *3-4. As with his other claims, petitioner raised this issue again in his petition for review before the California Supreme Court. Lodg. No. 7 (Petition for Review) at 20-22. As noted above, the Supreme Court summarily denied that petition. Lodg. No. 8 (Denial of Petition for Review).
The Due Process Clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). "[T]he dispositive question under Jackson is `whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Chein v. Shumsky, 373 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318). Put another way, "a reviewing court may set aside the jury's verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the jury." Cavazos v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2, *4, 181 L. Ed. 2d 311 (2011). Sufficiency of the evidence claims in federal habeas proceedings must be measured with reference to substantive elements of the criminal offense as defined by state law. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324 n.16.
In conducting federal habeas review of a claim of insufficient evidence, "all evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution." Ngo v. Giurbino, 651 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2011). "Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial," and it requires only that they draw "`reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.'" Coleman v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 2060, 2064, 182 L. Ed. 2d 978 (2012) (per curiam ) (citation omitted). "`Circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from it may be sufficient to sustain a conviction.'" Walters v. Maass, 45 F.3d 1355, 1358 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
If the record supports conflicting inferences, the reviewing court "must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 133, 130 S.Ct. 665, 175 L. Ed. 2d 582 (2010) (per curiam) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326). In evaluating the evidence presented at trial, this court may not weigh conflicting evidence or consider witness credibility. Wingfield v. Massie, 122 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1997). Instead, as noted above, the Court must view the evidence in the "light most favorable to the prosecution," Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
Juries have broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw from the evidence presented at trial. This court may not "impinge[ ] on the jury's role as factfinder," or engage in "fine-grained factual parsing." Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 2065. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, "[t]he relevant inquiry is not whether the evidence excludes every hypothesis except guilt, but whether the jury could reasonably arrive at its verdict." United States v. Mares, 940 F.2d 455, 458 (9th Cir. 1991). Under Jackson, the Court need not find that the conclusion of guilt was compelled, only that it rationally could have been reached. Drayden v. White, 232 F.3d 704, 709-10 (9th Cir. 2000).
"A petitioner for a federal writ of habeas corpus faces a heavy burden when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence used to obtain a state conviction on federal due process grounds." Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). Because this case is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, this court owes a "double dose of deference" to the decision of the state court. Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 896 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boyer v. Belleque, 659 F.3d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 2011)). See also Coleman, 132 S.Ct. at 2062 ("Jackson claims face a high bar in federal habeas proceedings because they are subject to two layers of judicial deference."); Kyzar v. Ryan, 780 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2015) (same).
The prosecution must prove two elements to establish a gang enhancement: (1) that the crime was "committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang," and (2) that the defendant had "the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. . . ." Cal. Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). The element of specific intent does not "require[ ] that the defendant act with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist a gang; the statute requires only the specific intent to promote, further, or assist criminal conduct by gang members." People v. Albillar, 51 Cal.4th 47, 67 (2005). Further, "[t]here is no statutory requirement that this `criminal conduct by gang members' be distinct from the charged offense, or that the evidence establish specific crimes the defendant intended to assist his fellow gang members in committing." Id. at 66.
This court finds that the Court of Appeal was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that sufficient evidence supported petitioner's gang enhancement. First, expert testimony is sufficient on its own to establish that some particular conduct benefited a gang. People v. Vang, 52 Cal.4th 1038, 1048 (2011) ("`Expert opinion that particular criminal conduct benefited a gang' is not only permissible but can be sufficient to support the Penal Code section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), gang enhancement." (quoting Albillar, 51 Cal. 4th at 63)); see also Bonilla v. Adams, 423 F. App'x 738, 739-740 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a sufficiency of evidence claim where petitioner committed a robbery with two other gang members and expert testimony "explained in hypothetical terms how such offenses could be useful to the gang as a whole"). Second, there was sufficient evidence that petitioner was affiliated with the Norteño gang. He was validated as a Norteño gang member in 2005 after a fight in which a rival gang member was beaten with a baseball bat. Lodg. No. 2 (Reporter's Transcript Volume 2 of 4) at 530. An officer also testified that petitioner, along with Joel Anaya and several other Norteño gang members, were contacted by law enforcement in September of 2010 after another gang fight. Id. at 532. Finally, petitioner and his brother — whose Norteño gang membership he does not deny — robbed and assaulted an individual who had formerly been validated as a Norteño. A gang expert opined that such former gang members or `dropouts' are often physically attacked by current gang members as punishment for their disassociation. Id. at 435-436.
Based on the foregoing, the Court of Appeal was correct in determining that there was sufficient evidence to support petitioner's gang enhancement. The record simply does not support petitioner's contention that a finding in his favor on this enhancement was the only reasonable outcome.
Petitioner's last argument is that the trial court's denial of probation and twelve year prison sentence were fundamentally unfair. He emphasizes his testimony at the sentencing hearing where he admitted his involvement in the assault but denied any gang affiliation or motivation. ECF No. 1 at 37. Petitioner claims that this testimony provided the trial court with a `clear picture' of his motivation for the robbery and assault. Id. Finally, he notes that the trial court had a recommendation from a probation officer that his twelve year prison term be suspended. Id. The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments:
Anaya, 2014 WL 6610223, at *4-5. Petitioner raised this issue in his petition to the California Supreme Court, which was summarily denied. Lodg. No. 7 (Petition for Review) at 22-23; Lodg. No. 8 (Denial of Petition for Review).
It is well settled that "it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). As such, "[a]bsent a showing of fundamental unfairness, a state court's misapplication of its own sentencing laws does not justify federal habeas relief." Christian v. Rhode, 41 F.3d 461, 469 (9th Cir. 1994). Such fundamental unfairness might include any sentence "based upon any proscribed federal grounds such as being cruel and unusual, racially or ethnically motivated, or enhanced by indigency . . ." Makal v. Arizona, 544 F.2d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 1976). A petitioner cannot, however, transform state law claims into federal ones simply by adding phrases like "due process" and "Fourteenth Amendment." See Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that a petitioner cannot "transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process.").
The Court of Appeal noted that a defendant who willfully inflicts great bodily injury — as petitioner had — would not be entitled to probation absent unusual circumstances. No evidence before this court indicates that the trial court's decision not to grant probation was motivated by any proscribed federal ground. As such, the court finds that petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus be denied.
These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." Any reply to the objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). In his objections petitioner may address whether a certificate of appealability should issue in the event he files an appeal of the judgment in this case. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant).
