Filed: Jan. 04, 2018
Latest Update: Jan. 04, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 6, 2018, and to exclude time between January 9, 2018, and February 6, 2018, under Local Code T4. 1 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 6, 2018, and to exclude time between January 9, 2018, and February 6, 2018, under Local Code T4. 1 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The g..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER
JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on January 9, 2018.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 6, 2018, and to exclude time between January 9, 2018, and February 6, 2018, under Local Code T4.1
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes documents, financial records, video recordings, audio recordings, transcripts, and native Excel files, Bates-numbered CHAPIN_00000001 through CHAPIN_00019452. All of this discovery has been either produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review the discovery and materials produced by the government, review the current charges in light of the discovery and other materials produced by the government, consult with their respective clients, conduct investigation and research related to the pending charges, consider potential resolution, and otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of January 9, 2018 to February 6, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
FINDINGS AND ORDER
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.
