ORDER

(1) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO COMPEL;

(2) DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR AN INVESTIGATOR;

(3) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE AN OPPOSITION; AND

(4) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' REQUESTS TO MODIFY THE DISCOVERY AND SCHEDULING ORDER (ECF NOS. 23, 24, 26, 29, 30)

MICHAEL J. SENG, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, a civil detainee proceeding pro se, has filed this civil rights action seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This action proceeds on Plaintiff's original complaint against Defendants Pam Ahlin, Fresno Board of Supervisors, Norm Kramer, and Stephen Mayberg. The gravamen of Plaintiff's claims is that Defendants built and housed individuals like him in a facility located in an area known to be hyper-endemic for contraction of Valley Fever, an infection caused by exposure to coccidioides (also called coccidioidomycosis) fungus, and failed to take reasonable steps to protect him from the disease.

Pending before the Court are the following motions: (1) Plaintiff's motion to compel discovery (ECF No. 23); (2) Plaintiff's request for an investigator (ECF No. 24); (3) Defendants Ahlin, Kramer and Mayberg's request for extension of time to file an opposition to Plaintiff's motion to compel (ECF No. 26); and (4) Defendants' two requests for a modification of the Discovery and Scheduling Order1 (ECF Nos. 29, 30).

I. Relevant Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 22, 2015. The complaint was screened on March 28, 2016, and dismissed with leave to amend on qualified immunity grounds. (ECF No. 8.)

Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration of the screening order. (ECF No. 9.) On August 17, 2016, the undersigned determined that Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity and that the allegations are sufficient to proceed to service against Defendants Mayberg, Kramer, Ahlin and the Fresno Board of Supervisors on a safe conditions claim. (ECF No. 10.) Plaintiff was thus directed to file a notice of his willingness to proceed on the complaint as screened or file an amended pleading.

On September 19, 2016, plaintiff filed a response indicating his willingness to proceed on the complaint as screened. (ECF No. 11.) Accordingly, on September 22, 2016, the undersigned filed consistent findings and recommendations, which were adopted in full on November 23, 2016. (ECF Nos. 12, 13.) Defendants were served shortly thereafter.

On February 24, 2017, a Discovery and Scheduling Order ("DSO") issued setting the discovery deadline for October 24, 2017, and the dispositive motion deadline for January 5, 2018. (ECF No. 18.)

II. Plaintiff's Motion to Compel

Plaintiff's motion to compel seeks further responses to his discovery requests and $200 in sanctions against Defendants Kramer, Mayberg, and Ahlin for their allegedly dilatory discovery tactics.

A. Background

Plaintiff propounded his first set of requests for production of documents ("RPD") on Defendants Kramer, Mayberg, and Ahlin on July 21, 2017; his first set of interrogatories on August 15, 2017; and his second set of RPD on September 12, 2017.

Defendants Kramer, Mayberg, and Ahlin responded to the first set of RPDs on August 22, 2017. (Pl.'s Mot. to Compel ["MTC"] Ex. A). Defendants Kramer and Mayberg then responded to the first set of interrogatories on October 2, 2017 (MTC Ex. B), while Defendant Ahlin sought and was granted an extension through October 6, 2017, to respond to the interrogatories (MTC Ex. D). These Defendants allegedly misfiled the second set of RPDs and therefore did not respond to them before the response deadline. See Decl. of C. Murphy in Supp. of Defs.' Opp'n (ECF No. 27-1) ¶ 6. In any event, Defendants contend this second set of RPDs is identical to the first set2, and the response deadline fell after the October 24, 2017, discovery deadline in this case. Id. Plaintiff does not dispute either of these contentions.

B. Legal Standards

The discovery process is subject to the overriding limitation of good faith, and callous disregard of discovery responsibilities cannot be condoned. Asea, Inc. v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties' relative access to relevant information, the parties' resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit." Fed R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

Generally, if the responding party objects to a discovery request, the party moving to compel bears the burden of demonstrating why the objections are not justified. Grabek v. Dickinson, No. CIV S-10-2892 GGH P, 2012 WL 113799, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2012); Womack v. Virga, No. CIV S-11-1030 MCE EFB P, 2011 WL 6703958, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2011); Mitchell v. Felker, No. CV 08-119RAJ, 2010 WL 3835765, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 29, 2010); Ellis v. Cambra, No. 1:02-cv-05646-AWI-SMS PC, 2008 WL 860523, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2008). This requires the moving party to inform the Court which discovery requests are the subject of the motion to compel, and, for each disputed response, why the information sought is relevant and why the responding party's objections are not meritorious. Grabek, 2012 WL 113799, at *1; Womack, 2011 WL 6703958, at *3; Mitchell, 2010 WL 3835765, at *2; Ellis, 2008 WL 860523, at *4. However, the Court is vested with broad discretion to manage discovery and notwithstanding these procedures, Plaintiff is entitled to leniency as a pro se litigant; therefore, to the extent possible, the Court endeavors to resolve his motion to compel on its merits. Hunt v. County of Orange, 672 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2012); Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Productions, 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005); Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002).

C. Analysis

Plaintiff claims that Defendants' responses to his discovery requests were late and/or inadequate. However, he fails to identify with particularity which responses he finds inadequate and why. He objects generally to Defendants' objections based on, for example, the deliberative process and the official information privilege, but presents no legal argument why the objections are improper in the contexts asserted. Without providing this information, Plaintiff has not met his burden on his motion to compel.

In addition, to the extent Plaintiff's motion can be construed as a request for an extension of the discovery deadline, the Court does not find good cause. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Plaintiff was in receipt of Defendants' responses to the first set of RPDs as early as August 22, 2017, yet he waited until the eve of the discovery deadline to challenge them. He also does not contest the Defendants' claim that the second set of RPDs is identical to the first. Since Plaintiff himself could have prevented the need for an extension, his motion to compel and any related request for an extension of the discovery deadline must be denied.

III. Plaintiff's Request for an Investigator

On November 2, 2017, Plaintiff submitted a request for an investigator pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) "to assist plaintiff in the compelling of discovery from the defendants." Plaintiff seeks the appointment of an investigator to consider the Defendants' objections to Plaintiff's unspecified discovery requests.

Construing this request as a discovery-related motion, it will be denied, having been filed on November 2, 2017, several days after the October 24, 2017, discovery deadline. See DSO at 2 ¶ 7 ("[D]iscovery motions will not be considered if filed after the discovery deadline.")

To the extent the motion is deemed a request for appointment of counsel, it too will be denied. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel in this action, Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997), and the court cannot require an attorney to represent plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1816 (1989). However, in certain exceptional circumstances the Court may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to section 1915(e)(1). Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525.

Without a reasonable method of securing and compensating counsel, the Court will seek volunteer counsel only in the most serious and exceptional cases. In determining whether "exceptional circumstances exist, the district court must evaluate both the likelihood of success of the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the present case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances.

IV. Modification to the Discovery and Scheduling Order

On January 4, 2018, the Defendants moved to modify the DSO as it relates to the dispositive motion deadline, originally set for January 5, 2018. Good cause appearing, this deadline will be extended as set forth below.

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

IT IS SO ORDERED.