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U.S. v. Dewberry, 1:17-CR-00297-DAD-BAM. (2018)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20180308746 Visitors: 13
Filed: Mar. 07, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 07, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER BARBARA A. McAULIFFE , Magistrate Judge . STIPULATION Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant MYRON DEWBERRY, JR., by and through defendant's counsel of record, Monica Bermudez, hereby stipulate as follows: 1. A status conference in this was previously set in this matter for March 12, 2018, and time had previously been excluded to that date
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendant MYRON DEWBERRY, JR., by and through defendant's counsel of record, Monica Bermudez, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. A status conference in this was previously set in this matter for March 12, 2018, and time had previously been excluded to that date pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until May 29, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. and to exclude time between March 12, 2018, and May 29, 2018, inclusive, under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review the current charges, to review the discovery, to conduct research and investigation related to the charges and potential pretrial motions, and to consult with her client. b) Counsel have various conflicts in other cases between now and the proposed May 12, 2018 status conference that would not reasonably permit them to try this case any time between now and May 12, 2018. c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d) The government does not object to the continuance. e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of March 12, 2018 to May 29, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

Pursuant to the parties' stipulation and good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 1st Status Conference, currently set for March 12, 2018, is hereby vacated and continued to May 29, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. It is further ORDERED that the time period between March 12, 2018, and May 29, 2018, inclusive, is excluded from the calculation under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) for the reasons stated in the parties' stipulation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Source:  Leagle

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