STIPULATION AND ORDER CONTINUING STATUS CONFERENCE AND EXCLUDING TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR., Senior District Judge.

It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between plaintiff United States of America, on the one hand, and defendants Alyssa Lynn Nakamura Price and Zachery Joseph Bastien, on the other hand, through their respective attorneys, that the presently set March 23, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., status conference hearing shall be continued by the Court to July 20, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., to allow each defense counsel to review discovery of approximately 1,225 pages produced by the United States, conduct counsel's independent investigation into the facts and applicable law, interview witnesses, discuss with counsel's client potential pretrial resolution, and otherwise prepare each client's respective defense.

In addition, Todd Leras, Esq., counsel for defendant Zachery Bastien is presently assigned to a jury trial before District Judge Morrison England in the matter of United States v. Saber Shehadeh, Case No. 2:16-CR-038 MCE, scheduled to commence on May 14, 2018. The jury trial may possibly extend into mid-June 2018. Discovery produced in that matter exceeds 117,000 pages of Batesstamped documents. Most of Mr. Leras' work schedule has been occupied in preparing for this trial and Mr. Leras has been unable to fully prepare Bastien's defense in the instant case.

The United States has requested that the parties advance the case by requesting that the Court set a trial and motions briefing schedule in the Price/Bastien matters. However, both Mr. Leras and Assistant Federal Defender Hannah Labaree are not presently prepared to commit to a trial and a motions briefing schedule, but believe that by the July 20, 2018, status conference date they will be in a more informed position to make such decisions. In particular, Mr. Leras represents the time demands of the Shehadeh matter preclude him from committing to specific dates in the Bastien/Price matter at this time.

The parties agree and request the Court find that: (1) the failure to grant this requested continuance would deny each defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (2) the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

The parties further agree and request that the Court order for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which the trial of this case must commence, the time period from the date of this stipulation, March 21, 2018, to and including the July 20, 2018, status conference hearing, shall be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) and Local Code T4 to allow each defense counsel reasonable time to prepare each respective client's defenses.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its Order. It is hereby ORDERED that the presently set March 23, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., status conference hearing shall be continued to July 20, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.

Based on the representations of the parties in their stipulation, the Court finds that: (1) the failure to grant this requested continuance would deny each defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence; and (2) the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

The Court hereby orders that for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which the trial of this case must commence, the time period from the date of this stipulation, March 21, 2018, to and including the July 20, 2018, status conference hearing, shall be excluded pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and B(iv) and Local Code T4 to allow each defense counsel reasonable time necessary to prepare each respective client's defenses.

IT IS SO ORDERED.