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U.S. v. Huitron, 2:10 CR 162 JAM. (2018)

Court: District Court, E.D. California Number: infdco20180327c91 Visitors: 12
Filed: Mar. 26, 2018
Latest Update: Mar. 26, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER JOHN A. MENDEZ , District Judge . The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Heiko Coppola, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Miguel Huitron, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following: 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on March 27, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT;[PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

The United States of America through its undersigned counsel, Heiko Coppola, Assistant United States Attorney, together with counsel for defendant Miguel Huitron, John R. Manning, Esq., hereby stipulate the following:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status conference on March 27, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 8, 2018 and to exclude time between March 27, 2018 and May 8, 2018 under Local Code T-2 (complexity of the case) and Local Code T-4 (to allow defense counsel time to prepare). Such time exclusions were previously ordered in this matter prior to Mr. Huitron being brought before the Court. Such exclusions still seem to be appropriate based on the amount of defendants and discovery (as noted below).

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request the Court find the following:

a. This is a seven year old wire tap case with 12 defendants. The United States has produced 8,536 pages of discovery and eleven discs of audio files and call translations. b. Counsel for the defendant needs additional time to review the discovery, conduct investigation, and interview potential witnesses. c. Counsel for the defendant believes the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. d. The Government does not object to the continuance. e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) within which trial must commence, the time period of March 27, 2018, to May 8, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(ii) and (iv), corresponding to Local Code T-2 and T-4 because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at the defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED this 26th day of March, 2018.

Source:  Leagle

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