STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

TROY L. NUNLEY, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Defendant Dilesh Sharma, by and through counsel of record, and the Government by and through Government's counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on April 26, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, defendant now moves to continue the status conference until May 17, 2018, at 9:30 a.m., and to exclude time between April 26, 2018, and May 17, 2018 under Local Code T4.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes hundreds of pages of discovery, audio files, a video file and forensic analyses of seized electronic devices. That discovery has either been produced directly to counsel and/or made available for inspection and copying.

b) In addition to that discovery, the government has produced other discovery, including reports regarding incidents triggering U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5. The government has also made available for review other discovery related to possible incidents triggering U.S.S.G. § 4B1.5.

c) Counsel for defendant needs more time to review the discovery, conduct further investigation, consult with their client, and conduct additional research regarding the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the Guidelines application to their client's case before advising him about a potential resolution.

d) Counsel for the defendant needs more time to research, draft and file a new Motion to Dismiss Indictment, and to allow the Government adequate time to respond to any such motion.

e) Counsel for defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

f) The government does not object to the continuance.

g) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

h) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of April 26, 2018 to May 17, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.