BARBARA A. McAULIFFE, Magistrate Judge.
The United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and defendants, by and through their counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:
1. By previous order, dated May 18, 2018, this matter was set for status on September
24, 2018, at 1:00 p.m. Dkt. No. 27. The Order continued the status conference from June 25, 2018 to September 24, 2018 and excluded time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(i), (ii) and (iv).
2. The parties' stipulation and proposed findings for the May 18, 2018 Order could be read to pertain only to the request of defendant Pena and his counsel, though all parties agreed to the stipulation. Thus, the parties seek to supplement the request and findings of the May 18, 2018 to clarify that both defendants and their respective counsel request a continuance of the status conference and agree to the stipulation and order and to exclude time between May 18, 2018 and September 24, 2018 under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv). The government joins in this request.
3. The parties therefore agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
b. Counsel for both defendants desire additional time in preparation of this case. Defense counsel needs additional time to conduct investigation, review the extensive and voluminous discovery, communicate with their clients, and potentially have settlement negotiations with the government. Moreover, defendant Pena's counsel is engaged in two jury trials in the coming months, including one expected to last 6-8 weeks before Chief District Judge O'Neill. Thus, the requested continuance will conserve time and resources for the parties and the Court.
c. Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of May 18, 2018 to September 24, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED THAT the time period of May 18, 2018 to September
24, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i), (ii) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.