ORDER

KENDALL J. NEWMAN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Christine Karp seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") denying plaintiff's claim for Child Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act ("Act").1 Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Commissioner opposed by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 16, 17.) No optional reply brief was filed. For the reasons discussed below, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment, and AFFIRMS the Commissioner's final decision.

The court reviews the Commissioner's decision to determine whether (1) it is based on proper legal standards pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and (2) substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports it. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance. Connett v. Barnhart, 340 F.3d 871, 873 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). It means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007), quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F.3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff sole contention on appeal is that the ALJ erred at step three of the sequential disability analysis2 by finding that plaintiff did not meet listing 12.05C. That Listing requires, in part, a "valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function." 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.05C. As discussed below, the ALJ's step three finding is supported by substantial evidence.

The claimant "bears the burden of proving that . . . she has an impairment that meets or equals the criteria of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the Commissioner's regulations." Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2005). "For a claimant to show that his impairment matches a listing, it must meet all of the specified medical criteria. An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify . . . For a claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that his unlisted impairment, or combination of impairments, is `equivalent' to a listed impairment, he must present medical findings equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed impairment." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1990). Furthermore, "[t]he mere diagnosis of an impairment listed in Appendix 1 is not sufficient to sustain a finding of disability." Key v. Heckler, 754 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1985). Instead, all of the specified medical criteria must be met or equaled. Id. at 1550.

Plaintiff notes that consultative examining psychologist Dr. Guillermo Herrera assessed plaintiff with a full scale IQ of 65 on July 22, 2015. (AT 481-90.) However, two other examining psychologists assessed significantly higher full scale IQ scores. (See AT 30-32, 509-10 [July 8, 2015 testing by Alta California psychologist Dr. Cynthia Root rendering a full scale IQ score of 75], 528-29, 533 [June 2, 2016 testing by consultative examining psychologist Dr. Carol Chambers rendering a full scale IQ score of 71, but also noting that test results were "considered to be an underrepresentation of claimant's psychological functioning. She did not put forth reasonable effort at certain points of the testing" and further noting that "malingering is presented as a rule out diagnosis"].) It was plainly not unreasonable for the ALJ to question the validity of Dr. Herrera's outlier listing-level full scale IQ score when two other examining psychologists assessed higher full scale IQ scores that were not at listing level.3

Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Herrera's assessment that plaintiff had a verbal IQ score of 70, especially given that Dr. Root likewise assessed a verbal IQ score of 70. (AT 486, 509.) A verbal IQ score of 70 is the highest score that still technically meets the Listing. However, Dr. Root specifically observed that plaintiff's General Ability Index score of 75 (which was the same as her full scale IQ score of 75) was "the best representation of [plaintiff's] overall intellectual functioning." (AT 510.) Moreover, Dr. Chambers actually assessed a much higher verbal IQ score of 76. On this record, the court cannot say that the ALJ unreasonably or irrationally weighed the conflicting verbal IQ evidence, even if this court may have weighed it differently.

Therefore, the court concludes that the ALJ's assessment at step three was free from prejudicial legal error and supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: