FINDING EXCLUDABLE TIME UNDER THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR., Senior District Judge.

1. By previous order, this matter was set for a status hearing on June 22, 2018.

2. On June 21, 2018, counsel for defendant Derek Bluford submitted a memorandum at Docket No. 21 requesting that the status hearing be continued to September 21, 2018, and that time be excluded between June 22, 2018 and September 21, 2018 under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) & (B)(iv). In making the request to continue the matter, counsel for the defendant represented that he needed the time between June 22, 2018 and September 21, 2018 to continue to review discovery, to discuss the evidence with Mr. Bluford, to conduct a fact investigation, and to conduct legal research.

3. Based on the defendant's counsel's representations regarding his need to prepare the defense, and without opposition by the United States, the Court granted the defendant's request and continued the matter to September 21, 2018 at 9:00 a.m.

4. The Court hereby makes the express finding that the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act. Accordingly, for the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of June 22, 2018 through September 21, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.