STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

WILLIAM B. SHUBB, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record Assistant United States Attorney QUINN HOCHHALTER, and the Defendant: LARRY ST. CLAIR by and through his counsel of record TASHA CHALFANT, hereby stipulate and request that the Court make the following findings and Order as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for admit/deny hearing on August 6, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, the defendant now moves to continue the admit/deny hearing until August 13, 2018, and to exclude time between August 6, 2018, and August 13, 2018, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. Defense counsel was just appointed to represent Mr. ST. CLAIR on July 23, 2018. Efforts are being made to speak with the prior defense attorney, his probation officer who is based in Redding, California and obtain the records for the underlying Siskiyou County case. Due to the old age of this case in Siskiyou County and the wildfires in Redding, counsel needs additional time to obtain this information.

b. Counsel for the defendant desires additional time to obtain and review the petition, discovery, consult with her client, discuss potential resolution, and to explain the consequences and guidelines.

c. Counsel for the defendant believes that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny her the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 6, 2018, to August 13, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

All counsel has reviewed this proposed order and authorized Tasha Chalfant to sign it on his/her behalf.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

The Court, having received, read, and considered the stipulation of the parties, and good cause appearing therefrom, adopts the stipulation of the parties in its entirety as its order. Based on the stipulation of the parties and the recitation of facts contained therein, the Court finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting the requested continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

The Court orders that the time from the date of the parties' stipulation, August 6, 2018, to and including August 13, 2018, admit/deny hearing date shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this case must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C §3161(h)(7)(A) and (B) (iv), and Local Code T4 (reasonable time for defense counsel to prepare). It is further ordered that the presently set August 6, 2018, admit/deny hearing shall be continued to August 13, 2018, at 9:00 a.m.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.