STIPULATION TO SET MATTER FOR TRIAL AND REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; [PROPOSED] FINDINGS AND ORDER

GARLAND E. BURRELL, JR., Senior District Judge.

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on August 24, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, defendants Jagpal Singh, Jagdish Singh, Tajinder Singh, Parminder Singh, and Shawana Denise Harris, through their respective counsel of record, and the United States hereby request that his matter be set for a jury trial on April 16, 2019 at 9:00 a.m. with a trial confirmation hearing set for March 1, 2019 at 9:00 a.m., and that the status hearing set for August 24, 2018 be vacated.

3. Further, defendants also move to continue to exclude time between August 24, 2018, and April 16, 2019, under Local Code T4.

4. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a) The United States has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes collectively, investigative reports, electronic discovery obtained from the search of various electronic devices, records from the California Department of Motor Vehicles, and records from telephone providers and banks which is subject to a protective order. To date, the United States has produced over 3,000 pages of documents, as well as over a dozen audio/video recordings, some of which are in a foreign language. The United States continues to investigate the case and will continue to produce discovery up through the trial date.

b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review discovery, including that which will be produced up to the trial date, consult with their respective clients, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial. Counsel also need time to discuss with their clients potential resolution.

c) Further, April 2019 is the first available time when all defense counsel will be available for trial due to their respective pre-existing schedules, including other cases that are already set for trial as well as personal or familial obligations.

d) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence, and would deny each of their clients continuity of counsel.

e) The United States does not object to setting the trial in April 2019.

f) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

g) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of August 24, 2018 to April 16, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

5. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

FINDINGS AND ORDER

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.