JEREMY D. PETERSON, District Judge.
Plaintiff Roderick William Lear, a state prisoner, proceeds without counsel in this civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Four motions are pending before the court: (1) plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order; (2) defendants' motion for summary judgment on failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (3) plaintiff's motion for immediate resolution of all claims and other miscellaneous relief; and (4) plaintiff's motion for an Albino hearing and other miscellaneous relief. (Doc. Nos. 64, 51, 69, 74.) The undersigned recommends that the court deny all four motions for the reasons below.
Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order prohibiting the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") from confiscating his legal materials. (Doc. No. 64, at 1-2.) Here is the entirety of plaintiff's argument in support of his motion:
(Id. at 2.)
The court cannot grant the requested relief. The court lacks the authority to issue an injunctive order when a plaintiff seeks relief unrelated to his claims. See Pac. Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen's Med. Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Price v. City of Stockton, 390 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that courts issue injunctive orders to maintain status quo, not "to enjoin all possible breaches of the law"). Injunctive relief "requires a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself." Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636. The relationship between the two must be "sufficiently strong" such that the injunctive relief "would grant `relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.'" Id. (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945). As the court previously explained (Doc. No. 53, at 3), plaintiff's inability to access to his legal materials is not the subject of his claims: his claims arise from the conduct of medical professionals at Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP"), not his inability to access legal materials. (See Doc. No. 47, at 3-5, 10, 15.) The court should therefore deny plaintiff's motion. See Padilla v. Nevada, No. 08-cv-410, 2011 WL 2746653, at *8 (D. Nev. June 3, 2011) (denying plaintiff's request for preliminary injunction giving him access to legal materials), cited in Pac. Radiation Oncology, 810 F.3d at 636; Rodrigues v. Ryan, No. 16-cv-8272, 2017 WL 5068468, at *1-4 (D. Ariz. ` Nov. 3, 2017), aff'd, 718 F. App'x 577 (9th Cir. 2018).
Even though the court should deny plaintiff's motion, the undersigned is concerned that plaintiff's inability to access legal materials could deny him a fair opportunity to litigate this claims. The undersigned will direct defendants' counsel to serve the litigation coordinator at plaintiff's institution with a copy of these findings and recommendations. The undersigned will also request that the litigation coordinator assist in ensuring that plaintiff has a fair opportunity to access his legal materials. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff proceeds on medical deliberate-indifference claims against defendants Akanno and Palomino under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 47, at 15.) He alleges that Akanno and Palomino knew about plaintiff's serious back and leg pain, trivialized plaintiff's symptoms, failed to offer treatment, interfered with plaintiff's efforts to obtain treatment, and falsified medical records to prevent plaintiff from obtaining treatment. (See id. at 10.) Defendants now move for summary judgment for plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies as to his claim that Palomino falsified his medical records. (Doc. Nos. 51; 51-11, at 1.) They do not move for summary judgment on any other claim.
A district court must grant summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier of fact could find in favor of either party at trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The dispute is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." See id. at 248. The showing required to obtain summary judgment depends on the movant's burden of persuasion at trial: a movant who has that burden must present evidence supporting every element of a claim or defense; the movant without the burden can show that the opponent cannot prove an element of a claim or defense.
Familiar standards govern burden-shifting at the summary judgment stage. See Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 330-31. The movant bears the initial burden of production and must present evidence showing prima facie entitlement to summary judgment. See id. at 331. The burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to produce evidence showing a genuine dispute over a material fact. Id. The movant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. Id. at 330; Friedman, 833 F.3d at 1188).
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Albino v. Baca provides further guidance on summary judgment in the context of the exhaustion requirement set forth in the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"). 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). In Albino, the court of appeals explained that, if feasible, the trial court should decide the exhaustion issue before reaching the merits of a prisoner's claim. Id. at 1170. If necessary, the court may resolve disputed facts relevant to exhaustion in the same way that courts resolve facts for matters of "judicial traffic control"—such as subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, venue, and abstention. See id. at 1170 (quoting Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 741 (7th Cir. 2008)). If a factual finding on a disputed question concerns both exhaustion and the merits, the court's factual finding on exhaustion does not bind the jury. Id. at 1171.
To decide a motion for summary judgment, a district court may consider materials listed in Rule 56(c). Those materials include depositions, documents, electronically-stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations, party admissions, interrogatory answers, "or other materials." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). A party may object that an opponent's evidence ` "cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible" at trial, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2), and the court ordinarily rules on evidentiary objections before deciding a summary judgment motion, to determine which materials the court may consider. See Norse v. City of Santa Cruz, 629 F.3d 966, 973 (9th Cir. 2010); Fonseca v. Sysco Food Servs. of Arizona, Inc., 374 F.3d 840, 845 (9th Cir. 2004). Here, defendants present plaintiff's administrative grievances and his discovery responses. (Doc. Nos. 51-3, 51-4.) No party disputes these materials' admissibility.
The only question here is whether plaintiff has exhausted available administrative remedies for his claim that Palomino, a registered nurse at KVSP, falsified his medical records. Plaintiff contends that Palomino falsified his medical records by writing several false notes:
(Doc. No. 70, at 4-5 (Pl.'s Br.); see also Doc. No. 57, at 86-95 (Palomino's notes).)
The parties agree that plaintiff submitted a grievance (KVSP HC 14035455) on July 22, 2014 about "medical administrative removal of items in file," and that plaintiff has exhausted that grievance by presenting it to all three levels of grievance review. (Doc. No. 51-2, at 2; see also Doc. No. 51-4, at 89.) Plaintiff wrote in the grievance that Akanno, a doctor, had written false statements in his medical file. Plaintiff requested that: (1) "all the statements be removed from [his medical] file"; and (2) "[Akanno] not be allowed to write any further inaccurate stateme ts. . . ." (See Doc. No. 51-4, at 93.) Plaintiff did not mention Palomino in that grievance.
At the first-level review, the reviewer denied plaintiff's first request and stated that the documents in plaintiff's medical file that allegedly contained false statements were "legal documents" and as such could not be removed. (Id. at 93.) The reviewer granted plaintiff's second request and stated that Akanno is not permitted to write inaccurate statements in ` plaintiff's medical file. (Id. at 93-94.) However, the reviewer also noted that there was no evidence of false statements in plaintiff's file. (Id.) The second-level review resulted in the same outcome: plaintiff's requests were granted in part and denied in part for the same reasons as stated at the first-level review, and the reviewer noted that there was "no evidence the documentation in [plaintiff's] chart was falsified." (Doc. 51-4, at 96.) After the second-level review, plaintiff sought third-level review by submitting an appeal form with an attachment. (Id. at 89-92.) Plaintiff wrote in the attachment that "[t]here [was] an on-going issue with KVSP medical falsifying documents, disrespect and abuse of appeal process refusing to investigate and simply supporting [illegible.]" (Id. at 92.)
The third-level review led to a slightly different result. (Doc. No. 51-4, at 87.) As for plaintiff's first request, the reviewer noted that all entries in plaintiff's medical file were permanent and "may not be removed." (Id.) As for the second request, the reviewer wrote, "Your request that Dr. Akanno not be allowed to write any further inaccurate statements . . . is beyond the scope of the appeals process; however, you have not provided documentation to show Dr. Akanno's statements were inaccurate as you have alleged." (Id. at 88.)
Under the PLRA, an inmate who seeks to challenge a prison condition must exhaust available administrative remedies before suing in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. A district court may excuse an inmate's failure to exhaust if he had no administrative remedy available, but apart from this the PLRA recognizes no exception to the exhaustion requirement, and the court may not recognize a new exception, even in "special circumstances." Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1862 (2016). The court must also dismiss any unexhausted claim even if the inmate's complaint contains an exhausted claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007). Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense; defendant must show the availability of administrative remedies and the absence of exhaustion. See Albino, 747 F.3d at 1172.
To make out the affirmative defense, a defendant must first show that an administrative remedy was available. To be available, an administrative remedy must allow an inmate to obtain "some relief for the action complained of," as the word "available" means "`capable of ` use for the accomplishment of a purpose,' and that which `is accessible or may be obtained.'" Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 737-38 (2001)). An administrative remedy is unavailable "when (despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead end—with officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates." Id. Likewise, an administrative remedy is unavailable when "administrative officials have apparent authority, but decline ever to exercise it." Id. Similarly, a remedy is unavailable when the administrative scheme is "so opaque that it becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use." Id. And it is unavailable "when prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Id. at 1860.
Next, a defendant must show the absence of exhaustion. A prison's grievance procedures, not the PLRA, define proper exhaustion, see Jones, 549 U.S. at 218, and in California, the California Code of Regulations govern inmate-grievance procedures, Marella v. Terhune, 568 F.3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2009). The Code provides that an inmate's grievance must list all staff members involved in challenged conduct or provide other information useful in identifying those staff members. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(a)(3). However, an inmate can exhaust an administrative remedy through an inmate grievance despite failing to comply with a procedural rule "if prison officials ignore the procedural problem and render a decision on the merits of the grievance at each available step of the administrative process." Reyes v. Smith, 810 F.3d 654, 658 (9th Cir. 2016) (reversing district court's dismissal of inmate claims for failure to exhaust despite inmate's failure to list all staff members involved). "When prison officials opt not to enforce a procedural rule but instead decide an inmate's grievance on the merits, the purposes of the PLRA exhaustion requirement have been fully served: prison officials have had a fair opportunity to correct any claimed deprivation and an administrative record supporting the prison's decision has been developed." Id. at 658.
Here, defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to exhaust his claim against Palomino for falsifying medical documents because none of plaintiff's grievances list Palomino as a staff member involved in the challenged conduct. The court should deny defendants' motion for ` summary judgment for two reasons. First, defendants have not shown that plaintiff had an administrative remedy available to him for his claim against Palomino. Plaintiff filed a grievance (KVSP HC 14035455) asking that "all false statements" be removed from his medical file, which allegedly precluded adequate medical treatment and led to unnecessary pain for plaintiff. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 31 ¶¶ 118-19.) At each level of grievance review, the reviewer denied plaintiff's request, stating that the statements in the medical file could not be removed. (See Doc. No. 51-4, at 93, 96, 87.) The third-level reviewer noted in passing that, despite the permanence of the challenged documents, plaintiff could submit a request to amend them through a process other than the grievance procedure:
(Doc. No. 51-4, at 87.) Despite the third-level reviewer's statement about a process of amending medical records, defendants rely solely on the inmate-grievance procedure in support of their motions for summary judgment. (See Doc. Nos. 51-1, 51-2, 51-3, 51-4, at 2-6.) Thus, the court need not consider whether the process from the Inmate Medical Services Policies and Procedures, Volume 6, Chapter 45 was available to plaintiff. See California Pac. Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 885 F.3d 560, 570 (9th Cir. 2018) ("Inadequately briefed and perfunctory arguments are . . . waived").
Second, plaintiff's failure to list Palomino as a staff member involved in the challenged conduct does not amount to failure to exhaust because prison officials decided the grievance on the merits, ignoring the procedural defect. See Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658. Prison officials reviewed his medical file at each level of review, understanding his request to be for the removal of "all false statements from [his] file." (See Doc. No. 51-4, at 87, 93, 95.) The record does not state whether prison officials investigated whether Palomino wrote false statements, but it is at least possible that they reviewed her statements, since Palomino wrote her notes before plaintiff filed his grievance.
The grievance reviewers denied plaintiff's request to remove all statements in his medical file not because he had failed to name Palomino in his grievance, but because they found no evidence of false statements and plaintiff could not remove documents from his file. (Id.) What is more, plaintiff wrote in an attachment to his appeal form that "[t]here is an on-going issue with KVSP medical falsifying documents" before appealing to the third-level review. (Doc. No. 51-4, at 91-92.) This attachment introduced another procedural defect, as an inmate cannot raise a new issue in an attachment to an appeal form. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.2(b)(1). Even so, the third-level reviewer denied plaintiff's request on the merits after the review of plaintiff's medical file—overlooking the procedural defects that plaintiff (1) failed to name all staff members and (2) raised a new issue in the midst of the review process. (See Doc. No. 51-4, at 87.) Thus, "prison officials have had a fair opportunity to correct any claimed deprivation and an administrative record supporting the prison's decision has been developed," and plaintiff's claim against Palomino "has already been fully vetted within the ` prison system." See Reyes, 810 F.3d at 658.
The record presents yet another potential reason for denying summary judgment: a possibility that the interviewer for plaintiff's grievance (KVSP HC 14035455) did not properly screen it.
(Doc. 51-4, at 90.) However, whether Chen improperly screened plaintiff's grievance is genuinely disputed: The grievance decisions state that Chen interviewed plaintiff and gave him opportunities to explain his concerns and to provide supporting documents. (See Doc. Nos. 51-4, at 93, 95.) The court need not resolve this factual dispute; as discussed above, there are two other independent grounds for the court to deny defendants' motion for summary judgment.
In sum, defendants have not shown that plaintiff had an administrative remedy available or that he failed to exhaust. The undersigned will recommend that the court deny defendants' motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff filed two motions that require resolution through findings and recommendations. The first requests immediate resolution of all claims, and the second requests an Albino hearing that—according to plaintiff—would affect the court's decision on defendants' summary judgment motion on exhaustion. These types of motions are not included in the list of dispositive motions enumerated in the Federal Magistrates Act, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), but courts have recognized "some judicial functions as dispositive notwithstanding the fact that they do not appear in [§ 636(b)(1)]," and the courts in the Ninth Circuit follow a functional approach that considers "the effect of the motion" to determine whether a motion is dispositive. See Flam v. Flam, 788 F.3d 1043, 1046 (9th Cir. 2015); cf. United States ex rel. Hoggett v. Univ. of Phoenix, 863 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 2017) (noting that a motion's substance, not its label, governs its disposition). Accordingly, since these two motions could have the effect of dismissing the action or a claim, they are considered dispositive, and the undersigned will issue findings of fact and recommendations rather than orders. The undersigned recommends that the court deny both motions for the reasons discussed below.
Plaintiff filed a motion titled, "Plaintiff's request that court order immediate resolution of all claims against defendant Akanno, not consider Akanno in its review of defendants' request to vacate dispositive deadline for its review of Palomino's motions before the court, plaintiff[`]s request [for] trial by jury on all unrelated claims." (Doc. No. 69.) Despite the lengthy caption, the motion makes only two requests: (1) that the court deny defendants' motion to vacate the discovery schedule; and (2) that the court immediately resolve plaintiff's claims. (See id.) As for the first request, the court has already denied that motion (Doc. No. 68, at 6), so plaintiff's request is moot.
As for the second request, plaintiff states, "Defendants can not dispute the fact that Palomino intentionally falsified plaintiff's records to prevent him from receiving medical treatment, caused him to have a botch[ed] surger. . . ." (Doc. No. 69, at 1.) However, plaintiff does not develop this argument or present any supporting evidence, so the court cannot grant summary judgment or make any other ruling in plaintiff's favor. Plaintiff's motion should be denied.
Plaintiff filed a motion titled, "Request for an Albino hearing, court considers all evidence, pretrial conference on all claims concerning M.D. Akanno." (Doc. No. 74.) Again, the motion's caption differs from its substantive requests. In the body of the motion, plaintiff requests:
(See Doc. No. 74.) As for the first request, plaintiff does not explain why he needs a pretrial conference with Akanno or why he would be entitled to one, so he has not stated grounds for the requested relief with particularity, as required under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(b)(1)(B). Plaintiff's second, third, and fourth requests are moot: as discussed above, after considering all arguments and records from all parties, the undersigned has concluded that defendants have not shown entitlement to summary judgment on exhaustion. Additionally, because the analysis above turns on issues of law rather than factual disputes, an Albino hearing—which would resolve factual disputes—is unnecessary.
As for the fifth request, under Rule 15(a), plaintiff is permitted to add new claims arising from the events that occurred before the filing of the original complaint only by amending the complaint.
The undersigned will conclude by addressing two other matters. First, the undersigned will extend the deadline for dispositive motions, which is currently September 3, 2018. (See Doc. No. 68, at 6.) Although this is an older case, this extension is appropriate to allow time for (1) the parties to object to these findings and recommendations, (2) the court to consider the recommendations, and (3) the parties to prepare dispositive motions.
Second, the undersigned is willing to consider recruiting counsel for plaintiff. At least one reviewer of plaintiff's grievance found that plaintiff needed special accommodation for communication and noted that plaintiff had a Reading Grade Point Level below 4.0 for his Test of Adult Basic Education ("TABE"), even though not all reviewers reached the same conclusion.
The undersigned recommends that:
The undersigned submits these findings and recommendations to the U.S. district judge presiding over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 304. Within 14 days of the service of the findings and recommendations, the parties may file written objections to the findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document containing the objections must be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Findings and Recommendations." The presiding district judge will then review the findings and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties' failure to file objections within ` the specified time may waive their rights on appeal. See Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
