STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; FINDINGS AND ORDER

JOHN A. MENDEZ, District Judge.

STIPULATION

Plaintiff United States of America, by and through its counsel of record, and only defendants RAYMOND MORIN and RAUL DIAZ, by and through each counsel of record, hereby stipulate as follows:

1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on October 16, 2018.

2. By this stipulation, the defendants now move to continue the status conference until December 4, 2018, at 9:15 a.m. and to exclude time between October 16, 2018 and December 4, 2018, under Local Code T4. Plaintiff does not oppose this request.

3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:

a. There are approximately 225 pages of reports and several hours of videos that have been provided. Other discovery is in the process of being provided.

b. Counsel for the defendants desire additional time to consult with their respective clients, to review the current charges, to conduct investigation and research related to the charges, to review and copy discovery for this matter, to discuss potential resolutions with their clients, to prepare pretrial motions, and to otherwise prepare for trial.

c. Counsel for the defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.

d. The government does not object to the continuance.

e. Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendants in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.

f. For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of October 12, 2018, and December 4, 2018, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial.

4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.

IT IS SO STIPULATED.

ORDER

UPON GOOD CAUSE SHOWN and the stipulation of the parties, it is ordered that the October 16, 2018, status conference hearing be continued to December 4, 2018, at 9:15 a.m. Based on the representation of defense counsel and good cause appearing therefrom, the Court hereby finds that the failure to grant a continuance in this case would deny defense counsel reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court finds that the ends of justice to be served by granting a continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. It is ordered that time beginning from October 16, 2018, up to and including the December 4, 2018, status conference shall be excluded from computation of time within which the trial of this matter must be commenced under the Speedy Trial Act pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) and (B)(iv) and Local Code T-4, to allow defense counsel reasonable time to prepare.

IT IS SO FOUND AND ORDERED.