STANLEY A. BOONE, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff Israel Howard is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.
Following screening, this case proceeds on Plaintiff's complaint for (1) excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Sergeants Hildebrand and Garza; (2) deliberate indifference to a serious medical need in violation of the Eighth Amendment against Sergeants Hildebrand and Garza, and Officer Marquez; (3) Eighth Amendment unconstitutional conditions of confinement against Sergeant Hildebrand and Officer Marquez; and (4) retaliation in violation of the First Amendment against Sergeant Hildebrand. (ECF No. 1.)
On July 18, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies against them before filing suit. (EFC No. 20.) Defendants also filed a request for judicial notice in support of the motion. (ECF No. 21.)
On July 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss. (EFC No. 22.) On August 6, 2018, Defendants replied to Plaintiff's opposition. (EFC No. 23.)
The motion is now deemed submitted. Local Rule 230(1).
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") of 1996, "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Exhaustion is a mandatory requirement,
As noted above, Plaintiff in this case is a California state prisoner. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation ("CDCR") has an administrative grievance system for prisoner complaints. The CDCR requires a prison inmate to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement by following the procedures set forth in sections 3084.1 through 3084.8 of Title 15 of the California Code of Regulations. An inmate "may appeal any policy, decision, action, condition, or omission by the department or its staff that the inmate . . . can demonstrate as having a material adverse effect upon his or her health, safety, or welfare." Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3084.1(a).
The regulations require the prisoner to proceed through all three levels of review.
California state prisoners are required to use this process to exhaust their claims prior to filing suit.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on the grounds that a complaint "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true.
A claim may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.
The Court accepts Plaintiff's allegations as true for evaluating this motion. The events at issue occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison ("KVSP").
On July 15, 2016, Defendant Hildebrand called Plaintiff to the program office. Plaintiff was placed inside a standing cage, which was inside a room similar to a broom or storage room. Plaintiff was told to enter, and he complied. Once Plaintiff entered, Defendant Hildebrand closed the door and said, "Look, snitch, 3rd level [referring to Sacramento] got your 602. Drop it or sh—t can get real ugly." (Compl. 7.) He then closed the door, leaving Plaintiff in the cage.
Twenty minutes later, Defendant Hildebrand returned with a nurse, who asked Plaintiff if he was having pain from an assault he had reported in March 2016. Plaintiff told the nurse he was, but was okay because that incident was so long ago.
After being threatened and suffering retaliation a few hours prior, Plaintiff was in the D-yard program office cages for a couple of hours, with no access to the restroom. As he stood calling out loudly, Defendant Hildebrand returned. Defendant Hildebrand then cracked the door and sprayed his MK9 Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) pepper spray in the air, saying, "Shut the f—ck up snitch, piss on yourself." (Compl. 5.) Defendant Hildebrand then shut the door. Plaintiff started coughing very hard, and felt a sharp pain in his chest. Plaintiff felt like he was dying. He called out to please get the doctor, "I can't breathe, I'm having an asthma attack!" (
For thirty to forty minutes, Plaintiff could barely stand there, breathless and coughing. Plaintiff urinated on himself, and cried out, "Why are you doing this to me?!" (
After lying helpless with mace covered all over Plaintiff's body, Plaintiff was escorted out of the program office by Defendant Marquez, to go back to his cell. Plaintiff pleaded to "get the doctor, I can't breath[e] or see!" (
While being escorted by Defendant Marquez to Plaintiff's cell, Defendant Hildebrand ordered to "shut off his water." (Compl. 6.) Plaintiff was placed into his cell, and Defendant Marquez did as he was told, and shut off Plaintiff's water, so that he could not wash off the burning mace. Plaintiff had to use toilet water to clean his body, because he had no running water.
On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff received a Rules Violation Report ("RVR") as retaliation to cover Defendant Hildebrand for assaulting Plaintiff. The RVR was for delaying a peace officer. In the trumped-up report, Defendant Hildebrand lies about Plaintiff, and says that Plaintiff was attacking him. If Plaintiff was attacking a sergeant, he would not have been allowed to return to his cell, but would have been charged with battery on a peace officer, or threatening a peace officer, as mandated in Title 15.
In Plaintiff's complaint, he checked boxes indicating that there is an administrative appeal or administrative remedy process available at the institution, that he filed an appeal or grievance, and that the process is completed. (Compl. 2.) He further alleged that the appeal was partially granted because an appeal inquiry was made and his issues were adequately addressed. (
Defendants argue that, contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, Plaintiff did not receive a third level decision on his inmate appeal, and therefore he has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies prior to filing suit. In support, Defendants submit documents for Appeal Log No. KVSP-O-16-02506, which the Court can consider on a motion to dismiss because the appeal is referenced in the complaint. (ECF No. 21.)
According to the documents submitted with Defendants' request for judicial notice, Plaintiff submitted a CDCR Form 602 inmate appeal, dated August 9, 2016, regarding an incident of excessive force. (Appeal No. KVSP O-16-02506, ECF No. 21-1, at 3-6.) The document states that it was Plaintiff's second submittal regarding an incident that happened on July 15, 2016. (
Plaintiff's CDCR Form 602 generally describes a July 15, 2016 incident involving Defendants Hildebrand and Garza, as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. (Appeal No. KVSP O-16-02506, at 3, 5.) Although Defendant Marquez is not identified, Plaintiff also states that his water was shut off when he was returned to his cell so that he could not wash mace off his body, similar to what Plaintiff alleges in the complaint. (
A second level response was given to Plaintiff in a memorandum dated October 4, 2016. (10/4/16 Mem., ECF No. 21-1, at 7-8.) The response states that the appeal was processed, and that an inquiry was conducted into Plaintiff's allegations, including interviews with witnesses. (Id.) Plaintiff's appeal was therefore partially granted, in that an inquiry was completed, but it was found that staff did not violate CDCR policy. (Id.) The appeal further states that if Plaintiff wishes to "appeal the decision and/or exhaust administrative remedies, [he] must submit [his] staff complaint appeal through all levels of appeal review up to, and including, the Secretary's Third Level of Review." (
On November 29, 2016, the Office of Appeal sent Plaintiff a letter stating that his appeal was rejected at the third level, pursuant to CCR Title 15, Section 3084.6(b)(7). (11/29/2016 Letter, ECF No. 21-1, at 2.) The letter further stated that Plaintiff's appeal was missing documents, and that he should take corrective action and resubmit the appeal. (
Plaintiff does not dispute the documents submitted, but instead argues that he is not required to appeal through the third level because he received the full extent of relief available under the administrative system at the second level. In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's appeal was only partially granted, and therefore his appeal must have been submitted and accepted for decision at the third level of review before his claim would be deemed exhausted.
The Ninth Circuit has held that an administrative remedy is not available if prison officials inform the prisoner that he cannot file a grievance.
In
In contrast to inmate Brown, Plaintiff in this case was notified through the second level response letter of the inquiry that was made, the interviews conducted and witnesses questioned, and advised of the outcome—that staff was found not to violate CDCR policy. The response also specifically advised Plaintiff that he could appeal the decision to the third level if he was dissatisfied with the outcome, and that he must do so to exhaust his administrative remedies.
The Ninth Circuit addressed a second case in
Based on the foregoing, it is clear from the face of the complaint, and the documents incorporated by reference, that Plaintiff failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for the claims brought in this action. Therefore, his claims must be dismissed, without prejudice.
Accordingly, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss, filed on July 18, 2018 (ECF No. 20), be granted on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust available administrative remedies; and
2. This action should be dismissed, without prejudice.
These Findings and Recommendations will be submitted to the United States District Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
IT IS SO ORDERED.