JENNIFER L. THURSTON, Magistrate Judge.
On December 21, 2018, Defendant filed a stipulation for an extension of thirty-five days to respond to Plaintiff's opening brief. (Doc. 16) The Scheduling Order allows for a single extension of thirty days by the stipulation of the parties (Doc. 5-1 at 4), which was previously used by Plaintiff in this action. (Docs. 13, 14)
Beyond the single extension by stipulation, "requests to modify [the scheduling] order must be made by written motion and will be granted only for good cause." (Doc. 5 at 4) Accordingly, the Court construes the stipulation of the parties to be a motion to amend the Scheduling Order. Defendant asserts the additional extension is necessary, reporting: "Since the filing of Plaintiff's opening brief, Defendant's counsel has been addressing a full workload and backlog of district court cases and other matters, after recovering from sickness that caused her to be incapacitated and unable to work for multiple days." (Doc. 16 at 1) Though Defendant's counsel is working to "have some of her cases reassigned to avoid further delay of her cases, she still needs additional time to fully review the record and research the issues presented by Plaintiff's opening brief in this case." (Id. at 2) In addition, counsel reports that she "will be out of the office briefly to spend pre-arranged travel plans with family during the holidays." (Id.) Plaintiff does not oppose the request for a further extension, and it does not appear Plaintiff would suffer any prejudice through the delay.
Based upon the stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing, the Court