Filed: Dec. 29, 2018
Latest Update: Dec. 29, 2018
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 13, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 14, 2019, and to exclude time between December 13, 2018, and February 14, 2019, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The
Summary: STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR. , District Judge . STIPULATION 1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 13, 2018. 2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 14, 2019, and to exclude time between December 13, 2018, and February 14, 2019, under Local Code T4. 3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following: a) The g..
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STIPULATION REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIODS UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT; ORDER
MORRISON C. ENGLAND, JR., District Judge.
STIPULATION
1. By previous order, this matter was set for status on December 13, 2018.
2. By this stipulation, defendants now move to continue the status conference until February 14, 2019, and to exclude time between December 13, 2018, and February 14, 2019, under Local Code T4.
3. The parties agree and stipulate, and request that the Court find the following:
a) The government has represented that the discovery associated with this case includes approximately 21,650 pages, which has been produced on a rolling basis to the defense counsel.
b) Counsel for defendants desire additional time to review this discovery, consult with their clients, conduct additional investigation and research into this case in light of that discovery and consultation, and to otherwise prepare for trial.
c) Counsel for defendants believe that failure to grant the above-requested continuance would deny them the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence.
d) The government does not object to the continuance.
e) Based on the above-stated findings, the ends of justice served by continuing the case as requested outweigh the interest of the public and the defendant in a trial within the original date prescribed by the Speedy Trial Act.
f) For the purpose of computing time under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq., within which trial must commence, the time period of December 13, 2018 to February 14, 2019, inclusive, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C.§ 3161(h)(7)(A), B(iv) [Local Code T4] because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendant's request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.
4. Nothing in this stipulation and order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excludable from the period within which a trial must commence.
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
ORDER
IT IS SO ORDERED.
